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AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE: THE SINGULAR CASE OF UNDERHILL MOORE*
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL**
Toto, somehow I don't think
we're in Kansas any more.
INTRODUCTIONt
As a coherent intellectual force in American legal thought
American Legal Realism simply ran itself into the sand.1 If proof
of this assertion be needed one has only to ask a group of law
* Copyright 0 1981, John Henry Schlegel. Research for this article was supported by a
Faculty Research Fellowship and Grant-in-Aid from the Research Foundation of the State
University of New York. I am grateful to the late Robert M. Hutchins, David Kammerman,
Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, the late Mark May, Jane Moore, the late Donald Slessinger and
the late Dorothy Swain Thomas for granting me interviews with respect to the subject of
this article; to Gilbert Sussman, Esq., for his extensive taped recollections; to Allan Axelrod,
Grant Gilmore, and Friederick Kessler for having taken the time to supply interesting
answers to my open-ended questions; to Arthur Charpentier of the Yale Law School Library
and his staff; Judith Schiff and Patricia Bodak of the Department of Archives and Records,
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University and the staff there; the staff of the Rare Book
and Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University; Albert Tannler of the
University Archives, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, and his staff; Kathryn
Jacob, archivist, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University; Donald D.
Marks, and Steve Masar, University Archivists, Memorial Library, The University of
Wisconsin; and John M. Nugent, University Archivist, Kenneth Spencer Research Library,
University of Kansas for their kind assistance in my research and their attempts to make
my research both easier and more fruitful; to Jane Moore for permission to use the papers
of W. Underhill Moore; to Emma Corstvet Llewellyn for copies of documents she saved
from her years at Yale; to Harry Wellington, Dean, Yale Law School, for persmission to use
the minutes of the Yale Law School; and to Bliss, Bob, Tom, Jack, Al, Fred, Janet, and
Tom, each of whom took the time to read and comment, often copiously, on previous drafts
of this manuscript.
** b. 1942. A.B. 1964, Northwestern; J.D. 1967, Chicago. Private practice 1968, Chicago.
Teaching fellow 1967, Stanford; Ass't. Prof. 1973, Assoc. Prof. 1978, Prof. 1979, SUNY/
Buffalo.
t This is the second part in a series of articles intended to explore American Legal Real-
ism, its foundation, development, demise and legacy. This introduction is, in part, repeated
to give the new reader a sense of the overall project, see note 13 infra, and, in part, because
we all liked it so well. See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science:
From the Yale Experience, 28 BuFFALo L. Rlv. 459. The Editors.
1. Prof. Duncan Kennedy supplied me with this felicitous image of the decline of
Realism.
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school faculty members what American Legal Realism was and
what it accomplished. If one gets any but the most cursory of re-
sponses, the answers will range from "a naive attempt to do empir-
ical social science that floundered because of its crude empiricism,"
through "a movement in jurisprudence that quickly played itself
out because it really had no technical competence and little to
say," to "a group of scholars who did much to destroy the 19th
Century doctrinal universe but left nothing in its place."'2 Each of
these answers is both wrong and essentially partial. The answers
are wrong in that first, the Realists' social scientific research died
out because of the impermanence of the institutionalized circum-
stances under which it was undertaken, the peculiarities of the per-
sonalities of the leaders of the undertaking, and the difficulties in
matching the impulse to do such research with the social science of
the time; second, their jurisprudential activities gave out when,
faced with the implications of their own constructions, the protag-
onists lost their nerve; and third, their destruction of the 19th Cen-
tury legal universe left behind enduring achievements in commer-
cial law, corporations, and procedure that point toward the largely
legislative legal universe in which we live.3 The answers are notably
partial in that they ignore, if not suppress, both the political coher-
ence of the movoment and the more directly political activities of
many of its key members, as well as the extent to which it re-
flected, albeit belatedly, similar movements in American academic
thought generally-the rise of the social sciences,4 the destruction
2. I see no reason to document these attitudes towards Realism in great detail for they
are ubiquitous. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961) ex-
presses all of them, but especially the third; Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research
Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL Enuc. 399, 400-01 (1956) expresses the first with his usual degree
of overstatement; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132-44 (1961) expresses the second
with some reserve; H. REUsCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE: ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS (1951) is an
unusually vituperative presentation of all three; Annual Report of the Dean of Yale Law
School to the President and Fellows of Yale University 1977-78, pp. 1-2 (1978) is a particu-
larly silly, though thoroughly contemporary, example.
3. I do not wish to document these assertions here; the series of articles that I plan to
write, of which this is the second, will provide all the necessary documentation. See note 13
infra.
4. See generally, M. FURNER, ADvOcACY AND OBEcTIVITY A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONAL-
IzATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 1865-1905 (1975); T. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF
PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE AssOCIATION AND THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF ATHoRrrY (1977); Oberschall, The Institutionalization of Amer-
ican Sociology; in TIM ESTABLISHMENT OF EMPIRICAL SOCIOLOGY 187 (A. Oberschall ed.
1972). See also F. MATTHEws, QUEST FOR AN AMmCAN SOCIOLOGY: ROBERT E. PARK AND THE
196 [Vol. 29
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of the general formalist universe,5 and the decline of "pragmatic"
political and social thought.'
Given these deficiencies in the common legal understanding of
the Realist movement, it is at least curious that each partial under-
standing is invariably accompanied by the implicit, fatherly asser-
tion, "We are all realists now; don't worry about these questions."
While one may speak prose without knowing it, and similarly put
forth ideas without knowing their lineage, it is more difficult to
have learned a lesson-to no longer be that young and foolish, but
rather to have grown up, as it were-without having a rudimentary
understanding of the something about which the lesson was
learned. No less curious is the fact that historians, who have gener-
ally paid little attention to narrowly legal matters, have better un-
derstood the movement. Not only have they pointed out the previ-
ously enumerated similarities between Realism and other intel-
lectual movements in the twenties and thirties, but also they have
explicitly noted that the intellectual roots of the movement can be
found in the progressive politics of the pre-war period.7
These twin curiousities-the failure of understanding of the
lawyers and the relative success of the historians-can be ex-
plained, in part, if one recognizes that the common understandings
of Realism are both a part and a product of the intellectual world
of its successors, either the more conservative harvardian ones or
the less conservative las-dougalian ones. For the harvardians, dep-
rivation of the certainty of doctrine by the destruction of the for-
malist universe and of the certainty of fact by the failure of empir-
ical social science provided the justification for seeking legitimacy
in orderly process;8 for the las-dougalians the same two depriva-
tions provided the justification for seeking legitimacy in a policy
analysis based on assertedly democratic values and the soft facts of
CHICAGO SCHOOL (1977).
5. See generally M. Wm, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FOR-
MALISM (1947).
6. See generally E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURAL-
ISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
7. See generally 0. GRAHAM, AN ENCORE FOR REFORM (1967).
8. Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 DAEDALUS 119, 123 &
n. 26 (1974) provides a general list of the members of this school although I do not agree
with all his choices. The classic work is H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (1958).
1980]
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experts' opinions.9 And for both groups, the failure of Realist juris-
prudence provided the occasion for their theorizing. Given the
heavy stake of the successors of Realism in a particular under-
standing of that movement, and their near total success in domi-
nating post-Realist legal theory in America, it is not surprising
that the understanding of the movement necessary to post-Realist
theorizing is the understanding generally held in the legal commu-
nity. Nor is it surprising that the historians who have a less imme-
diate stake in the fortunes of post-Realist theory have managed to
understand the movement more fully.
To know that the intellectual world of the successors of Real-
ism has shaped our understanding of that movement is not to
know how to respond to that insight, however. And how to respond
is an important question, for it has become an increasingly perva-
sive perception that post-Realist legal theory has about run its
course headlong into a dead end. The harvardian search for legiti-
macy in orderly process has not succeeded in avoiding troublesome
questions of value, including those raised by the process itself, any-
more than the formalist universe had or empirical social science
was thought capable of.10 The las-dougalian search for legitimacy
in policy analysis has not succeeded in avoiding troublesome ques-
tions about the source and beneficiaries of the values assumed and
the independence of the experts' opinions from those values. And
so, the question of whose values legal rules serve, a question high-
lighted in the Realist's destruction of the formalist universe and in
their attempts at legislative law-making, and believed to have been
put to rest by post-Realist legal thought, has re-emerged, exactly
where it was found forty years ago.
One might respond to the "dead end" feeling accompanying
this reemergence in several different ways.1" One which comes im-
9. Here the classic works are H. LAsswELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAME-
WORK FOR POLmCAL INQUIRY (1950) and Lasswell & MacDougal, Legal Education and Pub-
lic Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
10. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1959) makes the deficiencies obvious even as it attempts to argue for the primacy of
"process."
11. One might simply ignore the feeling and build a castle at the dead end as does B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONsTrr='ON (1977). Ackerman, who from his foot-
notes, though not his other writing, seems to answer the question "What was American
Legal Realism and what did it accomplish?" with an "American Legal Who?", seems to be
struggling to reunite harvardian and las-dougalian thought by stiffening orderly process
with a spine of formalist welfare economics and wrapping up the result in the banner of
[Vol. 29
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mediately to mind, because of its current popularity, is to attempt
to return to the mainstream of European, specifically continental
European, social thought after close to 200 years of largely ignoring
that intellectual force.12 However, the juxtaposition of the feeling
of being at a dead end and the knowledge that the intellectual
world of the successors of Realism has shaped our understanding
of that movement in such a way as to suggest that, "We might not
all be Realists now," counsels a second, though related, enterprise.
One might attempt to recover an understanding of what Realism
was and how and why it ran itself into the sand. Such an endeavor
could be undertaken in order both to learn what went wrong, if
anything, in that particular revolt against legal orthodoxy and to
regain the mainstream of American legal thought at some point
before it turned into its present dead end, all in the hope if not to
learn from the mistakes of the past, at least to better understand
the way in which the choices of the past inform the world, and
thus the options, of the present.
What follows is the second installment of an attempt to un-
dertake the second enterprise and thus recover an understanding
of what Realism was.13 It is another excursion into why and how
scientific policymaking. The echo of Langdell in this use of science is surely no accident, any
more than is the echo of las-dougalian assertedly democratic values. See, e.g., id. at 229 n.3.
Of course, Ackerman is not the only contemporary practitioner of the castle builder's art.
See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (2d ed. 1977).
12. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITIs (1975); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY
(1976) is the best known of such attempts but others exist, for example, Balbus, Commodity
Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 11 L. & Soc'Y Rv.
571 (1977) (marxist); Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of
a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 M[N. L. REv. 601 (1977) (existential marxist); Katz,
Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L.
REv. 383 (1979) (structuralist).
13. The following outline of the entire project as presently conceived may present a
better sense of the relationship of part to whole, and of the significance of this part:
L The Intellectual Roots of Realism
H. Realism and Empirical Social Science
A. The Yale Experience
B. The Singular Case of Underhill Moore
C. The Johns Hopkins Institute of Law
m. Realism and the Politics of Law Reform
A. Economic Life and the New Deal
B. The Reform of Federal Procedure
C. The Belated Reform of Commercial Law
IV. The Implicit Jurisprudence of Realism
V. The Intellectual Legacy of Realism
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empirical legal research came to be done by one of the Realists at
Yale and how it then died out.14 This excursion builds on an earlier
examination of the empirical legal research engaged in by two of
the Realists at Yale, Charles E. Clark and William 0. Douglas. 15
That examination disclosed several tensions between the impulse
to do empirical research, growing out of the "progressive law re-
form tradition," and the means chosen to execute the research,
growing out of the "emerging social science tradition." These ten-
sions, it was argued, together with "accidents" such as the onset of
the depression and the character of the leadership of Deans
Hutchins and Clark during the period when the research was done
were accountable for the decline of empirical legal research at
Yale. This explanation, however, ignores the possibility that a re-
searcher who combined "reform" and "science" in different pro-
portions would encounter different problems attempting to sustain
his research over a period of time. Examination of the course of
that individual's research could thus provide a salutory check on
the initial understanding of the decline of empirical legal research
at Yale, based as it was solely on the work of Clark and Douglas.
Such a check is found by looking at the work of Underhill Moore.
Of all the Realists at Yale, Moore was the one most attracted to
empirical social science and least tempted to side track his scien-
tific enterprise in a more direct pursuit of reform through more
overtly political activities." How Moore became so singlemindedly
The reason for beginning this study anywhere other than at the beginning is found in the
pressures of the tenure process; because of the vagaries of research this is the second part of
the study to be completed and rather than perish ....
14. This aspect of Realism is inadequately treated in both of the major reconsiderations
of the movement to date. W. RumaLa, AMImcAN LEo REALISM (1968); W. TWINING, KARL
L WELLYN AND Tm REniSr MovE wmr (1973). The same is true of G. TARELLO, IL REAL-
ismo Gummo AimmcAo (1962). Bechtler, American Legal Realism Revaluated in LAW IN
A SOCIAL CoNrEx. LINER AwcoRUm HONOURING PROFESSOR LON L. FULLER 1 (T. Bechtler,
ed. 1978) does a slightly better job on this as on almost every aspect of Realism.
15. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale
Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. Rav. 459 (1979).
16. Northrup, Underhill Moore's Legal Science: Its Nature and Significance, 59 YALE
L.J. 196 (1950) is the only substantial study of Moore's work as a whole. Although the au-
thor was a personal friend of Moore, I have found the article singularly unhelpful, largely
because it reflects Northrup's preoccupation with certain issues in the philosophy of science
that do not seem to have troubled Moore more than incidentally. See note 409 infra. Two
works touch one or the other of Moore's two major research projects. Moskowitz, The Amer-
ican Legal Realists and an Empirical Science of Law, 11 VIL. L. Rav. 480, 490-97, 509-13
(1966), discusses Moore's banking research. This article accurately portrays Moore's work
200 [Vol. 29
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dedicated to his vision of what legal research should be17 and what
that dedication produced in terms of empirical research in law are
the questions addressed below. A search for an answer to the
"how" question may conveniently begin with Moore's return to the
Columbia Law School from a sabbatical semester in France, where
he studied French banking practice, lectured on American banking
law and, most important, read and wrote.
I. FROM COLUMBIA TO YALE
It's my life's work...
and it's all wrong.
In 1923 John Henry Wigmore s and his philosophical sidekick,
but suffers by being largely trapped in the RealiSm debates of the post-war period and thus
misses the anthropological roots of Moore's theorizing which would make sense out of what
Moskowitz sees as an inadequate explanation of a theory of judicial decision-making.
Verdon-Jones & Cousineau, The Voice Crying in the Wilderness: Underhill Moore as a
Pioneer in the Establishment of an Interdisciplinary Jurisprudence, 1 INT. J. OF L. &
PSYCH. 375 (1978), which was brought to my attention only after this work was completed,
discusses Moore's parking and traffic studies. It is the first article I have seen that appreci-
ates the significance of Moore's work. However, it is mistaken in seeing a continuity to
Moore's interest in behaviorial psychology as opposed to behaviorial social science generally.
By ignoring his interest in anthropological explanations it thus levels criticisms of Moore's
work that might be altered had the course of that work been known in more detail. At the
same time, its explanation for the disappearance of Moore's work in the years after the war
seems quite correct.
17. Moore's singleminded dedication is the source of some colorful, if doubtfully accu-
rate stories. The two most famous are the one about Moore "pulling drawers from his filing
cabinets and dumping the contents into waste baskets" while explaining" 'It's my life work
.... all the notes I have taken in a lifetime of research-and it's all wrong,"' enshrined in
FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW COLUMBIA
UNrvsRsrry 251 (1955), and the one about him sitting dressed in shorts on a camp stool in
front of the New Haven's old Hotel Taft and when questibned as to what he was doing
responding "Don't bother me. Can't you see I'm busy counting these cars?" enshrined in
Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 4 and Clark, Underhill Moore, 59 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1950). The
first is demonstrably wrong; Moore's annotations of American negotiable instruments cases
survive with his papers at Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University. The second, which to
my ear bears the tell tale signs of Thurman Arnold's authorship, is likely untrue except in
Clark's limited version which omits implicit reference to the season of the year; work near
the Hotel Taft was primarily done in December and January, indeed only three days of
observation were conducted other than in late fall or winter. True or not, however, the sto-
ries do capture the common understanding of Moore among academic lawyers; the man was
thought slightly mad.
18. b. 1863. A.B. 1883, LL.B. 1887, Harvard. Private practice, 1887, Boston. Prof. 1889,
Keio Univ., Tokyo, Japan; prof. 1893, dean 1901, Northwestern. His most famous work is A
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1904-05). d. 1943. W.
ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR & REFORMER (1977), though wholly inadequate to
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Albert Kocourek,19 edited a rather commonplace book called The
Rational Basis of Legal Institutions as part of the Modern Legal
Philosophy Series. The series was primarily designed to make con-
temporary European legal philosophy available in translation to
the American academic legal community,20 and Wigmore's book
was intended to be a representative compendium of post hoc justi-
fications by various scholars of existing legal "institu-
tions"-liberty, property, succession, the family and punishment.21
Although the collection was a useful one at this time when many
parts of the legal profession thought it sufficient justification for a
legal rule that it existed, the volume itself was of limited import.
As the essays were largely Anglo-American and no more than
twenty years old, the book was a monument to the relative poverty
of recent jurisprudential thinking. It was an example of rational
thought about legal institutions only in the sense that any product
of sustained thought without extensive regard to the plausibility of
its factual premises was rational. Therefore, given the limited in-
tentions of the editors, Col. Wigmore22 might well have been sur-
prised when the publication of his little book provoked an abso-
its task, is the only full length biography.
19. b. 1875. LL.B. 1897, Michigan. Private practice, 1897, Chicago. Lecturer (part-time)
1907, prof. 1914, Northwestern. His major publication is the now forgotten JURAL RELATIONS
(1927). d. 1952.
20. The series was the brainchild of Wigmore, Roscoe Pound, Ernst Freund, and C.H.
Huberich who convinced the Association of American Law Schools to provide editorial di-
rection to a project already begun by Wigmore's publisher. They justified the project on the
basis of the profession's being "almost wholely [sic] untrained in the technique of legal anal-
ysis and legal science in general" such as would be needed in the coming "period of con-
structive readjustment and restatement of our law." ASsOCIATION OF AmERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS, [1910] HANDBOOK AND PaocmrNiGs 49 [hereinafter cited as A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK,
without cross-reference]. Four years later the publisher was complaining that only one third
of the Association's member schools were subscribers. [1914] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 8. Ten
years later when the last book in the series was published the same lament could still be
heard. [1925] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 90. Moore once owned a subscription to the series, but
later sold the rights to it to a local Madison, Wisconsin book dealer. Boston Book Co. to
Underhill Moore, Oct. 2, 1911; Underhill Moore to Boston Book Co., Apr. 20, 1915 (on file in
the Underhill Moore papers at Butler Library, Columbia University) [hereinafter cited as
Moore papers, Columbia, without cross-reference].
21. THE RATIONAL BAsIs OF LEGAL INSITrUTONS XX-XXvii (J. Wigmore & A. Kocourek
eds. 1923).
22. Wigmore had been a colonel in the United States Army during World War I. Al-
though he served only in Washington on selective service and other manpower problems
during the war, he continued to serve in the reserve forces and liked the title which fit his
military bearing and so was known generally as Col. Wigmore. See W. RoALE, supra note
18, at 120-43.
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lutely vicious attack from W. Underhill Moore,23 a respected
scholar in the field of negotiable instruments who had almost never
before said anything in print on any subject outside the bounds of
commercial law.2 ' Perversely, in reviewing the book at length,
Moore ignored its manifest content but took its title at face value.
He thus observed that legal institutions were only patterns of ha-
bitual human behavior, the rationality of which depended on the
ends to which the behavior was a means.2 Quickly disposing of
historical inquiry into ends as largely valueless and of a more phil-
osophical inquiry into ends based on "human nature" as flimsy
speculation, he suggested that the rationality of legal institutions
was an unsolvable, non-problem. What was a problem to Moore
was, "What are means to legal institutions and to what proximate
ends are legal institutions means? Concretely, of what facts are
group habits consequences and what are the consequences of group
habits? ' 26 He then reasoned that solution to the problem would lie
in "the direction of detailed observation and systematic experi-
ment" into the psychology of "habit formation, stabilization, mod-
ification, and obliteration," the limitations on habitual behavior re-
sulting from biological and social inheritance, and the impact on
habitual behavior of changes in material and non-material cul-
ture.27 He also suggested the importance of examining "the availa-
ble means to experimentation" in the modification of group habits,
that is, "the legislative power of the government," and "current
experiments," such as collective bargaining, public utility rate reg-
ulation, and minimum wages for women, in the exercise of that
power.28 Finding in Wigmore's book few examples of the inquiry he
proposed, Moore then proceeded to bitterly slash at what was
presented for missing the point, only to give up before reaching the
end in a "spirit of weariness" with the entire enterprise that he
was criticizing.2 9
23. b. 1879. A.B. 1900, A.M. 1901, LL.B. 1902, Columbia. Private practice, 1902, New
York City. Prof. 1906, Kansas; ast. prof. 1908, assoc. prof. 190 , prof. 1910, Wisconsin; prof.
1914, Chicago; prof. 1916, Columbia; prof. 1929, Yale. d. 1949.
24. Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. Rv. 609 (1923) [herein-
after cited as Rational Basis].
25. Id. at 609-10.
26. Id. at 612.
27. Id. at 612-14.
28. Id. at 615.
29. Id. at 617.
19801
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The combination of social science, especially behavioral psy-
chology and cultural anthropology, and pragmatism in Moore's
presentation is striking especially in the context of the dry pages of
the 1923 Columbia Law Review.30 Surely others were struck by it,
if Col. Wigmore was not. However, the ideas were apparently not
brand new to Moore; his friends and acquaintances seemingly took
his review in stride. Orrin K. McMurray, a visitor at the Columbia
Law School just before Moore's sabbatical, expressed sympathy
with the general attitude but wanted the criticisms more pointed;31
John Dewey, also a member of the Columbia faculty, expressed
"pity for poor Wigmore" and "delight" at the "lucidity of thought
and statement."32 But if on the basis of the program set forth in
Moore's review anyone expected a dramatic flurry of activity, such
a person would be sadly disappointed because, for the time being,
Moore did little on any projects. He continued to collect materials
on the operation of commercial checking accounts and loan mecha-
nisms, as he had done for several years, but his effort was half
hearted. Moore was pnhappy.
The apparent reason for his unhappiness was the present con-
dition and future prospects of his law school. Moore had been
brought to Columbia in 1916 as part of a general attempt to im-
prove the law school after its relative decline around the turn of
the century as a result of both ineffective leadership and a series of
appointments that were notable largely for the paucity of scholar-
ship and the only occasionally better teaching by the appointees.33
The key to this largely successful advance was the law school's new
dean, Harlan F. Stone, 4 a former law school instructor and friend
30. See text at notes 253-57, infra.
31. Orrin K. McMurray to Underhill Moore, Sept. 28, 1923, (on file in the Underhill
Moore papers at Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University) [hereinafter cited as Moore
papers, Yale, without cross-reference].
32. John Dewey to Underhill Moore, Nov. 13, 1924, Moore papers, Yale.
33. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, does not explicitly
agree with this assessment, but it characterizes the term of the previous dean, George W.
Kirchwey, as "rather barren of positive achievement." Id. at 191. Its recounting of the ca-
reers of the faculty members hired in the years before Kirchwey's resignation in 1909, and
its view of Kirchwey's successor, Harlan F. Stone, as the creator of the "modern law school,"
id. at 214, all suggest that the characterization is correct.
34. b. 1872. B.S. 1894, Amherst; LL.B. Columbia, 1898. Private practice, 1898, New
York City. Lecturer (part-time), 1899, adjunct prof. 1903-05, dean 1910, Columbia. Attorney
General of the United States, 1924; Justice of Supreme Court of United States, 1925, Chief
Justice, 1941. d. 1946. The standard biography is A. MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR
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of Moore's. Among Stone's additions to the faculty were Thomas
Reed Powell, 5 with whom Moore immediately made friends, and
Walter Wheeler Cook 8 and Herman Oliphant,87 friends and col-
leagues of Moore's from Chicago. Then, just as things had gotten
going, Cook left for Yale," Powell, for Harvard ultimately,3 9 and
Stone, who resigned the deanship under pressure from the Univer-
sity's president, Nicholas Murray Butler,4 ° for private practice. 1
The remaining friend, Oliphant, had finished a clear second to
Young B. Smith in a fight to succeed Stone42 that was so very divi-
sive that the law school faculty's inability to agree on a successor
allowed the choice to fall to President Butler. Butler, finding that
his two wholly unrealistic but preferred candidates48 were unavail-
able, chose compromise by selecting Huger W. Jervey," a faculty
OF THE LAw (1956).
35. b. 1880. A.B. 1900, Vermont; LL.B. 1904, Harvard; Ph.D. 1913, Columbia. Private
practice, 1904-06, Vermont. Lecturer (pol. sci.) 1907, Columbia; assoc. (pol. sci.) 1908-10,
Illinois, lecturer (pol. sci.) 1911, (law), 1912, assoc. prof. 1913, prof. 1920, Columbia; prof.
1925, Harvard. d. 1955.
36. b. 1873. B.A. 1894, LL.M. 1901, Columbia. Inst. 1901, asst. prof. 1902, prof. 1903,
Nebraska; prof. 1904, Missouri; prof. 1906, Wisconsin; prof. 1910, Chicago;- prof. 1916, Yale;
prof. 1919, Columbia; prof. 1922, Yale; prof. 1926, Johns Hopkins; prof. 1935, Northwestern.
Tan LOGICAL AND LEGAL BAsES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1942) is his best known work. d.
1943. See W. TwiNING, supra note 14, at 38-39.
37. b. 1884. B.A. 1907, Marion Normal; A.B. 1909, Indiana Univ.; LL.B. 1914, Chicago.
Inst. (English) 1907-11, Marion Normal; inst. (commercial law) 1914, asst. prof. (commercial
law) 1915, lecturer (law school) 1914, asst. prof. 1916, assoc. prof. 1917, prof. 1919, Chicago;
prof. 1922, Columbia; prof. 1928, Johns Hopkins. General counsel, United States Treasury
Department, 1934. d. 1939. See Pollak, Memorial of Herman Oliphant, [1939] AsSN. OF BAR
OF CITY OF N.Y. Y.B. 432. Oliphant was a bit of a wild man who drove a yellow Stutz Bear-
cat. Interview with Jane Moore, May 18, 1976.
38. Up until his experience at the Institute of Law at Johns Hopkins and his difficulties
in finding a job in the middle of the depression when the Institute folded, Cook was con-
stantly on the nmove in search of a better place and a higher salary. See FOUNDATION FOR
RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 263-64.
39. Powell first took a visiting appointment at the University of California for the year
1923-24.
40. There is a capsule biography of Butler in A. MARRIN, NICHOLAS MURRAY BuTLER 13-
52 (1976).
41. See FOUNDATION FOR RESEACH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 272-74. The
two gentlemen had been at odds for nearly fifteen years. Id. at 217, 466-67 n.55, 468-69 n.67.
42. See Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Feb. 23, 1923 (vigorous dissent by minor-
ity), Mar. 23, 1923, Apr. 6, 1923 (two or three oppose Smith), Moore papers, Yale.
43. Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Apr. 23, 1923, (Butler favors Dwight Morrow
or Benjamin N. Cardozo) Moore papers, Yale.
44. b. 1878. B.A. 1900, MA. 1901, University of the South; LL.B. 1913, Columbia. Pri-
vate practice, 1913, New York City. Prof. (Greek) 1902-09, University of the South; assoc.
prof. (part-time) 1923, prof. 1924, Columbia. d. 1949.
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member with one year's part-time experience, who was notable
only for being a partner in Stone's law firm. The combination of
these departures and concern about the future of the school given
the general support in the faculty for Smith, a person whom Moore
thought to be wholly unsuited for the deanship, was sufficiently
disheartening that Moore considered leaving Columbia.45 While
pondering this possibility, Moore, one of the highest paid members
of the entire Columbia faculty,4 put his time and effort into his
consulting practice (most notably a study of the cement industry
for the industry trade association)47 and used the income to send
his children to good, private schools.48
Curiously, Moore's indecision about leaving Columbia was in
part related by the most unlikely of routes to his unhappiness with
the law school's present and future. In 1922 President Butler pub-
licly criticized law schools for their failure to engage in "searching
criticism" of their "program of study" and "methods of instruc-
tion.' 9 In response, Stone, who had been indirectly, though
sharply, criticized at the same time, appointed a curriculum com-
mittee, consisting of himself, Moore, Oliphant, Smith and T. R.
Powell, that began a survey of Columbia's course offerings for their
formal coherence.50 The survey apparently led to nothing in partic-
ular, what with the fight over Stone's successor that erupted four
months later. But the following fall, while the outcome of the
deanship fight was still in doubt, Butler let it be known that he
45. Underhill Moore to Orrin K. McMurray, Apr. 22, 1924, Moore papers, Yale.
46. Moore came to Columbia with a salary of $7,500 per year. Harlan F. Stone to Un-
derhill Moore, Feb. 8, 1916, Moore papers, Columbia. His salary climbed steadily to $12,000,
the absolute top of the Columbia salary scale in 1928. See Nicholas M. Butler to Underhill
Moore Apr. 5, 1928, Moore papers, Yale.
47. "It is desired that you should make a thoroughly independent investigation of the
origin, purposes, and uses of specific job contracts; how they affect both manufacturer and
purchaser; and whether this method of selling a portion of the output of the cement indus.
try is concealing any impropriety or illegality." C.H. Boynton (Atlas Portland Cement) to
Underhill Moore, Sept. 4, 1924, Moore papers, Yale. William 0. Douglas and Carroll
Shanks, Moore's research assistants at the time, did much of the work. See W. DOUGLAS, Go
EAST, YOUNG MAN 145 (1974). The work was terminated by the decision in Cement Manu-
facturers Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
48. See Underhill Moore to H.T. Manning, Apr. 3, 1928, Moore papers, Yale.
49. Butler, Annual Report in [1922] Columbia University: Annual Reports of the Presi-
dent etc. to the Trustees 27-28 cited in FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 273. The report was likely prepared in late June though not publicly released
until December. See A. MASON, supra note 34, at 132 n.22, 134 n*.
50. Harlan F. Stone, Memo to Faculty, Oct. 17, 1922, Moore papers, Yale.
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was interested by the activities of the curriculum committee.5 1 In
response to a request for suggestions as to what might be done to
further the work of the committee, and thus maintain Butler's in-
terest,52 Herman Oliphant drafted a long memo to the new curricu-
lum committee suggesting that the faculty undertake a total reor-
ganization of the curriculum along "functional" lines.53
Exactly what Oliphant meant by "functional" was remarkably
opaque, even after he had added a short memo designed to clarify
the matter." The best he could do was to suggest that a functional
organization first, was "more in terms of the human relations dealt
with and less ... in terms of the logical concepts of the conven-
tionally trained legal mind,"'5 5 second, would facilitate "any great
application of pertinent scientific knowledge as developed in the
other social sciences,"5 " and third, did not imply "the application
of an objective methodology in arriving at a rule of law to be ap-
plied in a particular case" or "an unorganized study of the special
facts lying back of a particular decision. ' 57 Beyond naming the
three general areas of human relations to be dealt with-family,
business and government- 58 when Oliphant provided details for
his plan they largely followed the curriculum organization at the
University of Chicago's School of Commerce and Administration"
where he had taught while attending law school." Indeed his only
specific suggestion was to begin the job of reorganization with busi-
51. Thomas I. Parkinson (acting dean), Memo to Faculty, Oct. 23, 1923, Moore papers,
Yale.
52. Id.
53. Herman Oliphant, The Revision of the Law School Curriculum, Oct. 29, 1923,
Moore papers, Yale. This memorandum forms the core of Oliphant, The Future of Legal
Education, 6 AM. L. SCH. REy. 329 (1928).
54. Herman Oliphant, Addendum, n.d., Moore papers, Yale.
55. Herman Oliphant, The Revision of the Law School Curriculum 8, Oct. 29, 1923,
Moore papers, Yale. See Oliphant, supra, note 53 at 332.
56. Id.
57. Herman Oliphant, Addendum, n.d., Moore papers, Yale.
58. Herman Oliphant, The Revision of the Law School Curriculum 8, Oct. 29, 1923,
Moore papers, Yale.
59. Compare id. at 10 (subdividing business relations into form of business unit, labor
relations, marketing, finance, and risk) with The School of Business at Erehwon in THE
COLLEGIATE SCHOOL OF BusINEsS 168-70 (L. Marshall ed. 1928) (subdividing business rela-
tions into labor, marketing, finance, risk and risk bearing, production, and accounting and
advocating the teaching of the form of the business unit at the junior college level).




ness credit and labor relations."1
The memo was sent to President Butler 2 and to Stone, then
still technically a faculty member.6 3 Butler indicated general agree-
ment." Stone, who did likewise, suggested that a "definite and
concrete program" for the adoption of "the functional approach to
certain portions of our curriculum" be prepared and that "domes-
tic relations, law administration ... security law and ... credi-
tors' rights" would be appropriate areas to begin with. 5 However,
the curriculum committee was apparently unmoved by either Oli-
phant's or Stone's suggestions and nothing came of the project.
Undaunted, in the fall of 1924, Oliphant joined with James C.
Bonbright of Columbia's School. of Business to offer a year-long
seminar in business organization-a "functional" classification in
the business school curriculum-as a part of Columbia's new grad-
uate program in law. 6 This seminar, for which planning was begun
even before Oliphant's memorandum, 7 was explicitly understood
to be a "concrete experiment" which if successful might be "ex-
tended into other fields, and ... conceivably lead to reorganiza-
tion of the undergraduate courses in such a way as to introduce,
not merely as incidental but as primary, a consideration of the
business situation under which the law is to be applied."68 Moore
61. Herman Oliphant, The Revision of the Law School Curriculum 18, Oct. 29, 1923,
Moore papers, Yale.
62. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 299, suggests that
Oliphant wrote a long letter to Butler that did not survive. I infer from Herman Oliphant to
The Committee on Curriculum, Nov. 1923? (detailing the response of Stone to the memo of
Oct. 29, 1923), Moore papers, Yale, that the missing letter dated Nov. 1, 1923, to which
Butler replied on Nov. 17, 1923, either enclosed a copy of the memo or reproduced it.
63. Stone submitted his resignation February 23, 1923 (Harlan F. Stone to Underhill
Moore, Mar. 15, 1923, Moore papers, Yale), to be effective on June 30, 1924. He then ar-
ranged to secure a leave of absence to October 1, 1923. He was later appointed to the Attor-
ney General of the United States and at that time advanced the effective date of his resigna-
tion to April 7, 1924. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 273-
74.
64. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 299.
65. See Herman Oliphant to The Committee on Curriculum, Nov. 23, 1923? (excerpting
letters from Stone dated Nov. 5, 1923 and Nov. 9, 1923), Moore papers, Yale.
66. See Herman Oliphant & James C. Bonbright to Dear Colleague, Oct. 25, 1923;
James C. Bonbright to Underhill Moore, Apr. 5, 1924; James C. Bonbright to Huger W.
Jervey, Nov. 25, 1924, Moore papers, Yale. The seminar was open to graduate students in
law, management and the social sciences as well as to some undergraduates by permission.
67. Herman Oliphant & James C. Bonbright to Dear Colleague, Oct. 25, 1923, Moore
papers, Yale.
68. James C. Bonbright to Underhill Moore, Apr. 5, 1924, Moore papers, Yale.
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participated in the seminar, 9 as did Robert L. Hale,70 an acquain-
tance of Moore's with a joint appointment in law and economics.
But more important was the participation of Dean Jervey.71 His
participation in this seminar made Moore think twice about sever-
ing his ties with Columbia, at least until he saw what would be
done "with respect to major appointments," for Jervey's interest
meant that curriculum reform along the lines set forth in Oli-
phant's memo, or at least along the less ambitious lines suggested
by the seminar's organizers, was still a possibility.7 2 Either alterna-
tive suggested the central relevance of the kind of inquiry into le-
gal institutions that Moore had proposed in his review of Wig-
more's book.
The seminar was successful enough that it was repeated in
1925, this time focusing on corporate finance in an obvious attempt
to take a still more "functional" approach to the subject.73 It drew
the interest of several of the younger faculty members on whom
Moore pinned his hopes for reform in teaching at Columbia, most
notably Karl N. Llewellyn7 4 and William 0. Douglas. It also pro-
vided a focus for efforts of those members of the Columbia faculty
most interested in curriculum reform, largely the participants, and
kept that subject alive by providing some evidence of the plausibil-
ity of functional organization of the curriculum. This second role
proved to have been valuable when, in the spring of 1926, Harvard
69. James C. Bonbright (?), Syllabus, Fall 1924?, Moore papers, Yale. Moore taught
"lien instruments," various kinds of mortgage financing. Hale's contribution is not detailed.
70. b. 1884. B.A. 1906, A.M. (economics) 1907, LL.B. 1909, Harvard; Ph.D. 1918, Co-
lumbia. Private practice 1909-12, Chicago & New York City. Lecturer (economics), 1915,
lecturer (part-time) 1919, lecturer (legal econ.) 1922, asst. prof. 1928, assoc. prof. 1931, prof.
1935, Columbia. d. 1969. Hale was the first modem law professor with a background in
technical economics. His piece, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive
State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923) was extremely influential among the Realists at Columbia.
He is the subject of a forthcoming work by Prof. Warren E. Samuels of the Department of
Economics, Michigan State University; see Samuels, The Economic System of Power and
Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MwAi L. REV. 261 (1973).
71. James C. Bonbright (?), Syllabus, n.d., Moore papers, Yale. Jervey taught "non-lien
instruments," stocks and debentures.
72. Underhill Moore to Orrin K. McMurray, Apr. 22, 1924; Underhill Moore to James
C. Bonbright, Apr. 28, 1924, Moore papers, Yale.
73. James C. Bonbright (?), Syllabus, Fall, 1925?; James C. Bonbright to Huger W.
Jervey, Nov. 25, 1924; James C. Bonbright to Underhill Moore, June 12, 1926, Moore pa-
pers, Yale.
74. James C. Bonbright (?), Syllabus, Fall, 1925?; Underhill Moore to Roswell Magill
(Columbia law school faculty), Apr. 7, 1927, Moore papers, Yale.
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announced its drive for a mammoth increase in its endowment to
be used, in large part, for research professorships. Columbia
searched for an enterprise that would both distinguish it from
Harvard and draw attention from Harvard's effort.7 5 As part of
that search a day after the New Republic editorialized in favor of
the Harvard campaign, the law faculty decided to undertake a
thorough revision of its curriculum, "so as to secure better correla-
tion between law and the other social sciences, particularly
economics. 78
These two developments, the seminar and the curriculum
study, were enough to create a limited kind of optimism about Co-
lumbia and its prospects and thus to get Moore working again. The
transformation was marked. He gave up his consulting practice, ac-
quired money for use during 1926-27 from a special presidential
fund for research, and began work on a book on banking law and
practice along the lines he had outlined in his review of Wigmore's
book three years before. 7 The method behind the research was no-
tably eclectic. Moore used secondary sources extensively, but to
these he added direct inquiries to bankers about bank practice 8
and questionnaire surveys designed to show some representative-
ness in their findings, though hardly any sophistication in design.79
The immediate results of this renewed activity were two. The first
was a restructuring of Moore's old course in negotiable instruments
75. The Harvard fund drive is recounted in A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A
HISTORY OF IDEAS & MEN, 1817-1967, 262-70 (1967). Explicit acknowledgement of the moti-
vation of the Columbia faculty is detailed in Young B. Smith (?), Memorandum for the
President at 2-3, Spring 1926?, Moore papers, Yale.
76. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 300, which, how-
ever, does not acknowledge the relationship between the curriculum study and the Harvard
endowment drive. The editorial was Socializing Legal Education, 15 NEW REPUBLIC 211
(1926) (Apr. 14, 1926). The curriculum study was moved, Apr. 15, 1926. FOUNDATION FOR
RESEARCH IN LEGAL HIsToRY, supra note 17, at 300 n.126. Harvard's announcement had a
similar impact at Yale. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 471-72 and nn.64-65.
77. Underhill Moore to H. T. Manning, Apr. 3, 1928; Frederick J. E. Woodbridge to
Underhill Moore, Apr. 29, 1927 (detailing grants to Moore), Moore papers, Yale.
78. See, e.g., Underhill Moore to W.L. Trumble (Barclay's Bank), June 20, 1927, Moore
papers, Yale.
79. See Underhill Moore to Young B. Smith, Dec. 24, 1927 (recounting use of funds),
Moore papers, Yale. Some of the questionnaire research was published as Klaus, Identifica-
tion of the Holder and Tender Receipt on the Counter-Presentation of Checks, 13 MINN. L.
REv. 281 (1929). See id. at 299 & n.64. Samuel Klaus, a 1927 graduate of Columbia, was one
of Moore's research assistants during the academic years 1926-1928. See Moore to Hugh
Satterlee, Nov. 26, 1927, Moore papers, Yale.
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into one in commercial bank credit, a course in which he supposed
most parts of the earlier course would be dealt with "somehow,
someplace."80 The second was an article by Moore and his research
assistant about the practice of giving interest on the balances of
checking accounts.81 That article, however, showed only exhaustive
caselaw research and comprehensive knowledge of the secondary
banking literature both in the United States and in the British
Empire. It was a start, of a sort.
Meanwhile "the great debate" over curriculum reform pro-
ceeded in earnest.8 2 Moore was an interested, although not particu-
larly active, player in what was plainly Herman Oliphant's show.
Along with Oliphant, he formed the steering committee that ar-
ranged the seminar,83 and helped frame the request to President
Butler for the funds to bring Leon C. Marshall"" as director of the
seminar. Marshall, a personal friend of Oliphant's and former
Dean of the University of Chicago's business school had gained a
reputation as a curriculum reformer at Chicago.8 5 But, while a reg-
80. Underhil Moore to Leon C. Marshall, Oct. 22, 1927, Moore papers, Yale.
81. Moore & Shamos, Interest on the Balances of Checking Accounts, 27 COLUM. L.
Rav. 633 (1927). Abraham Shamos, a 1927 graduate of Columbia, was another of Moore's
research assistants. Apparently Shamos did library research while Samuel Klaus (see'note
79, supra) did "field" research, a differentiation of function that Moore kept for many years.
The library assistant did all of Moore's personal accounts as well as prepared semi-annual
balance sheets and income statements! See Underhill Moore to Abraham Shamos, June 22,
1927; Underhill Moore to David L. Daggett, Apr. 21, 1936 (describing job of assistant),
Moore papers, Yale.
82. The reform of Columbia's curriculum has been fully recounted elsewhere, four
times to be exact. Currie, The Materials of Law Study (pt. 3), 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1955) is
the most comprehensive. See also FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note
17, at 297-303 (rather badly biased toward view of the victors); W. TWINING, supra note 14,
at 45-52; Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, 5 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMRICA HISTORY 403, 470-77 (1971).
83. Huger W. Jervey to Underhill Moore & Herman Oliphant, Apr. ?, 1926, Moore pa-
pers, Yale.
84. See Young B. Smith (?), Memorandum for the President, Spring, 1926? Moore pa-
pers, Yale. Marshall's appointment was justified to Columbia's president only in part by his
leadership of the seminar. Its primary justification was as the second step of a general plan
to integrate "law and the allied sciences, such as economics and sociology." Thus he was
supposed to coordinate the work in commercial law with "underlying economic problems"
and "the actual structure and working of... business life"-apparently the work he did
during the latter half of his year and a half appointment. Id. at 1, 4.
85. For Marshall's views on business education and his impact on the University of
Chicago's Business School see L. MARSHALL, supra note 59; L. Marshall, The Collegiate
School of Business 3 (1928) reprinted in HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 78 (R. Kent, ed.
1930); H. DREiSER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UrnvaRsrry OF CHICAGO, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
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ular participant in the seminar, Moore generated few of the formal
documents that were the basis for discussion. His major contribu-
tions were to suggest scraping trusts,"6 to supply a detailed sylla-
bus for the proposed course in commercial bank credit,87 and to
help author a report on the law library. He chose instead to con-
tinue his work on banking law and practice with an intensity that
in the summer of 1927 made it seem appropriate to take a research
assistant with him while he taught at Cornell."'
The optimism that fueled Moore's intense activity was short-
lived however. The following fall it became clear that Dean
Jervey's health would not permit him to continue his administra-
tive duties.89 Young B. Smith was thereupon appointed acting
dean and, when in spring Jervey chose to resign, the fight over the
deanship between Oliphant and Smith broke out again.90 Smith
had been rather driving in his role as acting dean,91 nevertheless
Moore still feared the effects of Smith's selection on the programs
of the school.9 2 Whether he supported Oliphant's candidacy is not
clear, s but whatever the case, Moore knew from recent experience
BusuNEss 6-10 (n.d.). Marshall was dean at Chicago when Oliphant taught there.
86. Underhill Moore to Leon C. Marshall, Oct. 22, 1927, Moore papers, Yale.
87. See Underhill Moore & Karl N. Llewellyn, Report of the Committee on Finance
and Credit, Apr. 7, 1927, in Faculty Conference on Legal Education, 1926-1927, Documents,
on file at the Columbia University Law School Library. The document is summarized in H.
OLIPHANT, SUMMARY OF STUDIES IN LEGAL EDUCATION 92-94 (1928).
88. Underhill Moore to Robert C. Rathbone, July 8, 1927, Moore papers, Yale.
89. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 303.
90. Id. at 303-04.
91. See, e.g., Young B. Smith to Faculty, Oct. 29, 1927 (on securing funds from Com-
monwealth Fund), Moore papers, Yale.
92. See Theodore S. Hope to Underhill Moore, June 11, 1928 (recounting earlier con-
versation with Moore), Moore papers, Yale.
93. While there are several scraps in the Moore papers to support the proposition that
Moore opposed Smith's appointment, there is little to suggest support for Oliphant's candi-
dacy, except as an alternative to Smith's, and reason to believe that Moore questioned Oli-
phant's ability to stick to a job once begun. See note 105 infra. I thus am more cautious
than FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 304, which, in drawing
sides in the battle between Smith and Oliphant, relies heavily on the word of Smith, the
winner, and Julius Goebel, Jr., a relative outsider whose regular appointment to the faculty
was not made until spring 1928, although he had been an associate in law since fall 1925.
The resulting bias in favor of the winners, portrayed as a hearty little band, id. at 310,
overlooks matters such as Llewellyn's ambiguous role, see W. TwINING, supra note 14, at
103-04, which contributed to his estrangement from Moore, and Roswell F. Magill's support
for Oliphant which tabbed him as a potential emigrant to Yale, see Minutes of the Faculty
of Law, Yale University, May 18, 1928. Indeed, I suspect that the fight may not have been
nearly as one sided as is usually portrayed.
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that, given the division of the faculty, the choice of dean would fall
to President Butler. Therefore, Moore personally counselled Butler
of the wisdom of a further interregnum.e When Butler refused to
take that advice95 and appointed Smith, Moore sulked and went to
his summer home.
Within a week Robert M. Hutchins, Dean at Yale, on learning
of events at Columbia from William 0. Douglas, another opponent
of Smith, who had not just sulked, but resigned,"6 secured authori-
zation from his faculty to offer a job to Moore. 7 Simultaneously
Walter Wheeler Cook apparently used the fight at Columbia and
the prospect that the losers would be willing to leave to secure the
agreement of the Johns Hopkins University Board of Trustees to
begin an Institute of Law devoted to research and not teaching."
Both men moved quickly. Hutchins offered the possibility of com-
bining teaching with research in a social science institute;99 Cook
offered a newly organized Institute devoted to legal research alone.
Hutchins waited while the Yale Corporation decided how many of
the Columbia dissidents it could hire in one year;100 Cook brought
94. See Nicholas M. Butler to Underhill Moore, May 2, 1928 (recounting visit), Moore
papers, Yale.
95. Id.
96. See W. DOUGLAS, supra note 47, at 163 (perhaps overdrawn, but close).
97. Minutes of the Faculty of Law, Yale University, May 10, 1928. Hutchins did not
really know much at this time. See Robert M. Hutchins to James R. Angell (Yale's Presi-
dent), May 11, 1928 ("Must go to New York to get what light I can on the Columbia men"),
(on file in the James R. Angell Presidential Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale Univer-
sity) [hereinafter cited as Angell papers, without cross-reference].
98. See Herman Oliphant to Underhill Moore, May 25, 1928 (implies discussion begun
earlier), Moore papers, Yale. Cook had gone to Hopkins in the fall of 1926 as the school's
lone professor of jurisprudence, his salary paid under a special grant. Walter Wheeler Cook
to Frank J. Goodnow (Johns Hopkins' president) Apr. 1, 1926. He came to Hopkins with a
formulated plan for a School of Jurisprudence which in the next two years slowly
metamorphosized into a research institute, but as late as April, 1928, the project looked as if
it would remain in the planning stage for another year. See Joseph S. Ames (acting presi-
dent) to Walter Wheeler Cook, Apr. 11, 1928. Yet by late May the concept of a research
Institute had hardened, funding was being sought, and a faculty decided on. See Joseph S."
Ames to Daniel Willard (President of Bd. of Trustees) May 29, 1928. (All three letters are
filed in the Presidential papers, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University).
99. At the time Yale had pending an application to the Rockefeller foundations for a
grant to support what became the Institute of Human Relations. See Schlegel, supra note
15, at 486-88.
100. Hutchins made his offer to Moore in Robert M. Hutchins to Underhill Moore,
May 21, 1928, Moore papers, Yale. He planned to also add Douglas, Theodore S. Hope, Jr.
(Moore's assistant), Roswell P. Magill, Oliphant and Hessel Yntema. Robert M. Hutchins to
James R. Angell, May 24, 1928, Angell papers. President Angell immediately wrote the rele-
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the chairman of the Hopkins' Board of Trustees and the member
most interested in the project to New York to meet with Moore
and with Oliphant,101 who had earlier expressed a willingness to go
to Hopkins even without the attraction of a going Institute.102 Al-
though each side pressed and came up with unheard of salaries,103
Moore declined both offers. His reasoning was simple. While the
Hopkins plan was ideal,10 Moore was concerned that given the
financial instability of the enterprise, the lack of any firm idea on
the part of the Hopkins' trustees as to the standard for measuring
progress in research of the kind proposed, and the questionable
ability of Oliphant and, even more so, Cook to stick to research
during the first lean years, the plan would never really get carried
out, with the result that the trustees, seeing the limited results,
would withdraw their support and the participants would head off
in other directions. 05 Yale on the other hand was not ideal because
of the teaching obligation,106 but at least if the proposed Institute
were funded, as expected, it would be financially stable for a long
enough period to prove the value of the social science method as
applied to law. So Moore waited to see what would happen. While
he waited, he and his research assistant, Theodore S. Hope, Jr.,107
vant members of the Yale Corporation and eight days later was able to say that Yale would
hire all six if Oliphant and Magill would wait until fall 1929. James R. Angell to Robert M.
Hutchins, June 1, 1928, Angell papers. In the interim Magill declined the offer, Oliphant
accepted the offer from Hopkins, and Hutchins thought that Moore, and with him Hope,
had done likewise. Robert M. Hutchins to James R. Angell, June 8, 1928, Angell papers. In
fact Moore had done no such thing, but had that day declined the Hopkins offer. See Un-
derhill Moore to Miss Basset, June 8, 1928 (directing relay of message to Hope announcing
decision to stay at Columbia), Moore papers, Yale. Throughout the scramble Hutchins suf-
fered from hopeful misunderstandings. At the time of making the offer to Moore, Hutchins
thought he had already obtained acceptances from Oliphant and Magill. See Robert M.
Hutchins to Underhill Moore, May 21, 1928, Moore papers, Yale. In fact at the time Oli-
phant was working to get Moore to come to Hopkins. See Herman Oliphant to Underhill
Moore, May 25, 1928, Moore papers, Yale.
101. See Underhill Moore to Walter Wheeler Cook, May 31, 1928; Herman Oliphant to
Underhill Moore, June 8, 1928, Moore papers, Yale.
102. See Walter Wheeler Cook to Frank J. Goodnow, Dec. 22, 1927, (on file in Presi-
dential papers, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University).
103. Cook offered $15,000; Yale ultimately matched that figure which was $3,000 above
Moore's salary at Columbia.
104. Underhill Moore to Homer F. Carey (former student teaching at Kansas), July 11,
1928, Moore papers, Yale.
105. See Herman Oliphant to Underhill Moore, June 15, 1928 (replying to Moore's ar-
guments), Moore papers, Yale.
106. Cf. Underhill Moore to Homer F. Carey, July 11, 1928, Moore papers, Yale.
107. b. 1903. A.B. 1925, Harvard, LL.B. 1928, Columbia. Research asst. 1928, Columbia;
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wrote, this time not out of optimism, but out of determination.
When they were done, Moore and Hope had produced an arti-
cle setting forth a method quite obviously designed to test Moore's
ideas first put forth over five years earlier at the expense of Col.
Wigmore.' 5 The idea behind the article was simple. Moore began
with the assertion, not made in the earlier piece but implicit in it
and current in Moore's thought at that time,109 that, "[t]he central
problem of the lawyer is the prediction of judicial and administra-
tive decisions of government officers." 110 Then, ignoring entirely
the possibility that legal rules might provide an adequate basis for
making such a prediction, he quickly dispatched as "not... veri-
fied in experience" the new notion, prominently associated with
Oliphant"' and Lleweflyn," 2 that "study of the relation between
decisions and 'the facts' of recorded cases" might provide such a
basis.113 Moore's explanation for not verifying the newer technique
was that the facts of a case were only one element in a situation
the balance of which was not possible to control for "in the actual
behavior situations of everyday life."114 Although thus admitting
that perfect prediction was impossible because of the singularity of
the phenomenon to be explained,1 5 Moore nevertheless proposed,
in line with his argument in the Wigmore review, to examine the
relation between the "facts" in a given case and the "institutional
(frequent, repeated, usual) ways of behaving" in the relevant com-
munity in the hope that "if such relation be found to be signifi-
cant, a step towards more reliable prediction will have been
made."M1 6
In the abstract, Moore's proposal to investigate the relation-
ship between what is classically known as law and custom was
research assoc. 1929 Johns Hopkins. Private practice, 1933, New York City.
108. Moore & Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38
YALE L.J. 703 (1929).
109. And for some time "The 'law' governing a particular state of facts which happens
to-day is the rule which will to-morrow be applied to the state of facts by the... officers
engaged in administering justice." Underhill Moore, Answers of Underhill Moore to Ques-
tionnaire, n.d. (Fall 1923), Moore papers, Yale.
110. Moore & Hope, supra note 108, at 703.
111. See Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71 (1928).
112. See K. LLEwELLYN, THE BRABLE BUSH (1930).
113. Moore & Hope, supra note 108, at 703.
114. Id. at 704.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 705.
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hardly novel, especially coming from a teacher of commercial law;
the question had a long history in both the general jurisprudential
literature as well as that more narrowly limited to commercial
law." 7 But, in the context of the traditional discussion of the ques-
tion, his way of going about the enterprise was nothing less than
astonishing. Working largely with a generalized behaviorist psy-
chology, still a controversial thing to do at the time, Moore pro-
ceeded to subdivide the "facts" of a case, as lawyers would know
them, into "terms", which when aggregated serially made up
"transactions", which when aggregated serially made up a "trans-
action-series".11 8 Grouping transactions by their descriptive simi-
larity yielded a group of "sequences"; similarly grouping transac-
tion-series yielded a "sequence-series", also known as
"institutional sequences."" All of this apparatus was assembled
for "comparing with comparable sequences-series actual transac-
tion-series followed by judicial behavior" or, more simply, compar-
ing customary behavior, habit, with the parties' behavior in liti-
gated cases.1 20 Methods were also described for establishing
comparability of transactions-series when one of the transactions,
implicitly assumed to be a part of the series litigated, was "devia-
tional", which is to say not "institutional", not in the relation "fre-
quently following-frequently preceeding,' ' 121 and for evaluating
the degree of deviation-"slight" or "gross"-according to the effi-
ciency, certainty, familiarity and riskiness of the deviational as
against the institutional transaction.122 The entire procedure was
presented with the expectation that "after the method h~ts been
applied to large numbers of cases in many fields it may be possible
to state 'law' for some fields in terms of" the correlation between
"the decision and the measured degree of deviation between 'the
facts' and the institution," a correlation with "apparent" utility in
the prediction of decisions. 3
117. Discussion of the question dates back at least to Plato. In the narrower commercial
context, Anglo-American lawyers think of the opinions of Lord Mansfield as the starting
point of the discussion. See, e.g., Ewart, What Is the Law Merchant? 3 COLUM. L. REv. 135
(1903).
118. Moore & Hope, supra note 108, at 706-07.
119. Id. at 707.
120. Id. at 708.
121. Id. at 707-09.
122. Id. at 717-19.
123. Id. at 719.
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If the apparatus was not enough to intimidate all but the most
determined lovers of social science jargon,124 the examples Moore
gave of the process of comparison, complete with symbolic nota-
tion, were. Each was a common banking transaction in which the
bank had breached an agreement, explicit or implicit, made with a
customer, for example, by refusing to discount a note tendered
under a loan agreement or by dishonoring an overdraft despite the
existence of an overdraft agreement.125 Yet in the process of an
analysis designed to isolate exactly in which ways the bank had
acted contrary to expected behavior, Moore managed to deform
each into something queerly unrecognizable, turning the overdraft
agreement into a note offered for discount and the overdraft into a
draft for the balance of the account. 126 The reader who was both
undeterred by the jargon and willing to fight through the seeming
disorientation of the examples, upon careful examination, might
have noticed that there were problems with the relationship be-
tween the concepts of causality and institutional relation, 27 that
the surface impression of a complexity unnecessary for the simplic-
ity of the inquiry was indeed accurate, 28 and that the complexity
was potentially misleading. 2 ' Unfortunately careful examination
124. Moore justified his method with the slightly disingenuous observation that it was
necessary because the facts in recorded cases "are a small, and very probable non-represen-
tative, sample of all behavior" and the cases, "distinguished by dissimilarity rather than
similarity one to another." As a result, Moore asserted, legal categories are broad so as to
include as many cases as possible and thus "inadequate for classification." Moore & Hope,
supra note 108, at 705. Truth of the matter is, I suspect, that Moore also quite plainly loved
the arcane terminology he had invented.
125. Id. at 711-12.
126. Id. at 714-15.
127. Moore's notion of an institutional relation, "frequently following-frequently
preceeding" (id. at 707) though intended to describe only habitual behavior in fact implied
causality as well. In so doing it raised the possibility that his attempt to establish a causal
relation between customary behavior and legal decisions validating conduct in accordance
with that behavior might either founder because the assumed underlying causality was ab-
sent or succeed but only because of a spurious correlation with some element in the institu-
tional behavior.
128. See, e.g., Moore & Hope, supra note 108, at 715. "The second comparison of the
second deviational transaction with its first comparable sequence is made by substituting
for the prior terms of the transaction the correlative terms of the comparable sequence."
Translation: If we assume a less troublesome circumstance, it may highlight the bank's
error.
129. This was especially true in evaluating the degree of deviation between the transac-
tion and a sequence where the factors to be evaluated quite obviously overlapped as well as
were loaded in the direction of banker opinion. However, it is also true with respect to the
way that the method of deriving comparable entities lead away from the transaction in
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by outsiders, although sought, was not forthcoming,130 so whatever
deficiencies there were in the method remained. But, at least, it
was a method, a start toward research. Thus, when the Institute of
Human Relations at Yale was funded13 1 and Moore was again in-
vited by Hutchins to join it, Moore signed on because he remained
still "critical and disappointed" at Smith's appointment and felt
"quite lonely and out of it" by the departure of his friends." 2 He
was, however, cautious enough to ask to see a copy of the deed of
gift from the Rockefeller Foundation,3 3 donor of funds for the In-
stitute, and to inquire who were to be the other appointees.184 His
salary was to be higher than any other faculty member at the law
school, including the Dean;13 5 his two research assistants were to
have salaries similarly out of line,13 6 and several other promises
about research support had to be made to close the deal. 37 Then,
less than two weeks later, the promisor, Robert Hutchins, left to
become President of the University of Chicago.
There is a sense in which starting back at Columbia in 1923 in
order to attempt to explain how Moore came to dedicate himself so
singlemindedly to his vision of what legal research should be is to
knowingly indulge in a kind of genetic fallacy, positing origins be-
cause they must be there. This is especially true because Moore
suggested a perfectly adequate explanation for the effective hiatus
in his activities during his last years at Columbia when he ex-
pressed a belief that every law professor experienced a kind of in-
question. Ultimately Moore did not fully understand his own observation (see note 124,
supra) about the singularity of litigated phenomena.
130. Moore sent out dozens of reprints of the article. Most went unacknowledged. Of
those that were acknowledged none were accompanied by anything more elaborate than
President Butler's objection to the behaviorist psychology in the piece and his prediction
that Moore would in time get over it. Nicholas M. Butler to Underhill Moore, Jan. 15, 1929,
Moore papers, Yale. Others such as C. J. Keyser, a Columbia philosopher of science, and
Alfred L. Kroeber, the anthropologist, were not even this helpful.
131. See Schiegel, supra note 15, at 488.
132. Underhill Moore to Alexander M. Kidd (Cal. Berkeley, visitor at Columbia 1926-
28), May 15, 1929, Moore papers, Yale.
133. Underhill Moore to Robert M. Hutchins, Feb. 11, 1929, Moore papers, Yale.
134. Underhill Moore to Robert M. Hutchins, Feb. 15, 1929, Moore papers, Yale.
135. And remained so for years, a fact that rankled the new dean. See Charles E. Clark
to Charles Seymour, Feb. 10, 1934, Angell papers.
136. See Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, May 17, 1929, Moore papers, Yale.
137. Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976.
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tellectual menopause in the middle years of his career."3 8 And men-
opause is an apt description for much of Moore's years at
Columbia, for, after an initial flury, he completed little significant
work there, although he had done much before arriving and would
do much at Yale. Equally important, during this period of relative
inactivity, Moore somehow underwent one of the more profound
examples of a "change of life" by a major' law professor--entering a
respected, traditional negotiable instruments scholar and exiting a
full-fledged, if only self-trained, social scientist. However, to accept
Moore's conceit and view most of his years at Columbia as simply
an example of intellectual menopause is to accept the kind of
transparent post hoc rationalization he mocked in Wigmore's little
volume. There Moore suggested that rationalizations about the law
such as Wigmore had collected obscured the kind of regularities of
behavior he proposed to isolate in his own work. Here his rationali-
zation similarly obscures the degree to which the origins of, and
stimulus for, his research first evidenced in the Wigmore review
partake of both the uniquely personal and the quite commonplace
in the career of an early twentieth century law professor. Starting
with the commonplace will provide a good basis for gauging the
impact of the personal. Unfortunately, so doing requires an appar-
ent detour into comparatively "ancient" history.
Langdell's revolution in legal education-the teaching of law
solely by means of cases-can only be understood as the apercu of
one possessed. Had this revolution been begun anywhere else than
Harvard' s" and lacked the assistance of James Barr Ames1 40 in all
138. See Clark, Underhill Moore, 59 YALE. L.J. 189, 190 (1950).
139. Being at Harvard aided Langdell in two ways. First, during the first fifteen to
twenty years Langdell could exploit Harvard's traditional position, and thus an essentially
captive market, as the finishing school for relatively wealthy young men from upper New
England generally, and Boston in particular, who wanted to be lawyers. See, e.g., C. WAR-
REN, 2 HISTORY OF THE HvARD LAW SCHOOL 358. As a result Langdell had the time to let
the innovation mature and then to produce a half generation of student converts who might
spread the word. Second, because of Harvard's central position in the movement to create
the American university and its success in doing so, see L. VEYsE Y, THE EMERGENCE OF THE
AmERIcAN UNuIVsrrY (1965), it provided Langdell with a new and ready market for his
innovation: all the presidents of all the lesser universities for whom success was creating a
little Harvard on the prairie.
140. Stevens, supra, note 82 at 440, acknowledges the important role of Ames, Lang-
dell's first convert, in the success of Langdell's revolution, although he does not pinpoint
exactly what Ames contributed. Apparently Ames was a more dynamic teacher. He made
the shift from Langdell's casebook which was organized on historical principles to a
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likelihood it would have sunk beneath the waves as John Norton
Pomeroy's similar innovation had done. 41 Indeed, twenty years af-
ter Langdell began his revolution he had but one major convert,
Keener's Columbia,142 and the merits and demerits of the innova-
tion were still quite seriously being discussed in the pages of the
second university based law review, that of Yale. 1 3 But accompa-
nying Keener's victory at Columbia a succession of individuals, of
which Wigmore, and Nathan Abbott are among the most notable,
effectively conquered the law schools west of the Appalachians in
the name of Langdell and his system.14 The lucky ones like Ab-
bott returned to the East coast; the others, for example Harry
Richards, long time dean at Wisconsin, learned, or chose, to live in
the provinces."45 But for all it was an exciting enterprise, at least at
the start."46 The work of conquest done there then came the prob-
lem of populating these law schools with law teachers devoted to
Langdell's system. The problem was not unprecedented; the En-
glish civil service had met it as the British colonial empire ex-
panded, and there are earlier precedents. But peopling colonial law
schools is a different problem from that of claiming territory in the
name of Langdell.
casebook organized in a more analytical format as the treatises had been and shifted the
justification for case law teaching from the teaching of doctrine to training for thinking like
a lawyer. Even more importantly, ' Ames, unlike Langdell, was a missionary for the new
system.
141. Pomeroy, Jr., John Norton Pomeroy in 8 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 91, 99-101,
106, (W. Lewis ed. 1909).
142. See FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 135-58 for the
story of Keener's takeover of the Columbia faculty.
143. See, e.g., Phelps, The Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE L.J. 139 (1892);
Keener, The Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE L.J. 143 (1892).
144. Wigmore and Abbott introduced the case method at Northwestern in 1893. See W.
RoALFE, supra note 18, at 35. Then in 1895 Abbott moved and introduced the method at
Stanford where he was dean for ten years. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 203. Francis M. Burdick was another conqueror. He introduced a system
of text and cases at Cornell in 1887. See id. at 162.
145. b. 1868. A.B. 1892, Iowa; LL.B. 1895, Harvard. Private practice 1895, Iowa. Prof.
1898, Iowa; Dean 1903, Wisconsin. d. 1929. For a summary of Richards' early career, see W.
JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 115, 121-
33, 138-44 (1978). Richards brought case study to both Iowa and Wisconsin.
146. The excitement even comes through the dreary pages of W. ROALFE, supra note 18,
at 34-44. It is strangely missing from W. JOHNSON, supra note 145, largely because he views
the coming of "schooled lawyers" on the Harvard model at best ambivalently. FOUNDATION
FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 144-55, succeeds capturing the excite-
ment at Columbia in spite of itself.
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While there were several ways of solving the problem of popu-
lating the law schools with langdellian case law teachers, one seems
to have been chosen. Promising young a*pirants for teaching posts
at major law schools like Harvard and Columbia were sent to, or
placed in, provincial law schools, most notably in the midwest,
with the expectation that they would learn their craft and in effect
work their way back East.147 There were obvious exceptions to this
pattern of advancement, indeed careful examination of the growth
of the Harvard and Columbia faculties shows that by and large
service in the provinces was not the most likely way to a major
teaching appointment. 148 Nevertheless, career patterns of early
twentieth century law professors suggest that the idea of working
one's way up through a kind of "colonial" service was at least wide-
147. The demonstration of this proposition in a small compass is quite obviously diffi-
cult. Some evidence can be garnered by looking at the first "stud book." ASSOCIATION OF
AMERicAN LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS (1922). Looking only
at the first half of the listings, the following individuals, grouped by the school from which
they received their final law degree with their post fifteen years later indicated in parenthe-
sis, some quite obvious successes, others "drop-outs" of one kind or another, seem to fit the
pattern.
Harvard Henry Craig Jones (Iowa)
Henry W. Ballentine (Cal., Berkeley) Steven I. Langmaid (Cal., Berkeley)
Morton C. Campbell (Harv.) Edwin R. Keedy (Penn.)
Elliott Cheatham (Colum.) Charles W. Leaphart (Mont.)
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. (Harv.) Columbia
Henry H. Foster (Neb.) Percy Bordwell (Iowa)
Everett Frazer (Minn.) Charles K. Burdick (Cornell)
Ralph W. Gifford (Colum.) Homer F. Carey (Northwestern)
Eugene Gilmore (Wis.) Walter Wheeler Cook (Northwestern)
Herbert F. Goodrich (Penn.) Noel T. Dowling (Colum.)
William G. Hale (So. Cal.) Edward W. Hinton (Chgo.)
A clear class difference can be seen in the ultimate employment of individuals at the "also-
ran" law schools.
Chicago Yale
Leslie Ayer (Wash.) Millard Breckenridge (N. Car.)
Michigan George W. Goble (Ill.)
Edmund C. Dickinson (W. Va.) John E. Hallen (Ohio St.)
Alvin E. Evans (Ky.) Albert J. Harno (Ill.)
Northwestern
Earl C. Arnold (Vand.)
148. Of the major appointments at Columbia between 1900 and 1925, only Moore,
Cook, and Nathan Abbott had done any significant teaching elsewhere; at Harvard, only
Pound, Edmund Morgan and Edward Thurston. See generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 75
and FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17.
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spread, if not well founded, and wholly new for this group of aca-
demics that had traditionally been recruited from local practition-
ers, often locally educated practitioners. 149
Individuals were not, however, simply thrown to the wolves
that quite literally still were to be found in the Midwest at the
time and told to teach law for the greater glory of Christopher Co-
lumbus Langdell. Rather, several different kinds of support were
provided for these young law teachers. First, and most obvious,
was personal support and encouragement in correspondence from
the folks back home.150 Beyond this the case method itself pro-
vided a common identity in academic endeavors as well as a link to
the past that helped to justify colonial life. Similarly, common
hazards and the camaraderie often engendered in the course of
meeting them created a network of friends whose help could be
called on when advancement was sought.151 However, at least as
important as these forms of support was the notion of professional
role that received its early definition by Dean Ames and. substan-
tial affirmation at almost every meeting of the visible focus of the
profession, the new Association of American Law Schools.1 52
When Ames, drawing on ideas of Thayer153 and, to a lesser
extent Langdell, 1" posited the "threefold vocation of the law pro-
fessor-teacher, writer, expert counselor in legislation," and ad-
verted to the "strenuous" nature of these tasks, as well as their
importance for "the maintenance and wise administration" of the
149. W. JOHNSON, supra note 146, repeatedly emphasizes the fact that before adopting
Langdellian case method Wisconsin relied almost exclusively on local practitioners. The
same is true at Minnesota and Virginia. See J. RITCHIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: A
SHORT HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA FOR THE PERIOD 1826-
1926 (1978); Stein, In Pursuit of Excellence-A History of the University of Minnesota
Law School, Part I: The Pattee Years-A Time of Accommodation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 485
(1978).
150. See text and notes at 192-95 infra for examples.
151. See text and notes at 177-80 infra for examples.
152. A short history of the A.A.L.S. can be found in Seavey, The Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools in Retrospect, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153 (1950). Aspects of its history are
treated throughout Stevens, supra note 82.
153. Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1895)
(emphasizing the scholarly role of the professional law teacher). This lecture was quite obvi-
ously inspired in part by A. DIcEY, CAN ENGLISH LAW BE TAUGHT IN THE UNIVERSITIES?
(1883) and J. BRYCE, 2 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 623 (1888).
154. See J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 263 (1950) (Langdell on the law
professor as "juris consult").
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law, 155 he created an appealing vision of the academic lawyer's role
in society. Central to that vision was its scholarly aspect; Ames ex-
pected the "full-time" law professor to shortly create "a high order
of treatises on all the important branches of the law, exhibiting the
historical development of the subject and containing sound conclu-
sions based on scientific analysis."1 56 For the next twenty years, if
not longer, this vision of the professorial role, embroidered in doz-
ens of slightly different variations, but almost always emphasizing
an ideal of detailed, systematic, sustained, and comprehensive
works of scholarship on the German grand scale, formed the core
of the identity of the professional law teacher.1 57 Its impact can be
seen in the scholarly landmarks of the time, Williston's and Wig-
more's treatises, and the more monumental of the early casebooks,
of which Gray's six volumes on property is surely the most ex-
traordinary. Equally strong was its impact on the young law teach-
ers posted to the Midwest. For them, Ames' vision, if only in its
teaching aspect, provided at least rhetoric support for enduring the
routine teaching responsibilities encountered at small law
schools.1 58 At the same time, Ames' notion of the scholarly aspect
of the professional vocation resonated with that of advancement
through colonial service in such a way as to hold out the possibility
that better conditions at better schools would bring better chances
for writing and legislative drafting. 59 Thus the concept of a profes-
sional role provided additional support for the harried, underpaid
young law professor who found himself in Columbia, Lawrence, or
Grand Forks with many students and many courses but few col-
155. The Vocation of the Law Professor in J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 354,
368, 369 (1913) (The address was given in 1901 and privately printed thereafter).
156. Id. at 366.
157. Hohfeld, A Vital School of Law and Jurisprudence and Law; Have Universities
Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day, in
[1914] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 15, in its baroque detail, is perhaps the apogee of this notion of
professional vocation as well as an important early statement of the case for a still more
analytic, less genetic scholarship than that pioneered by Ames. Lewis, The Law Teaching
Branch of the Profession, in [1924] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 65 is about the last statement of the
notion in any form that Ames would have recognized.
For the impact of the Germanic model of legal scholarship on these law teachers, see
AMES, supra note 155, at 68-69. See generally J. HERBST, THE GERMAN HIsToRIcAL SCHOOL
IN AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP (1965).
158. For an example of those teaching responsibilities, see text and note at 168, 172
infra.
159. See, e.g., text at notes 172-75, 211-19 infra.
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leagues and precious little in the way of library resources. 160
The twin notions of advancement through colonial service and
of a serious commitment to legal scholarship in a particular
mode-treatises, and to a lesser extent casebooks, that provided a
systematic presentation of a particular branch of law-by and
large defined much of the world of the pre-World War I law pro-
fessor.16 1 It was into this world that Underhill Moore came as a
young law teacher. How much he knew about that world is not
clear, although he cannot have been wholly unprepared for it. He
was a 1902 graduate of Columbia, at that time at the peak of its
early development.16 2 He knew something about what scholarship
was; while in law school he completed a masters degree in the
School of Political Science, the premier department in the coun-
try,163 and as part of that degree wrote and subsequently published
a short thesis.' Moore also knew what it meant to be a profes-
sional; his father was a Park Avenue opthamologist and there were
lawyers among his family, most notably his grandfather, Abraham
Underhill, and his grand uncle, Thomas S. Moore.165 He likewise
knew what contemporary practice was having worked for five years
doing "probate, the construction of wills and trusts, the 'disentan-
gling' of statutes and the law of property."1 6 But whatever Moore
160. On the limited libraries of provincial law schools, see D. WIODOR, ROSCOE POUND:
PHMOSOPHER OF LAW 121 (1974); Pattee, The College of Law in FORTY YEARS OF THE UNI-
vERsITY OF MINNESOTA 141, 142 (E. Johnson, ed., 1910).
161. One can discount the purely verbal expressions of the notions of colonial service
and scholarly vocation as simply that-much talk the unimportance of which is shown by
the little action that accompanied it. And as is often the case with such an objection, it has
more than a bit of merit. The histories of major law schools such as Harvard and Columbia
are replete with faculty whose commitment to anything more than a very episodic scholar-
ship is highly dubious. Any attempt to account generally for the process of professionaliza-
tion of law teachers before World War I would have to account for these negative cases too.
But for present purposes all that is important is that, whether these two notions are domi-
nant or only subsidiary themes over the profession as a whole, they adequately explain
Moore's early professional activities. And that they do.
162. See FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 161.
163. The department included John W. Burgess, Frank J. Goodnow, John Bassett
Moore, and Munroe Smith. See generally R.G. Hoxie, A HISTORY OF THE FACULTY OF POLITZ-
CAL SCIENCE, COLUMBIA UNsvERsrrY (1955).
164. Moore, What Constitutes a Contract? 63 ALBANY L.J. 411 (1901).
165. Cohen, Prof. Underhill Moore and His Influence On The Growth of the Law
School, 2 BULL. OF ALUMNI ASS'N OF L. SCH. OF COLUM. U. 3 (1929).
166. Horace E. Deming to Edmund J. James (Pres., U. of Il1.), June 17, 1910, Moore




knew about the world of the academic lawyer, when he decided in
1906 that it was time to teach, he sought a hand from Columbia's
dean, George Kirchwey, and at his suggestion took a job at the
University of Kansas Law School.1 e7
At Kansas, Moore was a real colonial officer. As the low man
on a faculty of four, Moore introduced a variant of the case
method of teaching while in one year offering six courses.,," His
students were apparently a bit intimidated by his forceful teaching
style which, given that at the time he had red hair, red whiskers
"in rich and tangled profusion," and a temper to match, is proba-
bly best described as fierce.16 e With his heavy course load little re-
search was done; all that Moore managed to publish was an edited
version of his old A.M. thesis1 70 already published once before. Af-
ter two years he moved on to Wisconsin, a school where, unlike
Kansas, text books were not used in classes, 71 and thus presuma-
bly a step up the ladder. At Wisconsin a somewhat lighter teaching
schedule17 1 permitted him some time for scholarship, initially a
casebook on negotiable instruments done in collaboration with a
senior colleague there,173 a book review,174 and several articles on
negotiable instruments each done with quite exacting thorough-
ness.17 5 At the same time there was occasion to renew his friend-
167. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 249.
168. Underhill Moore to Harry S. Richards, Feb. 28, 1907, (assigned text and cases but
used cases in class)(on file in the Law School Administration, General Correspondence Files
at Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin, Madison) [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin
Law School Files, without cross-reference]; Note, 2 AM. L. SCH. REv. 245, 246 (1908) (taught
Agency, Bills and Notes, Bailments and Carriers, Damages, Partnership and Insurance, In-
terational Law, and Elementary Law and Jurisprudence); Kansas Law Class of 1908, 25th
Annual Reunion Booklet (1933), Moore papers, Yale.
169. See Kansas U. Law Class of 1908, 25th Annual Reunion Booklet (1933), supra
note 168. Moore's teaching style is uniformly described as terrifying. See, e.g., FOUNDATION
FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 250.
170. Moore, Significance of the Term "Contract" in Article I, Section 10 of the Consti-
tution, 14 KANSAS LAW 1 (1907).
171. Underhill Moore to George Richards, Dec. 19, 1910, Moore papers, Columbia.
172. Note, 2 AM. L. SCH. Rnv. 245, 246 (1908) (Bankruptcy, Bills and Notes, Criminal
Law, Conflict of Laws and Suretyship).
173. H. SMrrH & W. U. MOORE, CASES ON Tm LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES (1910).
174. Moore, Book Review, 4 ILL. L. Rnv. 607 (1910) (review of F. MEECHAM & B. GIL-
BERT, CASES ON DAMAGES (1909)).
175. Moore, Negotiable Instruments in 7 AMERICAN LAW AND PROCEDURE 1 (1912) (This
series, edited by James Parker Hall, Dean at the University of Chicago, contains articles by
Walter Wheeler Cook, Albert Kales, and Roscoe Pound, among others. To the consternation
of these individuals this work, originally designed for non-lawyers, was in fact utilized by
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ship with Walter Wheeler Cook and to run unsuccessfully for local
office as part of an attempt to institute the commission form of
government in Madison.17
Moore and his colleagues understood their place on the colo-
nial career ladder. Cook, who left Wisconsin first, seems to have
helped start Moore down the road that ultimately led to Moore's
joining Cook at Chicago;177 Moore repaid the favor by opening up
the possibility for Cook to further advance by teaching summer
school at Columbia. 78 Moore quite explicitly valued the potential
claim to advancement that was symbolized by his "connection"
with Columbia through his teaching summer school there. 70 Eu-
gene Gilmore, another colleague at Wisconsin, recognizing the way
Wisconsin was for many but a way station to better places and
wanting to join the parade, attempted to fit his career into his
friends' pattern. 80 Similarly Moore internalized Ames' notion of a
scholarly vocation. Early on he criticized a damages casebook for
giving only a "half-hearted" rather than "thorough-going" applica-
tion of the inductive method by lumping together tort and contract
cases rather than separately working out the development of each
form of action.' 81 Later he picked Williston as the model against
which to measure "true scholarly instincts.' 82 The joint impact of
these two notions can be seen in Moore's response to his first dean-
ship offer. He turned it down because the library was so small that
scholarship would be difficult and because the school, North Da-
the La Salle Extension University as a part of its correspondence course in law. See Hall,
Communications, 2 AM. L. SCH. Rzv. 471 (1910)); Moore, Banks and Banking in the United
States in Dm HANDELSGESEnr DES ERDBALLS 1 (0. Borchard ed. 191?); Moore, Bills of Ex-
change in 11 DiE HANDELSGEsBTZE DES ERDBALLS 111 (O.Borchard ed. 191?).
176. Underhill Moore to Harold Kellock, Mar. 13, 1912, Moore papers, Columbia. I in-
fer that Moore knew Cook while both were students at Columbia from Harry S. Richards to
Underhill Moore, Mar. 10, 1908 (Cook says try Missouri); Underhill Moore to Harry S.
Richards, Mar. 16, 1908 (remember me to Cook), Wisconsin Law School Files.
177. See Walter Wheeler Cook to Underhill Moore, Feb. 27, 1912, Moore papers,
Columbia.
178. See Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Dec. 19,1913 (try Cook); Walter Wheeler
Cook to Underhill Moore, Dec. 29, 1913 (thanks), Moore papers, Columbia.
179. See Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Dec. 19, 1913, Moore papers, Columbia.
180. See Eugene Gilmore to Underhill Moore, May 27, 1919, June 3, 1919 (1 am a good
teacher, but have lacked the time for scholarship); Harry S. Richards to Underhill Moore,
June 16, 1919 (Gilmore not interested in scholarship), Moore papers, Columbia. On Gilmore
see W. JOHNSON, supra note 145, at 115, 166-67.
181. Moore, supra note 174.
182. See Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Feb. 22, 1916, Moore papers, Columbia.
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kota, was so far off the circuit that it would be hard to get good
teachers.183
It would, however, be a mistake to infer from Moore's inter-
nalization of the notions of advancement through colonial service
and professorial vocation that his years at Kansas and Wisconsin
were in any sense idyllic. On the contrary, while at both schools
Moore expressed all of the complaints one might expect from a
young man at a colonial outpost. From the beginning he was un-
happy at Kansas, a place where, as Moore saw it, the Dean was
proud that the law school was a "dumping ground" for athletes.18
Even with his advance to Wisconsin Moore was unwilling to be
contented with a law professor's salary"85 and soon was com-
plaining not only about salary but also about the slow pace of his
academic advancement and the general lack of appreciation or sub-
stantial recognition as a law teacher.""' In the summer of 1910 an
offer to teach at the University of Illinois, which, somewhat to his
surprise, brought forth a matching offer at Wisconsin, 87 and the
possibility of an offer from Cornell,188 raised Moore's spirits a bit,
but not for long. In the winter of 1912, he resigned his post at Wis-
consin with the expectation of returning to New York, reentering
practice, this time with a friend, and hopefully teaching part-time
at Columbia.189 However the friend died unexpectedly19" and
183. Frank McVey to Underhill Moore, Apr. 6, 1912 (offer); Underhill Moore to Frank
McVey, Apr. 1912 (draft) Moore papers, Columbia. A later offer at Missouri where "modem
methods of teaching... [were] thoroughly established" Charles K. Burdick to Underhill
Moore, Mar. 26, 1914, Moore papers, Columbia, floundered on the question of compensation
alone, Underhill Moore to Charles K. Burdick, Apr. 13, 1914, Moore papers, Columbia. The
pecking order was indeed finely drawn.
184. Underhill Moore to Harry S. Richards, Feb. 28, 190T, Wisconsin Law School Files.
185. Horace E. Deming to Underhill Moore, Dec. 23, 1908, Moore papers, Columbia. At
the time Moore's salary was $2200.
186. See George Kirchwey to Underhill Moore, Apr. 27, 1910 (replying to Moore's com-
plaints), Moore papers, Columbia.
187. Oliver A. Harker (Dean) to Underhill Moore, June 4, 1910 (offer), June 10, 1910
(salary $3,000); Underhill Moore to Horace E. Deming, July 30, 1910 (recounting outcome),
Moore papers, Columbia. At the same time Moore had an offer to teach at George Washing-
ton. Ernest G. Lorenzen (Dean) to Underhill Moore, June 17, 1910, Moore papers, Colum-
bia. That school was apparently below Wisconsin in the pecking order too, for a year later,
Lorenzen took a post as a professor at Wisconsin.
188. See George Kirchwey to Underhill Moore, June 8, 1910 (I have written Cornell);
Underhill Moore to George Kirchwey, July 30, 1910, ("Although I am devoted to my work
here and like the school & faculty immensely, I hope something will come of the Cornell
matter another year."), Moore papers, Columbia.
189. Underhill Moore to Charles R. Van Hise (President), Feb. 1, 1912 (resignation);
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Moore stayed on at Wisconsin buoyed a bit by the deanship offer
at North Dakota. "91
While Moore struggled with his lot at Wisconsin his mentors
offered necessary support and simultaneously reinforced his colo-
nial and vocational perspectives on that lot. Dean Kirchwey pro-
vided encouragement and also reproof when confronted by Moore's
impatience in the early years at Wisconsin. He emphasized both
that Moore was an "infant ... in point of years and experience"
and that Moore had assumed for himself "the arduous paths of
academic life. 19 2 And he rejoiced at the possibility that Moore
might receive an offer from Cornell-"a long step in the right di-
rection." 193 When Stone took over the deanship at Columbia he
took over the job of encouraging Moore, too, for example by sug-
gesting that "ultimately" part-time work would be available if
Moore sought to return to practice 194 or by releasing Moore from
an agreement to teach summer school so Moore could take the
chance to establish a connection with, and perhaps open the possi-
bility of a job at Chicago, with the observation that Moore's teach-
ing had been "extremely satisfactory."19 5 Friends provided support
too, most notably Cook who nurtured the hope that Moore could
move to the University of Chicago,190 "one of the three best law
schools in the country."1 9 7
While Moore waited for something better to come along, he
continued to work to make sure that that something better would
come along. He resumed his "intensive study of negotiable pa-
per"198 that had as its first product a new edition of Norton's
Handbook, notable for the unbelieveable thoroughness of the
Underhill Moore to Lawrence W. Trowbridge, Mar. 12, 1912 (discussion of partnership);
Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Mar. 23, 1912 (what about part-time teaching?);
Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Mar. 26, 1912, (nothing but patents available), Moore
papers, Columbia.
190. Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Apr. 22, 1912, Moore papers, Columbia.
191. See text at note 183 supra.
192. George Kirchwey to Underhill Moore, Apr. 27, 1910, Moore papers, Columbia.
193. George Kirchwey to Underhill Moore, June 8, 1910, Moore papers, Columbia.
194. Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Mar. 26, 1912, Moore papers, Columbia.
195. Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Dec. 22, 1913, Moore papers, Columbia.
196. See Walter Wheeler Cook to Underhill Moore, Feb. 27, 1912, Moore papers,
Columbia.
197. Underhill Moore to Charles R. Van Hise, Feb. 13, 1913, Moore papers, Columbia.
198. Walter Wheeler Cook to Underhill Moore, Aug. 4, 1916, Moore papers, Columbia.
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notes. 199 Then, in the spring of 1914, Moore helped organize a "le-
gal and philosophical colloquium" whose participants included
John Commons, Richard T. Ely and the prominent moral philoso-
pher F.C. Sharp.200 At the same time he nurtured his relationship
with Chicago, not only by teaching summer school,20 1 but also by
teaching part-time during the school year at substantial personal
inconvenience.202 His efforts were not wasted. In the summer of
1914, when Julian Mack, a faculty member at Chicago, was ap-
pointed to the United States Commerce Court,203 Moore was cho-
sen as his replacement.2°
With his appointment at Chicago, at a substantial increase in
salary, Moore's overt complaints about the financial lot of a law
professor ceased,205 although a careful observer cannot fail to no-
tice a reoccurance of the pecuniary motivation in his behavior from
time to time.20 6 Reunited with Cook, acquainted with Oliphant for
the first time, and located at a place he could respect, Moore began
to lose the manner of a sub-altern.0 7 He started attending the
199. C. NORTON, HANDBOOK OF TmE LAW OF BmLs AND NOTES (4th ed. W.U. Moore & H.
Wilkie 1914). At the same time he published W.U. MOORE, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES ON THE LAW
OF BMLS AND NOTS (4th ed. 1914). He also tried to get the job of editing Ames' casebook on
the subject. Underhill Moore to Richard Ames, May 31, 1912, Moore papers, Columbia.
200. See Underhill Moore & Henry W. Ballentine (Wis. law faculty), Notice of Le-
gal-Philosophical Colloquium, Jan. 1914?, Moore papers, Columbia. Commons spoke on
the "Legal and Economic Theory of Value and Valuation," Ely, on "The Social Theory of
Private Property," and Sharp, on "Principles of Judicial Legislation."
201. James P. Hall to Underhill Moore, Dec. 13, 1912, Jan. 23, 1914, Moore papers,
Columbia.
202. James P. Hall to Underhill Moore, Feb. 6, 1913 (offer to teach suretyship two days
per week for spring quarter); Underhill Moore to Charles R. Van Hise, Feb. 13, 1913 (re-
quest for permission), Moore papers, Columbia.
203. On Mack see H. BARNARD, THn FORGING OF AN AMERICAN JEW: THE LiFE AND
TIMES OF JUDGE JULIAN W. MACK (1974) which unfortunately slights most of Mack's career
except for his Zionist activities.
204. Deans kept up their role in encouraging youngsters well into retirement. See
George Kirchwey to Underhill Moore, Dec. 9, 1914 (Congratulations on your move, but I
still wish you were at Columbia.), Moore papers, Columbia.
205. Moore's starting salary at Chicago was $5500, a substantial jump from the $4000
he would have made had he stayed at Wisconsin. With the advancement came a further
decrease in teaching load. Note, 3 AM. L. SCN. REv. 587 (1914) (Bills and Notes, Municipal
Corporations, Suretyship and Mortgage, and half of Contracts).
206. See text at notes 212-13 infra.
207. Which is not to say he was entirely satisfied with his position at Chicago. "The
position here is a very attractive one and my opportunities and compensation are, I sup-
pose, as good as there would be at Columbia," Underhill Moore to James McClelland, Aug.
19, 1915, Moore papers, Columbia (emphasis supplied). See also text at note 215 infra.
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meetings of the Association of American Law Schools and partici-
pating in its affairs.20 8 He continued his research in Anglo-Ameri-
can negotiable instruments law, pointedly giving up its regional
character. 209 Then in 1916, almost before he had a chance to get
settled in Chicago, there came the call from Columbia. 210
Moore attempted to maintain a studied indifference to Stone's
offer, citing family, social, and business reasons for staying at Chi-
cago,211 but, when Stone made that offer financially attractive,21 2
Moore came running. Indeed he began to recruit for his new school
by attempting to steal colleagues from Chicago even before he had
arrived at Columbia.21 In truth, he was a bit surprised to get an
offer from Stone21 4 and not unhappy to leave the "close and stuffy"
atmosphere of the University of Chicago Law School.215 Stone's ar-
gument that plans were "well under way for the organization and
development" of Columbia "as a professional school and for carry-
ing on in connection with it work in legal research" such as would
"make the strongest appeal for the man ambitious to increase his
power and influence as a law teacher and a writer on legal sub-
jects" echoed Ames' idea of a professional role.216 It plainly hit
home with Moore who acted on it as he bargained for subjects in
"closely related fields of law" in order to facilitate his scholar-
ship217 and, not incidentally, not get stuck teaching torts.2 8 In-
208. See [1914] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 2, [1915] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 25, 29 (nominating
committee). Moore was also chairman of the local arrangements committee in 1915.
209. See Underhill Moore to Harold M. Wilkie (collaborator on Norton), Oct. 18, 1915
(no longer wish to do Wisconsin annotations to Negotiable Instruments Law), Moore papers,
Columbia.
210. Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Jan. 11, 1916 (salary of $6,000), Moore pa-
pers, Columbia.
211. Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Jan. 13, 1916 (and in any case I make $6,000
and am scheduled to go to $7,500 in due course), Moore papers, Columbia.
212. Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Jan. 17, 1916 (I can go to $7,500); Underhill
Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Jan. 19, 1916 (what about private practice?); Harlan F. Stone to
Underhill Moore, Jan. 26, 1916 (I will meet but not top Chicago; you may practice but may
not "maintain an office and have regular office engagements"); Underhill Moore to Harlan
F. Stone, Jan. 26, 1916 (I will come talk); Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Feb. 8, 1916,
(offer of $7,500), Moore papers, Columbia.
213. &e Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Feb. 22, 1916 (E. W. Hinton); Underhill
Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Apr. 16, 1916 (Walter Wheeler Cook), Moore papers, Columbia.
214. Underhill Moore to W. Oliver Moore (father), Mar. 10, 1916, Moore papers,
Columbia.
215. Underhill Moore to E. W. Hinton, fall 1916?, Moore papers, Columbia.
216. Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Jan. 17, 1916, Moore papers, Columbia.
217. Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, Feb. 18, 1916; May 4, 1916, Moore papers,
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deed, he argued with such force that Stone rearranged the curricu-
lum in order to accommodate Moore and at the same time hold to
the "cardinal principle . . . that the more prominent instructors
would meet each of the three classes" each year.2"9
When Moore got to Columbia he had made it, and he knew it.
He worked to build his "power and influence" in many ways. He
increased his activities in the A.A.L.S. by taking on the chairman-
ship of the round table on commercial law for two years"2 ° and by
actively participating in floor debate on proposals to classify law
schools.221 He increased his efforts at scholarly productivity by ac-
quiring a student research assistant to aid in "briefing, examina-
tion of law and collection of authorities" on the grand negotiable
instruments project.2 22 He even planned a casebook on surety-
ship.223 In short, he acted as if he believed in scholarship on the
grand scale and was in every way fully committed to the "strenu-
ous" career of the law teacher.224 Yet almost as soon as his position
at Columbia was established, somewhat curious things began to
take place. First his research, once urgently up to date,225 began to
fall behind. 226 Then Moore stopped participating in A.A.L.S. af-
fairs.22 7 Instead he began to read John Dewey on education,228 and
various authors on psychoanalysis.229 He made friends with mem-
Columbia.
218. See Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Feb. 15, 1916 (torts; no one wants it and
I can get you the retiring teachers' notes); Apr. 26, 1916 (again); Underhill Moore to Harlan
F. Stone, May 1, 1916 (no, ignorant on the subject), May 4, 1916 (again), Moore papers,
Columbia.
219. Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, May 5, 1916, Moore papers, Columbia.
220. See [1920] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 64; [1921] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 29.
221. [1921] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK at 115-19.
222. Underhil Moore to Harlan F. Stone, June 30, 1916, Moore papers, Columbia.
223. Ultimately he would even play the role of providing support for the young teachers
sent to the Midwest as he had been. See Homer F. Carey (Kansas) to Underhill Moore, Feb.
6, 1929; Underhill Moore to Homer F. Carey, Feb. 13, 1929; Homer F. Carey (Michigan) to
Underhill Moore, May 11, 1930; Underhill Moore to Homer F. Carey, May 14, 1930; Homer
F. Carey to Underhill Moore, Sept. ?, 1931; Underhill Moore to Homer F. Carey, Sept. 30,
1931, Moore papers, Yale.
224. Underhill Moore to Harlan F. Stone, May 1, 1916, Moore papers, Columbia.
225. See Underhill Moore to Frederick C. Hicks (Colum. librarian) June 30, 1916, July
11, 1916 (must not miss a single advance sheet), Moore papers, Columbia.
226. See Underhill Moore to Max Radin (Cal., Berkeley), Oct. 27, 1919 (I am a year
behind), Moore papers, Columbia.
227. After 1921, he attended only one meeting, see text and note at 646 infra.
228. See Underhill Moore to Robert L. Hale, Nov. 30, 1918, Moore papers, Columbia.
229. See Harold Kellock (classmate) to Underhill Moore, June 20, 1920, Moore papers,
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bers of Columbia's sociology department, 30 and helped raise
money for a "detailed inquiry into several lines of productive in-
dustry and business enterprise" to be run by Thorsten Veblen.5 1
The shift in Moore's interests was gradual. During this same
time he published two bits of caselaw research notable largely for
the copious footnotes, 2  and completed a previously contracted for
revision of his jointly authored casebook.233 And he considered
moving to Yale to be with Cook. 34 But, however gradual in cumu-
lative effect, the change was well enough known in the New York
intellectual community that when Morris R. Cohen, a prominent
City College professor of philosophy who was interested in legal
topics, chose to take a swipe at the critics of Col. Wigmore's book
as "marxians, positivists, behaviorists, and psychoanalysts ...
united in the dogma that the reasons we give for any legal institu-
tion cannot possibly have any effective influence on its growth or
administration," a position he characterized as "a snap judgment"
Columbia.
230. See, e.g., William F. Ogburn to Underhill Moore, July 20, 1920 (visit to summer
home) Moore papers, Columbia.
231. See An Inquiry into Business and Production, (unpublished study) Spring, 1920?;
Harold Kellock to Underhill Moore, May 20, 1920, Moore papers, Columbia.
232. Moore, Theft of Incomplete Negotiable Instrument and Negotiation to Holder in
Due Course, 17 COLUM. L. Rv. 617 (1917); Moore, The Right of the Remitter of a Bill or
Note, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1920). Moore also published two book reviews at this time,
one mildly humorous, 19 COLUM. L. Rv. 87 (1919) (review of T. BATY, LOAN AND HIRE
(1918)) and the other quite serious, 20 COLUM. L. Rxv. 365 (1920) (with Walter Wheeler
Cook) (review of E. LoRENzEN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES
(1919)).
233. H. SMITH & W. U. MOORE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES
(2d ed. 1922).
234. See Walter Wheeler Cook to Underhill Moore, Mar. 24, 1919, Moore papers, Co-
lumbia. Moore was apparently sought as a replacement for Wesley 14. Hohfeld who died in
October 1918 after an illness of some nine months. Ultimately Cook decided to come to
Columbia, apparently because he had concluded that it was the "place [where] the greatest
progress is to be hoped for in really doing constructive things during the next twenty years,"
(id.) and, as a result, Moore decided to stay. See Ernest G. Lorenzen (then at Yale) to
Underhill Moore, Apr. 16, 1919, Moore papers, Columbia. Moore and Cook had engaged in
this little dance once before, but with no result. See Walter Wheeler Cook to Underhill
Moore, Feb. 4, 1917 (I'll consider Columbia), Feb. 18, 1917 (well then you come to Yale);
Underhill Moore to Walter Wheeler Cook, Feb. 5, 1917 (can't get faculty together for an-
other week), Moore papers, Columbia. Dean Stone had said it was not the time to add Cook
to the faculty less than a year earlier. See Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Apr. 18,
1916, Moore papers, Columbia. It took Oliphant two times to make up his mind to come to
Columbia, too. See Herman Oliphant to Underhill Moore, May 29, 1920, Moore papers,
Columbia.
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unsupported by any serious evidence from the realm of law, '23 5 one
of Moore's friends considered this criticism a "slap" directed
squarely at Moore.2 6
But notoriety does not imply explicability, indeed it probably
implies the reverse. The question remains just as it was posed
before this detour into the commonplace in the life of the early
twentieth century law professor: notoriety aside, what brought
about the change in Moore's interests that first showed itself in
print in the Wigmore review? The answer is to be found in the
more personal aspect of Moore's participation in and reaction to
the commonplace in the world of the law professor as he knew it.
One of the ideas that held together the notions of advance-
ment through colonial service and of professorial vocation was that
of the university law school. This idea was first formulated by
Thayer who affirmed that "law must be studied and taught as
other great sciences" at the universities, "as deeply, by like meth-
ods, and with as thorough a concentration and life-long devotion of
all the powers of a learned and studious faculty" and then relegate
the "difficult main work of teaching" to an "of course. '2"7 Re-
search, especially that in the German historical tradition,238 was
235. Cohen, Book Review, 33 YAE L.J. 892, 892 (1924). On Cohen see D. HOLLINGER,
MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIEwrnWIC IDEAL (1975).
236. Thomas Reed Powell to Underhill Moore, June 20, 1924, Moore papers, Yale. Co-
hen may well have had Moore in mind as having written one of "the notices of this book
[that] have been rather unjust in failing to take account of what the editors actually set out
to do"--namely, create "a new type of text for students of law, occupying an intermediate
position between the ordinary casebooks and treatises on the general theory of law." Cohen,
supra note 235, at 892, 893. But, if so, it is curious that many of their specific complaints
were identical. Compare Cohen, supra note 235, at 893 ("many of the selections seem to me
perfectly valueless," "[p]roperty is discussed as if it were just one simple thing existing by
itself"), and 894 ("the overpowering impression which the reading of this book makes. . . is
the awful amount of nonsense written by worthy people on serious and momentous sub-
jects") with Rational Basis, supra note 24, at 616 ("the selection and arrangement of the
material under the heads of property and succession are all that would be expected from a
treatment of the institution of property as a single problem to be settled a priori.") and 617
("Upon opening the volume, we thought we sensed a spirit of weariness in Mr. Justice
Holmes' Introduction; upon closing .the book, our confidence is strengthened that this im-
pression was correct."). Indeed they identified similar good points, too. Compare Cohen,
supra note 235, at 894 (Pound, McMurray, and Charmont) with Rational Basis, supra note
24, at 616, 617 (Pound, Bosanquet, Charmont and Parsons). It would not have been unli!ely
for Cohen to have attacked an individual with whom he was in basic agreement. See gener-
ally D. HOLLINGER, supra note 235, at 69-90.
237. Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARv. L. Rv. 169, 173,
183 (1895).
238. Id. at 175-180. See generally J. HEREST, THE GERMAN HISTORICAL TRADITION IN
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thus in the forefront, rhetorically at least, of discussion aimed at
forging a professional role. Ames, similarly emphasized the schol-
arly aspects of the university law professor's "vocation" but, as
might be expected from a stronger teacher, began with the "para-
mount duty" of teaching on the part of one who has "mastered his
subject."2 39 The vision of the younger generation, those who were
Moore's chronological contemporaries, was if anything more ex-
teme as can be seen from Hohfeld's Vital School of Jurisprudence
and Law in which, drawing on the example of "schools of medicine
and education" that have "gone far ... in developing the sciences
and activities that lie back of the purely professional work," he
created a school for "the systematic and developmental study of
legal systems" so grand as to quite obviously dwarf the profes-
sional program.2 40 And Hohfeld's was a vision with more than a
little magic to it as can be seen from the later somewhat bewilder-
ing history of the idea.24 1 As these leaders of the profession saw the
matter it was the true university law school where one advanced
and in which one could most fully practice one's scholarly vocation.
In support of this goal they identified as one of the reasons for the
superiority of the university affiliated law school the advantage to
be derived from the manifold resources of the other departments
of the university.242
Looked at critically the idea of a university law school was
partially a device whereby academic lawyers attempted to differen-
tiate themselves from their netheren in the proprietary schools. At
the same time it was an idea that could be acted upon, just as the
AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP (1965).
239. J. Aams, supra note 155 at 364-65, 362.
240. Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Universities
Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day? in
[1914] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 76, 82, 80.
241. Hohfeld's speech and a similar one by Harry Richards led to the formation of a
Committee on the Establishment of A Juristic Center of the Association of American Law
Schools. See [1915] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 28-29. Richards, Joseph Beale and Harlan Fisk
Stone as members of the Committee tried to kill the idea of establishing such a center since
"constant work with advanced classes in speculative jurisprudence is not calculated to pro-
duce results that are of great practical value." [1916] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 180-182. Kocourek
managed to keep the idea of such a center alive, id. at 94-95. When it surfaced on the other
side of World War I, it had metamorphized into the organization that became the American
Law Institute, [1922] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 37-39. The common law world had again managed
to triumph.
242. See, e.g., Swan, Reconstruction of the Legal Profession, 28 YALE L.J. 784, 792-94
(1919) (a peculiarly mundane example).
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notion of a professional vocation, in part a plea for higher salaries,
%could be.24 Moore quite obviously acted on the notion of a profes-
sional vocation as he did his colonial service.2 " Likewise, he acted
as if he believed in the idea of the university law school. When he
sought, or was asked, to leave Kansas and teacher's training,2 4 5
Moore looked for a place where he could "sympathize with the ide-
als of the rest of the faculty."2 "' When he found that place with his
move to Chicago he gave up any lingering parochial conception of
the appropriate scope of his research and began to give his work
national scope.~7 Then, two years later, with the move to Colum-
bia, Moore reached the university law school par excellence. Co-
lumbia, unlike almost any other major law school, had had a con-
stant, if rocky, relationship with studies in political science for
nearly sixty years.us The school was thus, in theory at least, more
open to the resources of the university than were most law schools
at the time. When Moore arrived he started to explore just what he
had been told would be his reward for successful advancement up
the ladder of colonial service-the resources of a major university;
the same resources he had begun to explore in a very tentative way
his last semester at Wisconsin.2 "
243. See, e.g., AMEs, supra note 155, at 369. This note continues down to this day. See
H. Wellington, Annual Report of the Dean of Yale Law School to the President and Fellows
of Yale University for 1977-78, at 4-5 (1978).
244. See text at notes 173-75, 181-83, 198-99, 209 supra.
245. Clark, Underhill Moore, 59 YALE L.J. 189, 190-91 (1950) suggests that Moore cre-
ated some trouble while at Kansas. Exactly what that trouble was is hard to pinpoint, how-
ever. There is a family story that Moore was fired from his post at Kansas in a dispute over
Chapel attendance and that William Allen White helped him out of this bind. Interview
with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976. I have been unable to verify the story, though it has a
certain ring of truth to it. The survival of compulsory chapel at Midwestern state universi-
ties as late as 1907 is one of those quaint native customs that Moore, the colonial officer,
would have felt bound to resist just as in other places he would have felt compelled to clothe
the natives. But, however plausible, the story is not likely to be true. Moore ascribed his
troubles at Kansas to his having flunked 15 to 20 per cent of his classes, a fact which to-
gether with his use of the case method earned his dean's enmity. Underhill Moore to Harry
S. Richards, Feb. 28, 1907, Wisconsin Law School Files. One of the Regents at Kansas
ascribed those troubles to a feeling on the part of students that Moore was too severe and
expected too much work. A.C. Mitchell to Harry S. Richards, May 22,1908, Wisconsin Law
School Files.
246. Underhill Moore to Harry S. Richards, Mar. 7, 1908, Wisconsin Law School Files.
247. See text at note 209 supra.
248. See generally, FOUNDATION FOR RCsEARcH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 85-
91, 96-98, 110-15, 126-28, 148, 167-68, 210-11.
249. See text at note 200 supra.
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What Moore found was an intellectual community in its most
extraordinary period of social scientific creativity: James Harvey
Robinson and Charles Beard in history, Thorstein Veblen 210 and
William D. Mitchell in economics, Franz Boas in anthropology,
E.L. Thorndike in educational psychology, William F. Ogburn in
sociology and, of course, John Dewey. And again Moore did just
what he was expected to do, or at least what the idea of a univer-
sity law school purported to expect; he attempted to learn what
this exciting atmosphere had to offer for the study of law.
Part of what Moore in fact learned in this atmosphere is easy
to isolate. As the citations in the Wigmore review indicate, he
gained a basic grounding in social science as it was taught in the
years around World War J.251 But specific knowledge is not all that
Moore acquired in these years. A more important, though less tan-
gible, acquisition was an understanding of, and commitment to,
the modern concept of science as an empirical or experimental
activity.2 52
Evidence of the fact and the impact of the adoption of a mod-
ern concept of science on Moore's previously quite conventional
thought can be seen by comparing any of his earlier articles with
the Wigmore review or, even better, by browsing through the pages
of the volume of the Columbia Law Review in which that review
appears. There, amid discussions of determinable fees,23 frolic and
250. Veblen was not at Columbia but at the New School for Social Research, an estab-
lishment of dissident Columbia faculty members. He was, however, a part of the intellectual
community that had its center first at Columbia and then at Columbia and the New School.
251. See Rational Basis, supra note 24, at 613-14. Each of the books cited is a general
introductory work, occasionally a text book even, written with one exception (William Mc-
Dougall) by people at, or associated with, Columbia University in the years on either side of
World War L Each is the kind of book a technical specialist might suggest to an interested
but green colleague in response to the lunchtime observation, "That's very interesting; I'd
like to read some more about these problems"--the kind of introduction one unlettered in
social science could usefully have acquired immediately after becoming seriously interested
in it. One of the authors is known to have been a personal friend of Moore-William F.
Ogburn; the rest were individuals that a prominent new faculty member less than forty
years old and hired at a quite extraordinary salary would have met at the faculty club of
what was still a relatively small university.
252. My understanding of the reception of the "scientific ideal" into American aca-
demic thought has been immeasurably aided by many discussions with Prof. David Hollin-
ger. He should not, however, be tarred with responsibility for what I have done to his essen-
tial insight into American thought around the turn of the century.
253. Powell, Determinable Fees, 23 COLUM. L. Rav. 207 (1923).
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detour,254 and confusion of goods, 55 Moore's article stands out as
virtually the only piece that looks both to experimental methods.
and to social and economic conditions for the answer to any ques-
tion about law and this in a volume that contains articles by Karl
Llewellyn 256 and A.A. Berle, Jr.2 57 Yet, the review is singularly de-
void of suggestions of how this quite remarkable change in Moore's
thinking took place.
Although one could easily argue that by 1920 the modern con-
cept of science was sufficiently established within the university
community for it to be simply in the air and thus capable of pene-
trating unaided even the walls of a law school, the specific source
for Moore's ideas was more concrete; it was a trio of scholars quite
squarely within the social science community that Moore con-
fronted with his arrival at Columbia: John Dewey, James Harvey
Robinson, and Thorstein Veblen.
These three men who Moore acknowledged had made him
over during his "first years of enthusiasm at Columbia 258 were in
254. Smith, Frolic and Detour: I, 23 COLUM. L. Rv. 444 (1923). Smith, Frolic and De-
tour: II, 23 COLUM. L. Rav. 716 (1923). /
255. Arnold, Confusion, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 235 (1923).
256. Llewellyn, Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions Precedent in the
Law of Negotiable Paper, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 142 (1923).
257. Berle, Jr., Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, 23 CoLuM. L. REv. 358 (1923). The
contrast is heightened if one notes that the only other article that from its title sounds as if
it will deviate, and in some ways does, from the norm of langdellian disputation is an article
that emphasizes the source of that contrast with a footnote acknowledgement to Dewey. See
Isaacs, How Lawyers Think, 23 COLUM. L. Rav. 555 n.2 (1923).
258. Underhill Moore to James Harvey Robinson, Jan. 13, 1934, Moore papers, Yale.
The context of this letter lends strength to deductions from it. Moore was the co-organizer
of a committee to raise funds to commission a portrait of Thorstein Veblen, Yale's first
Ph.D., to be hung in Yale's new Hall of Graduate Studies. The committee included Edgar
Furniss, an economist and Dean of Yale's Graduate School, Wesley C. Mitchell, the Colum-
bia economist, Jerome Frank and Harold Laski. Moore had written Robinson, a personal
friend from the years at Columbia, Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976, for a contribu-
tion, which Robinson cheerfully made. The quotation asserting that Robinson, Veblen, and
Dewey "made . .. [Moore] over" in his early years at Columbia is from Moore's un-
characteristically warm thank you note to Robinson.
The similarity in the thought of these three men has been noted. See generally M.
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AmEOAm THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (2d ed. 1957). As
subject for biography Veblen is the best represented. See J. DORPMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN
AND His AMERICA (1935); D. RmsmAN, THoRSTEIN VEELEN: A CRmCAL INTERRETATION
(1953). The standard work on Dewey is still S. HooK, JOHN DEWEY,' AN INTELLECTUAL POR-
TRAIT (1939) although G. DYKHunmN, THE LIFE AND MIND OF JOHN DEWEY (1973) merits
some attention. See also L. HENDICK, JAMES HARvEY ROBINSON, TACHER OF HISTORY
(1946).
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fact friends, all living and working in New York City by about
.1919, just the time when Moore's interests began to shift.25" All
three shared and were known for their thorough commitment to
the modern notion of science and their equally thorough opposi-
tion to the more ancient notion of science as any rational activity,
specifically, as a rationalistic activity. Dewey was a tireless prosely-
tizer for a scientific attitude of mind.26 0 Robinson, who has been
described as a "cheer-leader" for the social sciences, fought for a
scientific history that explained not how things were but how they
had come about.2 1 Veblen similarly attacked classical economics
for not concerning itself with actual institutions and for not basing
its theoretic propositions on examination of functioning economic
entities.6 2
The impact of these concepts from Robinson, Veblen, and
Dewey on the content of the Wigmore review and also to Moore's
later work can be seen by examining the langdellian science of law
as it was known to Moore and his contemporaries. 263 For all of its
259. Dewey and Robinson were at Columbia when Moore arrived there. Veblen came to
New York in 1918 and joined Robinson at the New School for Social Research in 1919 when
that institution was established, about the time Moore published his last bit of conventional
research. Soon after its founding Moore showed a definite interest in activities at the New
School. See Underhill Moore to A.A. Goldenweiser, Nov. 17, 1922 (meeting of the Social
Science Club of the New School), Moore papers, Yale. Robinson was a personal friend;
Dewey, at least a solid acquaintance. See John Dewey to Underhill Moore, Nov. 13, 1924
(comment on Wigmore review. "I haven't seen the book, but I can readily believe that it
called for this treatment; the general type of thought you criticize is certainly the great
intellectual enemy at present."), Moore papers, Columbia. How well Moore knew Veblen is
open to question. At least he did not know Veblen well enough in 1919 to ask him directly
for an article for the Columbia Law Review. See Underhill Moore to Harvey T. Maun, Mar.
4, 1919, Moore papers, Columbia. See also text and note 231 supra.
260. M. WHrrE, supra note 258, 238-39.
261. Id. at 29.
262. Id. at 7-8, 21-27.
263. It is extremely doubtful that specific works of Dewey, Robinson, and Veblen, as
opposed to their general attitude or approach, provided a direct influence on Moore that
resulted in his adoption of the ideas expressed in the Wigmore review. Of the two books by
Dewey it is known that Moore read-DFsocRAcY AND EDUCATION (1916) and HUMAN NA-
TURE AND CoNDuCr (1922)-neither is central to his concerns and, even more important,
Dewey's well known opposition to Watsonian behaviorist psychology is wholly at odds with
Moore's early and continuing interest in that psychological approach. As for Robinson,
Moore showed no interest in history until during World War II. Veblen is a more difficult
case. In a very real sense Veblen was an urban anthropologist and his hotion of an institu-
tion and of the importance of examining institutional behavior finds a parallel in Moore's
notion of an institution, see text at note 116, supra, which like Veblen's is borrowed in part
from cultural anthropology, and an exemplar in at least one of Moore's activities during the
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talk about being an inductive enterprise, legal science was precisely
the kind of science Dewey, Robinson, and Veblen had attacked.
Concerned with the formal interrelationship of rules and the prin-
ciples from which they were supposedly derived, legal science as-
sumed the efficacy of the rules and ignored their origins, except as
readily disclosed in old English cases or as produced out of an ill-
defined custom or an hypothesized sovereignty. It thus purported
to describe and understand a human activity without putting that
activity into its social context and then subjecting that complex of
conceptual artifact and social context to empirical, especially
causal, scrutiny.26 ' Therefore legal science, if seen as a description
of the operation of legal institutions, was open, first, to the charge
that it had ignored its ostensible subject matter and, second, to the
prescription that direct examination of that subject matter in a de-
tached, empirical attitude would improve understanding of the ac-
tivity or institution far more than further formal elaboration.
This was precisely the line of argument that Moore took in his
Wigmore review. Moore began his review with the assertion that,
since legal institutions were the products of the habitual behavior
of individuals, to propose and carry out an inquiry into the ra-
tional basis of group habits was, first, to pose "a problem that does
not exist" and second, to ignore the only plausible subject matter
for inquiry: the ways in which group habits are formed. Such an
inquiry necessitated examining the "proximate ends" to which ex-
isting group habits, that is, existing legal institutions, are means
and the ways in which group habits can be modified, implicitly to
attain different proximate ends.26 5 Moore's prescription was just
what one might have expected of Dewey and the others: immedi-
twenties-the cement industry study. However both the notion of an institution and the
related study of cement production are easily derived from sources other than Veblen and,
in fact, to the extent ascribed to individual authors are ascribed to authors other than Veb-
len (See Rational Basis, supra note 24, at 614 n.5). On the other hand, at one time Moore's
attachment to Veblen's thought was well enough known to be mentioned in the high-brow
press. See The Honorable Supreme Court, 13 FORTUNE 79, 83 (May 1936).
264. The conspicuous exception to this generalization is Roscoe Pound who in THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921) adopted an explicitly causal approach to legal history,
but utilized a notion of causation (i.e., what precedes causes what follows) so simpleminded
as to only emphasize its similarity with langdellian lawyer's history of doctrine and its dis-
tance from a social history of law such as Robinson, or more obviously his friend Charles
Beard, might have written. See, e.g., C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
265. Rational Basis, supra note 24, at 612.
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ately turn inquiry "in the direction of detailed observation and
systematic experiment," in other words adopt a modern empirical
cast of mind.268 And finally, in detailing criticism of Wigmore's vol-
ume, Moore sketched the kinds of inquiries that might be under-
taken by one with the requisite empirical cast of mind: the impact
of material, especially biological and technological culture on the
formation and maintenance of group habits,2 7 "the available
means to experimentation"-executive, legislative, and judicial leg-
islation-in the modification of group habits,2 6 8 and current experi-
ments in the use of these tools.28 9
Equally important, Moore's two pronged argument against
Wigmore's book, that it asked the wrong question, and failed to
adopt a scientific attitude, was precisely the same as the one
Dewey had made with respect to formal logic seen as a description
of human thought 70 Robinson, with respect to European history
seen as a list of kings, treaties, and plagues,2 71 and Veblen, with
respect to classical economics seen as a description of industrial
-production and marketing.272 Moreover, not only was the substance
of Moore's argument such that it could have been done by Dewey,
Robinson, or Veblen, the form was too. In making his point Moore
took an ambiguously normative/descriptive question, "What is the
basis of legal institutions?", asserted that the question was de-
scriptive, and criticized the answer for being ambiguously norma-
tive/descriptive instead of rigorously descriptive, just the proce-
dure which Dewey and Veblen adopted, and have been criticized
for, in their critiques of formal logic and classical economics.2 3
Now why Moore found the scientific message of Dewey,
Robinson, and Veblen so enticing that after accepting it he could
say to a friend, "There is no God and Dewey is his prophet,"274 is a
different question. Here the truely personal factors enter in. Part
266. Id.
267. Id. at 612-14.
268. Id. at 615. Curiously Moore did not mention various types of government propa-
ganda as he would years later.
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 18-20 (1924). See
also M. WHnTE, supra note 258, at 24.
271. M. WHITE, supra note 258, at 28-29, 48-52.
272. Id. at 22-24, 186-89.
273. Id. at 23.




of the reason is his literal mindedness which, when combined with
a streak of thoroughness, could easily reason "If this is legal sci-
ence, then it will be really scientific. '27 5 Equally critical is the iden-
tification of each of the three men, and social science generally,
with progressive politics. Moore had been associated with liberal or
progressive political activities at least since he was graduated from
law school, ties acquired if nowhere else through his association in
practice with Horace E. Deming, a dogged advocate of the Austra-
lian ballot and significant force in reform politics, first in New
York, through his work in the Reform Club, and then nationally,
as one of the founders of the National Municipal League. 278 In-
deed, Moore affirmed this political background in his losing run for
local office, made on behalf of that classic progressive reform, the
commission form of government277 and in working with such orga-
nizations as the American Civil Liberties Union 27 8 and the Society
for Cultural Relations with Russia27'9 during his years at Columbia.
But beyond these two factors little can be isolated, little except
that uniquely personal factor of having come to Columbia, to the
university law school, from colonial service primed, as it were, to
learn what the university had to offer for the study and teaching of
law.
What Moore expected to learn, or what his mentors expected
him to learn, from his confrontation. with the university is unclear.
What he in fact learned, however, as the Wigmore review quite
dramatically showed, was that he had been asking the wrong ques-
tions, that in the words of the largely apocryphal Moore throwing
out his research notes, "It's my life work. . . and it's all wrong."280
He had been seeking an understanding of law by asking questions
275. Cf. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975 (emphasizing "bull-
headedness"); Gilbert Sussman to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976 (taped interview). The
parking study, see text accompanying notes 410-606, is a monument to thoroughness, if
nothing else. As for literal mindedness it is notable that in all of Moore's correspondence
there are virtually no metaphoric statements and that even his closest associates never com-
ment on his humor, even indirectly.
276. See 33 NAT'L CYCLOPEDIA Am. BIOG. 424 (1947).
277. See text at note 176 supra.
278. See, e.g., Albert De Silver to Underhill Moore, Apr. 27, 1922; Roger Baldwin to
Underhill Moore, Nov. 10, 1922, Moore papers, Yale. Cf. Minutes of a meeting of Lawyers at
the Lawyer's Club, Mar. 17, 1920 at 1 P.M. (meeting concerning "legal service needed in
presenting the civil liberties issue at the present time. .. ") Moore papers, Columbia.
279. Of which Moore was once a director.
280. See FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 251.
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about doctrine when all the other social sciences had been asking
questions about society and individuals in society. And so, per-
versely-for the lack of activity surrounding rhetoric about the re-
sources of the university suggests the rhetoric was not intended to
be taken seriously-Moore started off to acquire a social under-
standing of law. Being a commercial lawyer and thus being familiar
with arguments about commercial law as little more than the law
facilitating the customs of businessmen, Moore was quite naturally
attracted to cultural anthropology. So when it came time to not
just talk about research, but do some, he isolated a method to look
seriously at the relation between law and custom and then aban-
doned Columbia where he got the idea, but lost his friends, for
Yale and a new start.
11. RESEARCH AT YALE
Can't you see I'm busy,
counting these cars?
Oil portraits are an unusual form of stock-taking, among the
living a voluntary acquiescence in being "framed." When Moore
left Columbia several of his former students assembled a fund to
acquire a portrait of Moore for his former law school.2 81 The result-
ing likeness, painted by a neighbor whose work Moore tirelessly
promoted, shows a rather stiff, possibly corseted, late-Edwardian
gentleman, his glasses forcefully grasped in one hand but, for a
pipe smoker, his pipe rather gingerly held in the other. He is
seated gazing off into the middle distance with a certain amount of
obvious self-satisfaction. The background of book shelves and desk
suggests an office, but there are few clues to the fact that the sub-
ject is a law professor; he might as well be a banker or a prosperous
businessman. Yet, if one discounts for the relatively limited talent
of the artist, the picture offers a significant insight into the subject
at this time in his career. Moore was, first of all, a gentleman. The
family was at least upper middle class and accordingly his tastes
ran to expensive pipes, bone handle knives, and gray Packard
roadsters. He was likew'ise a late-Edwardian. He had come to ma-
turity as the twentieth century began, then learned two gentle-
281. The fund was assembled by Carroll Shanks and Homer F. Carey. A photograph of




manly crafts, initially that of the office lawyer in the world of small
but elite corporate and commercial practice that was already dying
out, and then, as the first decade of that century drew to a close,
that of the law teacher. In the process Moore acquired, if he had
not been born with, the attitudes of the pre-war lawyer or busi-
nessman. Work was neither fun nor unimportant; it was to be seri-
ously and thoroughly pursued. Recreation was neither frivolous nor
a family affair; it was most often a walk in the woods with one's
friends, a long boat or auto trip, or a chance to read alone at one's
summer home. Yet, at the same time, Moore was neither dour nor
hidebound. His occasional dalliances were known to his employees
at least.2 2 His most trusted assistants, William 0. Douglas and
Carroll Shanks, are known to have been set to the illicit task of
grading his exams in the secrecy of the Moore family living room
in Englewood.2 83 His tastes in music ran to the moderately avant-
garde and in literature, to contemporary novels, poetry, and
drama.2 8 And his politics was distinctly liberal, if not left.28 5 These
hints of modernity aside however, overall Moore was distinctly a
man of the pre-war world.
While the figure in the foreground of Moore's portrait cap-
tures the man, the indefinite surroundings likewise suggest the es-
sential ambiguity of his position in the already balkan intellectual
world of the twenties and thirties. Trained as a lawyer and law
professor, Moore had foresworn the method of research peculiar to
his training because it was "not verified in experience" with the
intention of beginning a line of research that by its method, the
distinguishing demarcation for modern academics, should have
placed him in one of the social science departments of the Univer-
sity.2 Yet, wholly without the credentials that would have admit-
282. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975; Interview with William L.
Dennis, Apr. 21, 1977.
283. Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976.
284. Moore knew and supported the music of the American composer Carl Ruggles,
read Joyce's ULYSSES when published only as WORK IN PROGRESS, knew T.S. Eliot's poetry
and was a regular at Yale Drama School productions.
285. Not only was he an A.CL.U. regular but he supported such causes as the sus-
taining fund for Emma Goldman, see Mildred Mesirow to Underhill Moore, Apr. 3, 1935
(thank you for the contribution), Moore papers, Yale, and the International Committee for
Political Prisoners. Emma Corstvet remembers that at this time Moore considered himself a
socialist. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975.
286. It is likely that the oft-noted (see, e.g., J. REDLcH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE
CAsE MEMOD 23-25 (1914); Stevens, supra note 82, at 440-41) shift in the justification of
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ted him to one of these newly professionalized and thus highly cre-
dential conscious departments,287 Moore lacked a natural home. He
was an amateur in a world increasingly intolerant of anything but
professionals and as such was without a recognizable peer group.
Moore was not, however, wholly without resources, at least if a
sense of self-satisfaction, of confidence in one's view into the mid-
dle distance, if not farther, can be considered a resource. In his
gaze and in the force with which his glasses, if not his pipe, were
held, there was sufficient confidence to last for a while, at least
until the support which Moore expected from the Institute of
Human Relations could materialize. How long that self-confidence
lasted and what it produced in the way of research is a matter that
divides neatly into two subjects-banking research and parking
research.
A. The Law and Practice of Commercial Banking
It is precisely with a sense of self-confidence that Moore began
his research at Yale. Before he had lost Theodore S. Hope, Jr., to
Herman Oliphant and the Hopkins' Institute, 8 the two men had
isolated a subject for research and devised a questionnaire with
which to begin the study. So in the fall of 1929, Moore set his new
assistant, Gilbert Sussman, s9 to work pretesting the question-
naire °  and calmly left on a sea voyage to Europe on board the
yacht of an insurance broker friend.2 1 When he returned, midway
into his first semester at Yale,2 92 problems with the questionnaire
had already surfaced, problems intimately related to the research
method, the subject for research, and not incidentally, Moore's
the case method of legal instruction from a better way of learning doctrine to the way of
learning to think like a lawyer was in part an academic lawyer's response to being part of a
university. Thinking like a lawyer was a distinctive method; it thus distinguished law as an
academic discipline as much as participant observation distinguished anthropology or the
experiment distinguished early psychology.
287. See generally works cited at note 4 supra.
288. Theodore S. Hope to Underhill Moore, June 27, 1930, Moore papers, Yale.
289. b. 1905. A.B. 1926, Oregon; LL.B. 1929, Colum. Research ass't 1929, Yale. Govern-
ment practice, 1934, Washington D.C. & Oregon; Private practice, 1945, Oregon.
290. See Moore & Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting
of Direct Discounts-III. The Connecticut Studies 40 YALE L.J. 752 (1931) [hereinafter
cited as The Conn. Studies].
291. See Underhill Moore, Diary Written During the Cruise from New York to Gibral-
ter, on the Schooner Yacht Black Eagle, Aug. 7-Sept. 4, 1929, Moore papers, Yale.
292. Moore's first faculty meeting was Nov. 4, 1929.
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lack of experience in questionnaire design.
Using his so-called "institutional approach" Moore set out to
examine the extent to which judicial decisions reflect judicial ac-
ceptance and enforcement of community custom. In such an enter-
prise the otherwise despised law reports were peculiarly useful be-
cause they were full of countless "natural experiments," instances
where the decisions on a given point of law "go both ways." In
these instances one could attempt to discover the institutional,
customary, ways of behaving and then match this behavior to the
rule of law adopted in the jurisdiction.29 s Moore chose to research
one of these instances: the liability of a bank for wrongful dishonor
of a customer's check where the bank's defense was its decision to
charge the customer's account, without notice to the customer,
with the amount of that customer's overdue personal time note
which had been previously discounted for the customer by the
bank and its proceeds credited to the account in question-in
banking jargon of the time the practice of debiting (without notice)
direct discounts. On this quite abstruse and now largely unintel-
ligible question of banking law Moore isolated three decisions, a
1904 South Carolina case holding for the customer and 1920 New
York and 1928 Pennsylvania cases holding for the bank, and set
out to investigate banking practice in these three states during the
relevant period of time. 94
To begin this investigation Moore gave Sussman the task of
pretesting Moore's questionnaire by administering it to all of the
banks in the state of Connecticut. 9 5 Soon after Sussman began
this task it became apparent that although Moore had done a very
careful legal analysis of his fact situation, his questionnaire omit-
ted any mention of the frequency of one of the suspected variables,
the existence of security.2 " The omission was one of the problems
that faced Moore when he returned from Europe. It was easily cor-
rected and so Sussman returned to the field with a new question-
naire, one which both showed a growing awareness that behavior
293. Moore & Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of
Direct Discounts-I. Institutional Method, 40 YALE L.J. 555, 564-65 (1931).
294. Moore & Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of
Direct Discounts-I. Legal Method: Banker's Set-Off, 40 YALE L.J. 381, 381-85 (1931).
295. The Conn. Studies, supra note 290, at 752-53.




was a matter of more or less, and not yes or no,2 97 and collected
data on matters that were irrelevant to the study, but of general
interest to Moore.2 9 8 A more difficult problem that emerged was
the recognition that, even as revised, the questionnaire would un-
cover not the behavior patterns in question, but only bankers'
opinions about those behavior patterns. In one sense that problem,
too, could be solved, at least in Connecticut, and Moore set about
solving it. He sent Sussman to observe the activities of the bank
employees who carried out the transactions Moore was interested
in.299 This study, which by its small sample showed a growing
awareness of the limited purposes of pretesting methods,300 gener-
ally supported the findings of the. questionnaire study.30 1 But send-
ing Sussman into the field in Connecticut for the third time only
accentuated another, much less tractable problem: money.
Moore had negotiated with Hutchins for the payment of the
salaries of two research assistants, one for the empirical research
and the other for more mundane tasks, including doing Moore's
personal bookkeeping.30 2 Some money for expenses other than the
salary of these two assistants was included in what was plainly
seen by Moore, at least, as a package deal, 03 but he had not really
understood how expensive the planned field work was going to be.
The cost of field work was brought directly home when, even
before Sussman had finished with the third round of pretesting in
Connecticut, Moore sent him off to Pennsylvania to study the
practices of banks there before any more time could elapse be-
tween the 1928 Pennsylvania decision and the investigation. 0' In
297. Compare The Conn. Studies, supra note 290, at 753-54 with id. at 755 (especially
questions 22 and 26).
298. Id. at 755 (for example, the practice of paying interest on the balance in checking
accounts).
299. Id. at 766-67.
300. Sussman visited nineteen (12 per cent) of the commercial banks in the state, "each
.. . chosen because of its proximity to New Haven and because of the likelihood that it
would allow the study to be made." Id. at 766.
301. See id. at 773-74.
302. See Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, May 17, 1929 (recounting conversation
with Hutchins), Moore papers, Yale. See note 81 supra.
303. Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, Mar. 13, 1930 (expense money); Underhill
Moore to Charles E. Clark, Nov. 5, 1931 (Moore's understanding), Moore papers, Yale.
304. Moore & Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of
Direct Discounts-IV. The South Carolina and Pennsylvania Studies, 40 YALE L.J. 928,
942 (1931) [hereinafter cited as The S. C. and Penn. Studies].
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so doing Moore substantially depleted his available funds and thus
jeopardized speedy completion of the research. So, while Sussman
finished his work in Connecticut, Moore worked to get Hutchins'
successor, Charles E. Clark, to supply more money in order to send
Sussman to South Carolina.0 5 Moore's plea, made in the name of
the "morale of everyone in the Bank Credit study,"30 6 fell on deaf
ears. To Clark, a budget was a budget, especially when he was
"doubtful about the feasibility of tracing the life history of a case
so far away as South Carolina and so long ago as 1900. ''307 Moore
turned to Yale's President James R. Angell, an acquaintance from
back at the University of Chicago, for help in softening up Clark.30 8
Although Angell agreed to help,309 Clark did not seem to relent.
Part of the reason why the morale of everyone in the Bank
Credit study needed lifting was that the results in Pennsylvania
had hardly been a cause for great joy; they were, at the least, some-
what ambiguous. For this study Moore had sent Sussman to con-
duct interviews at a selection of the banks in the state, a selection
made so as to over-represent the banks in the Philadelphia area
where the case had arisen.310 From his experience in Connecticut
Moore had substantially improved his questionnaire. It was nar-
rower in scope and more naturalistic than the obviously legalistic
Connecticut questionnaire."' But a better instrument had not
brought better results. If anything the reverse was true; the better
instrument had brought more ambiguous results.1 Moore discov-
ered that most discounted time notes were paid by the borrower's
drawing a check, generally on his account at the bank holding his
note, and tendering this check in payment of the note. This prac-
tice was all but universal outside of Philadelphia. A significantly
smaller proportion of matured time notes were paid by the bor-
rower explicitly instructing the bank that held the note to pay it
305. Underhill Moore to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 12, 1930, Moore papers, Yale. The Con-
necticut study was finished in March, 1930 when the Pennsylvania study was begun. Id.
306. Id.
307. Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, Mar. 13, 1930, Moore papers, Yale.
308. Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, May 19, 1930, Angell papers.
309. James R. Angell to Underhill Moore, May 20, 1930, Angell papers.
310. The S. C. and Penn. Studies, supra note 304, at 942-43.
311. Compare The Conn. Studies, supra note 290, at 753-55 with The S. C. and Penn.
Studies, supra note 304, at 943.




by directly charging the borrower's account at that bank. No one
could have been surprised by these results which were essentially
similar to the results in Connecticut.31 s But on the key question of
whether a bank ever liquidated a matured time note without either
a check of, or instructions from, the borrower, the results were in-
consistent. They showed that in Philadelphia such action was at
least as common as that of liquidating a note on the borrower's
instructions, but that outside that city such unilateral action by a
bank was virtually unheard of.3 14 Working with a decision from a
court of statewide jurisdiction and getting this queer discontinuity
in data, Moore concluded that only liquidation by check was a re-
current, in his jargon, institutional, transaction in Pennsylvania. 15
Moore's conclusion seemingly suggested that in this circum-
stance at least, the law was not following custom, for the Penn-
sylvania decision had upheld the Philadelphia bank's defense. But
Moore did not take time to puzzle over this implication; rather,
despite the shortage of funds, he sent Sussman to South Carolina.
For the investigation there, a sample of 93 banks located through-
out the state that had survived the twenty-five years since the de-
cision was chosen 16 and appropriate letters of introduction se-
cured, including some from the skeptical Clark.17 At first Moore
helped with the research. It soon became apparent that many of
the banks chosen either lacked records back the twenty-five years
or were unwilling to let Sussman look at the records they did
have." Thus even working together the two men only managed to
secure records at about half of their sample and even those records
generally spanned only the first decade of the century.319 However,
these limited records, bolstered by largely unstructured interviews
with officers at the banks investigated and correspondence with
other bankers in South Carolina, 20 disclosed a uniform pattern. 21
Matured time notes were never involuntarily liquidated by the
313. Compare id. at 947 with the Conn. Studies, supra note 290, at 773-74.
314. The S. C. and Penn. Studies, supra note 304, at 947.
315. Id. at 952-53.
316. Id. at 928-29.
317. More importantly from Prof. E. C. Coker of Yale whose brother taught in South
Carolina. Gilbert Sussman to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976 (taped interview).
318. Gilbert Sussman to Underhill Moore, Aug. 12, 1930, Moore papers, Yale.
319. The S. C. and Penn. Studies, supra note 304, at 929.
320. Id. at 930-31.
321. Id. at 937 reports the results in tabular form.
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bank holding the note. They were either paid in cash or by check
and on very rare occasions on instructions. The reason was simple;
most commercial credit was agricultural and intended to be liqui-
dated out of the sale of harvested crops.22 Harvest time was un-
predictable and therefore maturities stated on notes were largely a
matter of informed guessing.
These results were intriguing, but then the money ran out, the
research stopped, and Moore and Sussman began the task of writ-
ing up the results of the year's effort. In so doing they had to deal
with the criticisms of their enterprise offered by Dorothy Swaine
Thomas, a statistical sociologist, who was new at Yale and at-
tached to the law school. 23 She found the project "very obscure"
in both writing and method, and urged Moore to give up the re-
search because the method was too complicated and the data too
problematical to yield good results. 24 He was quite obviously look-
ing for help and eager to learn, but nevertheless kept on with the
project, learning what he could from her, but also desiring to see
what he could learn about what interested him 25 Then, in the
middle of writing, more money came in the form of a $2,000 alloca-
tion from the Institute's budget.3 26
Quickly, Moore sent Sussman and five assistants into the field
in New York.32 7 This time Moore used two investigative tech-
niques: first, a variant of the third Connecticut study, in which the
teller responsible for the transactions in question filled out work
sheets and then the research assistant examined the results for
"ambiguities and incompleteness, 3 28 and second, a questionnaire
administered in small banks to the bank officer or teller in charge
322. Id. at 941.
323. Schlegel, supra note 15, at 519-22, 527-29, 538-45, recounts Thomas' background
and her participation in research by William 0. Douglas while at Yale. Moore & Sussman,
Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts-VI. The
Decisions, the Institutions, and the Degrees of Deviation, 40 YALE L.J. 1219 n.1 (1931)
[hereinafter cited as Debiting Study Results] directly acknowledges "her skeptical, pointed
and invaluable criticism."
324. Interview with Dorothy Swalne Thomas, June 3, 1975. Cf. Gilbert Sussman to
John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976 (taped interview).
325. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
326. See Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, Nov. 18, 1930, Moore papers, Yale.
327. Moore & Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of
Direct Discounts-V. The New York Study, 40 YALE L.J. 1055 (1931) [hereinafter cited as
The N.Y. Study].
328. Id. at 1055-56.
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of the discounting of notes, and, in larger banks, to the person in
charge of loans or discounting. 29 By using these two techniques
Moore apparently hoped to avoid the problems of finding, getting
access to, and using old records that had been encountered in
South Carolina. He reasoned that a correspondence between the
two measures of current practice would strengthen interview re-
sults about former practice. Other attempts were made to improve
the reliability of his results. In both parts of the inquiry Moore
tried to work with a scientifically chosen sample, although limited
cooperation by interviewees made such attempts largely nuga-
tory.330 And his questionnaire explicitly took into account the pos-
sibility that banking practice had changed in the ten years since
the decision in question; it also showed a great deal of care in
structuring the inquiry to get plain "yes" or "no" answers. 3 1
The results of the New York study came in after publication
of the initial parts of the whole study had already been begun. 32
In the more urban counties the dominant form for the liquidation
of matured time notes was by means of a debit charge without in-
structions or a check from the borrower. In rural counties almost
all notes were liquidated by check; some, on customer instructions;
few, by bank debit in the absence of either. But, taken as a whole,
the one most common transaction was that of the bank's debiting a
customer's account on its own initiative. Thus, it might be argued
that while there was some variation between studies, where bank
debits were a known, if not always frequent, practice (Penn-
sylvania and New York) the court decision validated them; where
such action was virtually unknown (South Carolina) the court deci-
sion failed to approve the practice.
With the completion of the New York work Moore rushed to
get his results in print, and in the process passed up a chance to
get embroiled in*Llewelyn's feud with Pound over the existence
and content of Realist Jurisprudence. 3 3 In the resultant nearly 150
329. Id. at 1055, 1063.
330. Id. at 1063-64.
331. See id. at 1057-63 where questionnaire is reproduced in detail.
332. Id. at table I following 1068 reports the results.
333. See Underhill Moore to Karl N. Llewellyn, Apr. 4, 1931, Apr. 11, 1931, Moore
papers, Yale. The relevant articles are Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next
Step, 30 COLUM. L. Ray. 431 (1930); Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 697 (1931); Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HAnv. L. REv. 1222 (1931). The controversy is thoroughly summarized in W. TWININo,
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pages stretching over six successive issues of the Yale Law Jour-
nal, the convoluted, opaque prose dictated by the convoluted,
opaque method developed two years earlier in the Rational Basis
of Legal Institutions thoroughly obscured the quite interesting re-
sults. Moore's cautious conclusion did little to remedy this obvious
defect. He hazarded that his research had presented only "rough
outlines" of the institutional patterns and his method for choosing
a standard against which to compare those patterns and for mea-
suring the degree of deviation of the pattern from that standard
had fallen "far short of attainable precision. '334 Yet he concluded
that where the action of the bank deviated "slightly" from the in-
stitutional pattern of behavior, the court validated that behavior;
where it deviated "grossly" the court refused to validate that be-
havior.33 5 As that conclusion was precisely what he had set out to
prove, a certain amount of joy was in order.
Moore had the six articles bound together and distributed the
set to friends and acquaintances at Yale, Columbia, and elsewhere.
Among the recipients were President Angell and Clark Hull, a psy-
chologist associated with the Institute se Moore surely knew the
limits of the studyss 7 -most obviously the lack of any explanation
of how the institutional patterns were brought to judicial atten-
tion, the lack of simultaneity of the events studied, and the singu-
larity of the demonstration. What his audience thought about it, or
whether their understanding was so thoroughly impeded by the
structure and jargon of the research as to preclude thought, is
quite impossible to say. Beyond pleasantries, no one commented
on the research, at least by letter or in print, except perhaps for
Llewellyn, who, begging off "mature critique" until a second read-
supra note 14, at 70-83. Moore thought Llewellyn had blown the matter entirely out of
perspective. "I don't see why you are so excited... . Personally I am not interested in
whether or not there be a school of realists and if there be what Pound's views about the
school are." Underhill Moore to Karl N. Llewellyn, Apr. 4, 1931, Moore papers, Yale.
334. Debiting Study Results, supra note 323, at 1249.
335. Id. at 1249-50.
336. A list of the recipients entitled Debiting Direct Discounts is in Moore papers,
Yale.
337. As an example of Moore's rapidly growing statistical sophistication, he had ac-
quired a decent layman's understanding of the concept of spurious correlation (see Debiting
Study Results, supra note 323, at 1219); this at the time when the concept was only first
being introduced in the United States. See Lazarsfeld,,An Episode in the History of Social
Research: A Memoir in 2 PRSPEcTns IN AmEmcAN I HsTORY 270, 293-94 (1968) (recounting
his introduction of the notion of spurious correlation in 1933).
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ing, ignored the research and griped about how "unintelligible" the
last third of the earlier Moore and Hope article had been.338
Encouragement, however, was not what Moore needed to keep
his enterprise going. The results of this one study were a sufficient
impetus for further work, if only money could be found to support
that work. Thus, even before the debiting study was fully pub-
lished, Moore knew exactly what further work he wished to do. He
proposed to send "six men or women of Ph.D. or law journal cali-
ber" into the field to investigate the institutional patterns under-
lining twenty-five "recent decisions in the field of Commercial
Bank Credit in order to determine the causal relation, if any," be-
tween the pattern of banking behavior and the decision. 339 The es-
timated cost of such an endeavor, excluding his and Sussman's sal-
aries, would be a little over $11,000.340
The idea was a sensible one;34 1 it was surely better to build on
a small bit of successful research than to run off after something
else. Whether it was equally sensible to continue to use the frame-
work for research set forth in the Moore and Hope article is an-
other matter. Dorothy Thomas thought not and told Moore so; 842
he thought otherwise, though of course he thought his method
"perfectly clear. 3 43 However, money for further research was not
to be had either directly from President Angel 344 or indirectly
through the Institute. 45 Stymied, Moore decided to raise a small
338. Karl N. Llewellyn to Underhill Moore, July 27, 1931, Moore papers, Yale. See also
Underhill Moore to Karl N. Llewellyn, July 28, 1931 (earlier article was "perfectly clear");
Karl N. Llewellyn to Underhill Moore, July 31, 1931, ("Perfectly clear to whom?"), Moore
papers, Yale.
339. Underhill Moore, Memorandum In Re Continuation and More Extensive Prosecu-
tion of Work in "Commercial Bank Credit," Apr. 1931?, Moore papers, Yale.
340. Id.
341. It should be noted that the proposal was based on a different theory of validation
than that underlying the debiting study. It is impossible to determine whether Moore un-
derstood the significance of this shift from the natural experiment to the cumulation of
individual instances, especially since his later banking research shows a shift first to the new
theory and then back to the old, for Moore nowhere even notes the fact of these shifts,
much less discusses them. See text accompanying notes 360-67 infra.
342. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
343. Underhill Moore to Karl N. Llewellyn, July 28, 1931, Moore papers, Yale.
344. See Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, Apr. 1, 1931; James R. Angell to Un-
derhill Moore, Apr. 13, 1931, Moore papers, Yale. See also James R. Angell to Underhill
Moore, Apr. 8, 1931, Angell papers.




portion of the necessary funds by agreeing to do a new edition of
his casebook 3 e and amused himself with an informal study of the
reasons for the failure of a local bank.3 47 Then, with both of these
tasks begun and in need of completion, the Institute decided in the
fall of 1931 to support Moore's work with an allocation of $5000,
almost half of what he had said he needed.34 8
While Moore cleaned up the projects begun before Institute
funds became available he worked on two short articles. One, a
study of the consequence of a bank's insolvency on its relationship
with its commercial customers, a bit of pure doctrinal research,
was an outgrowth of his work on the local bank failure.3 9 The
other, called The Lawyer's Law, was an attempt to provide an in-
tellectual framework different than that provided in the Wigmore
review for the kind of study Moore had proposed before leaving
Columbia and had carried out at Yale in the discounted notes
study.350 This time following the central thrust of the argument in
the Rational Basis of Legal Institutions he emphasized not insti-
tutional patterns of behavior but rather what he took to be the
lawyer's central task: predicting judicial behavior. 51 From this pre-
mise Moore argued that when a lawyer predicts judicial behavior,
no matter what he says, he takes into account not just rules of law
derived from judicial decisions, 52 but also "every factor in the sit-
uation which he can differentiate from its context," and then
346. Contract between West Publishing Co. and Underhill Moore, July 13, 1931, Moore
papers, Yale. Sussman did most of the work on this project. Gilbert Sussman to John Henry
Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976 (taped interview).
347. See Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Feb. 19, 1932 (recounting research and
enclosing copy of resulting report), Moore papers, Yale.
348. See Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, Nov. 6, 1931 (reporting decision), Moore
papers, Yale.
349. Moore & Sussman, The Current Account and Set-Offs Between an Insolvent
Bank and Its Customer, 41 YALz L.J. 1109 (1932).
350. Moore & Sussman, The Lawyer's Law, 41 YALa L.J. 566'(1932) [hereinafter The
Lawyer's Law]. The occasion for writing this piece is unclear. Even Moore's co-author can-
not remember it. Gilbert Sussman to John Henry Schlegel, July 28, 1977. Despite the total
absence of helpful footnotes to the ideas Moore expressed, one can see in the piece at least
three possible occasions. First, the emphasis on prediction is reminiscent of the Realist con-
troversy, see note 333 supra. Second, the long central section on the logic of proof in multi-
causal analysis suggests Thomas' methodology seminar, see note 390 infra. Third, the final
section on interdisciplinary research seems a logical part of discussions at the time of the
Institute's first reorganization, see Schlegel, supra note 15, at 553-57, 558-60.
351. The Lawyer's Law, supra note 350, at 566.
352. Id. at 570-71 (a practice that is "grossly inadequate and filled with misleading
notions" Id.).
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makes an "intuitional judgment" on the basis of the whole. 53
Then, drawing, not always correctly, 54 on probability theory,
Moore illustrated how the lawyer's predictions might be formally
represented as the probability of the "future occurrence ... [of a
particular event] based upon the frequency of its past concurrence
with other particular events."5 Finally he lamented that,
[T]he lawyer's failure to see his problem as one of attempting to systematize
and to make methodical the processes implicit in his intuitional judgments
and his clinging to the traditional notion that his problem is one of system-
atizing statutes and decisions have completely blinded those with scientific
curiosity to take the direction which the inquiries into judicial behavior
should take. 8'
Response to this justification of Moore's efforts was sparse.
Herman Oliphant, then still at work at his studies for the Hopkins'
Institute, suggested that he and Moore were "pillars of conservat-
isms" with radicals like "Michael and Adler to the right and Frank
to the left. 3 57 Robert C. Angell, a sociologist who had worked on
family law at Columbia as part of the aftermath of the curriculum
study, expressed more than a little skepticism at the willingness of
lawyers to do the kind of work Moore advocated. 35 But with this
piece out of the way,35 9 Moore took to his research with some
relish.
To begin, Moore sent a third year student, C. E. Brandt, into
353. Id. at 569.
354. See Ray Westerfield (Yale Dep't of Pol. Econ.) to Underhill Moore, Mar. 8, 1932
(pointing out error), Moore papers, Yale.
355. The Lawyer's Law, supra note 350 at 571.
356. Id. at 575.
357. Herman Oliphant to Underhill Moore, Mar. 2, 1932, Moore papers, Yale. Jerome
Frank had taken a position on the almost total unpredictability of judicial decisions in LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) such as to effectively preclude the possibility of serious em-
pirical work; Jerome Michael and Mortimer Adler had concluded that there was no scientific
knowledge in criminology despite the mountain of research in their book. J. MICHAEL & M.
ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1932). For some reason Michael and Adler were
very interested in Moore's reaction to their book. See Emma Corstvet to Underhill Moore,
July 17, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
358. Robert C. Angell to Underhill Moore, Mar. 15, 1933, Moore papers, Yale. Angell
had published A RESEARCH IN FAmLmy LAW (1930) with Columbia Law School professor Al-
bert C. Jacobs, the pioneer attempt to merge social science data and family law. His piece,
The Value of Sociology to Law, 31 MICH. L. REv. 512 (1933), is a good statement of his
skeptical position.
359. As a result of Moore's acquaintance with a German anthropologist, The Lawyer's
Law, supra note 350, was translated into German as Das Gesetz des Juristen, 8 SOCIOLOGUS
385 (1930). See Underhill Moore to Richard Thurnwalt, July 18, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
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the field to start the first of the projected twenty-five additional
tests under the Moore and Hope method.360 Moore chose to inves-
tigate a six-month-old Pennsylvania case holding that a bank was
not liable to recredit a customer's account with the amount of a
check certified, and thus paid, by a teller at the main office within
a minute of receiving notice to stop payment based on an order
placed moments earlier at the branch where the drawer normally
transacted business. The method of investigation was similar to
that used in the New York debiting study.3 61 All the Pennsylvania
banks with branches were isolated and Brandt attempted to secure
cooperation of each such bank to permit the officer in charge to
complete a record of all the stop payment transactions during an
entire week. Better than three-quarters of the relevant banks coop-
erated in the study and over half participated for a second week as
a kind of control group. The work sheet was designed to isolate the
time it took to relay stop payment orders between main and
branch offices as well as to determine whether there was any differ-
ence in practice based on the depositor's mode of giving notice or
the reason for the order. While interviews were held with bank of-
ficers, the information gathered in the interviews was not used in
the investigation except to clarify the data through an understand-
ing of the internal organization of each bank.6 2
While Brandt worked in Pennsylvania, Moore set Emma
Corstvet, another social scientist at the Institute assigned to the
law school, to work on a second inquiry.3 6 3 Moore had isolated two
recent cases on the narrow question of whether the depositor of a
check, the proceeds of which were collected after the sequestration
of the assets of, and appointment of a receiver for, the depository
bank, was a general or preferred creditor of that bank.3 64 This vex-
ing, but quite topical, question turned on whether the check had
been "deposited" or only "received for collection," a matter that
360. Moore, Sussman & Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to
Stop Payment of Checks-I. Institutional Method, 42 YALE L.J. 1198 (1933) [hereinafter
cited as Stop Payments].
361. Id. at 1205-10 describes the method of the study in detail. See The N.Y. Study,
supra note 327, at 1055-66.
362. Id. at 1209.
363. Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, Drawing Against Uncollected Checks: II, 45 YALE. L.
J. 260 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Uncollected Checks].
364. Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, Drawing Against Uncollected Checks: I, 45 YALE L.J.
1, 1-2 (1935). The cases were decided in the same month.
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under traditional doctrine was to be deduced from the terms, usu-
ally implicit, of the bargain between the bank and the customer.
One of the important indicia of the terms of the bargain was the
time at which checks drawn against the deposit would be honored.
If the so called "uncollected funds" were immediately available
then the check had been deposited and the customer was a general
creditor; if available only at some later time the check had been
received for collection and the customer was a preferred creditor.
Here then was a circumstance, as in the debiting study, tailor
made for testing Moore's institutional hypothesis, and this time
without either the difficulties caused by using historical records to
verify old practice or the theoretical problems raised by the lack of
simultaneity of the events being investigated.
Unfortunately, in place of the theoretical and historical
problems in the debiting study, Moore acquired two quite immense
practical problems. One was the sheer volume and complexity of
the records that would have to be examined in order to investigate
whether and how often uncollected funds were drawn against. The
other was the unwillingness of banks to let anyone examine the
accounts of individual depositors, an examination necessary in or-
der to make the investigation.3 5 In order to avoid, at least tempo-
rarily, the second of these problems, Moore arranged for Corstvet
to begin an "exploratory study" in the records of the failed bank in
New Haven that he had previously studied.3 65 Corstvet took a
group of deposit slips for a nine day period a few months before
the failure and laboriously recreated the account of each of the
nearly three hundred depositors, in the process checking potential
variables such as age, occupation, age of account, average balance,
and outstanding borrowings. 3 7
The following year was spent tabulating and analyzing the
data collected in the two studies. 6 The stop payment study
turned out to be the easier to complete. Although there were seri-
ous problems with the accuracy of some of the data collected by
tellers filling out the work sheets,369 the accurate data showed that
the modal, median, and average time for a portion of the behavior
365. Uncollected Checks, supra note 363, at 262.
366. See Underhill Moore to Gilbert Sussman, Dec. 11, 1935, Moore papers, Yale.
367. Uncollected Checks, supra note 363, at 262.
368. Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Mar. 1, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
369. Stop Payments, supra note 360, at 1214-17.
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investigated-the time from receipt of notice of the stop payment
order in the main bank to its communication to the tellers in that
office-was at least as long as, and generally longer than, the time
found in the case in question for completion of the entire process
beginning with the giving of notice at the branch bank.370 Reason-
ing that the time for the entire process must necessarily be greater
than that for any known part, Moore concluded, quite turgidly,
that, as the teller at the bank in question certified the check only
moments before learning of the stop payment order, which was
communicated at the very least as fast as and more likely faster
than usual, the court, in upholding the bank's defense to the suit
to recredit the customer's account, was acting in accordance with
usual banking behavior. 71 Thus the study again validated Moore's
hypothesis.
Tabulation and analysis of Corstvet's exploratory study on the
uncollected funds cases was in fact completed long before the stop
payment study was published.37 2 Preparation for field work in New
York, the site of one of the decisions, was then started 33 and, with
the help of President Angell, introductions to bankers in Ohio, the
site of the other, were secured.37 4 Then, suddenly, "theoretical dif-
ficulties" which Moore "could not dispose of" were discovered.37 5
So, rather than spend "time and money when it was not clear pre-
cisely how the results could be interpreted," Moore stopped fur-
ther research.76 With this sudden jolt, after four years, the bank-
ing studies were over.
It is difficult to understand what theoretical problems, pecu-
liar to the uncollected funds study, were so devastating as to have
been grounds for terminating that research. Practical problems ex-
370. Compare id. at 1223 with id. at 1203.
371. Id. at 1231, 1234-35.
372. Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Mar. 1, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
373. Id.
374. See James R. Angell to Underhill Moore, May 23, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
375. Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, June 10, 1933, Moore papers, Yale. A year or
so later Moore described his problem as caused by "the difficulty of utilizing... methods
which were identical with those pursued in the two preceeding studies .... the great
amount of time and labor necessary to execute it and ... many difficulties inherent in the
field work." Underhill Moore, Report of Work Done by Underhill Moore and Associates in
Connection with the Institute of Human Relations, fall, 1934?, Moore papers, Yale [herein-
after cited as Moore Report, 1934].
376. Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, June 10, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
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isted, even monumental ones, given the technology of the time.
Two years later, just to publish the exploratory study, Moore and
Corstvet had to make crucial, simplifying assumptions about both
customers' bank balances and the time necessary for checks to go
through the collection process and for funds to return;377 replacing
these assumptions with anything but more accurate opinions would
have required months, if not years, of work. But these were not
theoretical problems; they were the kind of practical problems
Moore had met and overcome several times before. Thus his own
explanation for the termination of the uncollected fund study and
thereafter all of the commercial banking research, like his explana-
tion for the hiatus in his activities at Columbia during the twen-
ties, is at least a bit disingenuous. If in the end Moore faced theo-
retical problems, they were theoretical problems common to all the
banking research and not peculiar to the uncollected funds study.
What those theoretical problems were can be seen by looking again
at the course of Moore's research in his early years at Yale.
In four years Moore learned a great deal about social science
research. Indeed, the progress of his education can be seen in the
progressive refinement of the technical detail of his banking stud-
ies. In Connecticut Moore started with a lawyerly questionnaire
and a census methodology.37 8 Less than six months later in Penn-
sylvania his questionnaire had lost its lawyerliness and he was con-
tent to work with an informally defined sample 7 9 At the same
time, as shown by the third Connecticut study, Moore had begun
to doubt the reliability of questionnaire findings and thus began to
study by direct observation.so With the extension of work to
South Carolina and New York he began to worry about the
problems created by nonsimultaneous events.81 Then, in the writ-
ten reports of those studies, concerns surfaced about the represen-
tativeness of sample, the consistency and accuracy of questionnaire
answers and data interpretation generally.38 2 With the stop pay-
377. Uncollected Checks, supra note 363, at 281-84.
378. See text at notes 295-96 supra.
379. See text at notes 310-11 supra.
380. See text at notes 299-300 supra.
381. A problem he solved in the uncompleted study of drawing on uncollected checks.
See note 364 supra.
382. See The Conn. Studies, supra note 290, at 753, 767; The S.C. & Penn. Studies,
supra note 304, at 930-31, 944; The N.Y. Study, supra note 327, at 1063.
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ment study, further problems with the accuracy of observation ap-
peared as third party recording of data turned out to be suspect."'
Moreover, interviews began to diminish in importance as an
awarenness of statistical technique began to surface. 4 Finally, in
the uncollected funds study, first party recording became very dif-
ficult and the results problematic to interpret. s5
The pattern to these progressive refinements in technique is
really very simple-methodological objection, methodological im-
provement, methodological objection, methodological improve-
ment, again and again. Moore was going through a short, informal
course in contemporary social science method first at the hands of
Dorothy Thomas and then under the direction of both Thomas
and Emma Corstvet. Thomas knew a great deal about methodolog-
ical theory and was at the time working hard on studies of meth-
ods and accuracy of observation.386 Corstvet had basic statistical
training and had just completed directing her own extremely care-
ful statistical study of the consequences of auto accidents for Dean
Clark and a committee of lawyers studying the problem.87 Both
were quite obviously taken with the idea of teaching this particular
old dog some new tricks.8
The process of learning about method by responding to the
objections of Thomas and Corstvet was nevertheless a trifle exas-
perating as can be seen from a passage in The Lawyer's Law.
There, after Moore had completed setting out his framework, he
noted the important role that other social science disciplines could
play in improving on the lawyers' intuitions, but was careful to in-,
383. See text at note 369 supra.
384. Most obviously in the distinctions between median, modal, and average frequency
of the various time intervals.
385. See text at note 367 supra.
386. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 521.
387. Id. at 521, 534-35.
388. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975; Interview with Emma
Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975. The relationship between Thomas and Moore was quite
definitely that of junior specialist to senior colleague. A full year after she had arrived at
Yale she still referred to him as "Mr. Moore," see Dorothy Swaine Thomas to Underhill
Moore, Sept. 3, 1931, Moore papers, Yale. The more puckish Corstvet quickly solved the
relational problem by calling Moore "Honored Professor," see Emma Corstvet to Underhill
Moore, July 17, 1933; Aug. 16, 1933, Moore papers, Yale. Even when giving up her connec-
tion with the law school, Thomas indicated her continuing interest in working with Moore.
See Dorothy Swalne Thomas to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 9, 1933 (I'll be glad to... partici-
pate in ... seminars, particularly those of Underhill Moore. . ."; the handwritten note on
the blind carbon to Moore said, "I'm at your service, as always-2'), Moore papers, Yale.
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sist that cooperative research must be focused, not on an "amor-
phous and unorganized experience," but rather "of necessity" on
"a problem set by one ... [of the investigators] and the coopera-
tion of the others must be aimed at the verification of his hypothe-
ses."3 89 Yet, exasperated or not, Moore continued to learn from his
long drawn out lessons, acquired not just from the criticism of his
own work, but also through his participation in Thomas' method-
ological seminar at the law school390 and his reading of books on
method from the lists she recurrently prepared for him,391 as well
as through hours of discussion with Corstvet as she played out her
role as Dostoyevski's washerwoman. 9 2
As Moore learned the canons of social science method from
Thomas and Corstvet he also acquired something more intangible
from them: the culture of contemporary social science. Both wo-
men were at the time a part of the leading edge of the movement
to make social science "scientific" by making it numerical and
quantifiable,3 93 or, in the accepted jargon of the day, behaviorist,
not in the sense of Watsonian, but in the sense of the observation
of overt behavior, rather than introspection.9 They, and others
taking part in what was simultaneously a methodological revolu-
tion and the establishment of a distinctive academic identity, were
concerned with problems of method-observational techniques,
statistical techniques, and controls-to insure reliability, ver-
ifiability and replicability.
Examples of these concerns in the work of both women are
easy to find. Thomas taught William 0. Douglas about the need to
independently verify answers to questionnaires and tried to teach
him about the rudiments of causal inference.395 Corstvet spent
great amounts of time in her auto compensation study actually
verifying answers3s and, in another of her studies, painstakingly
389. The Lawyer's Law, supra note 350, at 576.
390. See Dorothy Swaine Thomas to Underhill Moore, spring 1932?, (plans for semi-
nar), Moore papers, Yale.
391. Several of these undated, untitled, handwritten lists are found in Moore papers,
Yale, starting in fall 1930 and continuing to fall 1932. The lists become increasingly techni-
cal in nature and ultimately focus on statistical technique.
392. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975.
393. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 520-22.
394. See, e.g., Emma Corstvet to Underhill Moore, Aug. 16, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
395. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 527-28.
396. Id. at 534-35,
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gathering otherwise boring information in order to be able to make
a causal inference. 97 One of their associates used utility company
records to study city migration in an attempt to completely avoid
interviews.398 All three tried to be very scientific.
Moore was quickly drawn into and absorbed this culture. How
quickly and how thoroughly can be seen from his study of the fail-
ure of the local bank. When it was completed in early 1932, Moore
gave a copy to the local economist who had recently become direc-
tor of social science activities at the Institute, with the observation
that the work was not for the Institute since it was ad hoc and of
no scientific value.3 19 After reading it, the economist, less bothered
by method than his social science colleagues, gently chided Moore
that he was "far too modest in the characterization" of his work. °0
But for Moore the characterization was precisely correct and this
fact suggests why he was ultimately faced with an insurmountable
theoretical problem in the banking research.0 1
From the beginning Moore was interested in pursuing an es-
sentially anthropological insight: law follows culture, not doctrine.
He may have phrased his point as a hypothesis, but it was a con-
clusion. When push finally came to shove and it .became time to
show that one could do real scientific work in law,0 2 Moore pro-
duced a method to test his hypothesis which bore all the hallmarks
of crank social theory40 -formal over-elaboration, arcane termi-
397. Id. at 438-39 (study on accounting practices of bankrupt and going business
concerns).
398. Interview with Mark A. May, June 9, 1975. Two other female. social scientists at
Yale shared a house in New Haven with Thomas and Corstvet. Interview with Dorothy
Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
399. Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Feb. 19, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
.400. Edgar Furniss to Underhill Moore, Feb. 26, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
401. Another indication of Moore's growing identification with an academic social sci-
ence can be seen by examining the list of individuals who received reprints of his early
articles. The debiting study went mainly to law professors and social scientists associated
with Columbia or the Institute. Two years later only twenty per cent of the mailing went to
law professors: almost the entire balance went to the social scientists, but not just to ac-
quaintances at Yale. Included on the list were Petirim Sorokin, F. Stuart Chapin, Stuart
Rice, Abraham Flexner, Robert Lowie, Bronislaw Malinowski and five other faculty mem-
bers at the London School of Economics, and Robert E. Park and five of his colleagues in
the Sociology Department at the University of Chicago.
402. Such had been the goal of Moore and those of his generation. Cf. Walter Wheeler
Cook to Underhill Moore, Mar. 24, 1919; Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Jan. 1, 1916,
Moore papers, Columbia.
403. For this concept, I must again thank Prof. Robert Gordon.
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nology, pseudo-mathematical precision-except one-imper-
viousness to criticism. Although the formal apparatus stayed the
same, the method changed with each criticism.
Moore started with something close to a crude anthropology:
Ask the natives what they do. And for a scientific demonstration,
he relied on what would today be known as a natural experiment:
The natives on one side of the river carry water on shoulder poles,
those on the other side, on their heads; what accounts for this dif-
ference?4 04 Through their criticisms Thomas and Corstvet rein-
forced the natural experiment form and tightened the observa-
tional method. Cases had to be decided simultaneously and
investigation made as soon after the fact as possible. Direct obser-
vation was to be preferred and, if impossible, elaborate verification
was essential. But ultimately even all of these methodological re-
finements were not enough, for still there could be troublesome
problems of data interpretation, as, for example, was the case in
the uncollected funds study. There, unlike the Connecticut pre-
test in the debiting study, no clear pattern emerged, so one could
only wonder whether a finding that uncollected funds were drawn
on in six to twenty-five per cent of all transactions, depending on
the time in the check collection process chosen as a yardstick, was
high, low or average.0 5 With comparable data from other banks
and other jurisdictions, even these practical problems could be
solved, as Moore eventually all but admitted.40 6 But, that work
having been done, there would still remain the basic theoretical
question underlying all the banking research: How similar were the
two cultures? Were they only separated by a river or by a gulf of
one kind or another?
Given Moore's hypothesis and his subject matter, there was
simply no way to answer that basic question by holding everything
but banking practice constant, no way to be even vaguely assured
that all of the other potential variables washed out. Even worse,
Moore knew that the other variables did not wash out.40 7 There-
fore, lacking any but the crudest techniques for correlating multi-
404. Stop Payments, supra note 360, is an exception, as were, of course, the entire
projected twenty-five case studies, text at notes 339-41 supra.
405. See Uncollected Checks, supra note 363, at 288-92.
406. See Moore Report 1934, supra note 375.
407. See, e.g., The Lawyer's Law, supra note 350, at 572-74. Cf. Moore & Hope, An
Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703, 705 (1929).
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ple, simultaneously varying factors, Moore was quite squarely
faced with the choice of either abandoning his four year long com-
mitment to quantification-to science as he had just learned it-or
abandoning his topic of research.
Faced with this dilemma he chose to stick with social science,
and with the kind of understanding of law he had been working to
develop for over ten years, by affirming its methodological precon-
ceptions and abandoning his chosen topic for research. In so doing,
in choosing to do something that was, in theory at least, readily
understandable to all academic social scientists who might care to
know, he was not securing an answer to his theoretical problem. As
he well knew, and as Emma Corstvet put it, paraphrasing him,
"one cannot deny the possible existence of many intangibles, some
of them important enough to threaten the overthrow of anything
induced by a more strictly behaviorist approach; but... hope lies
only in dealing with elements we can measure, running that risk
[and struggling to measure]." 40 8
Like Thomas, Corstvet, and dozens of other social scientists
Moore would struggle to measure, to confine his theoretical prob-
lem with a "strictly behaviorist approach," and would therefore
orient his research around that struggle. In short he had in a real
sense, become, if only in his head, a twentieth century social
scientist.40 9
408. Emma Corstvet to Underhill Moore, Aug. 16, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
409. Northrup, Underhill Moore's Legal Science: Its Nature and Significance, 59 YALE
L.J. 196 (1950) suggests that in shifting from his commercial banking studies to the parking
and traffic studies Moore was influenced (1) by Ehrlich's advocacy of a "deductively formu-
lated," experimentally verified scientific theory, id. at 198; and (2) by an experience of the
lack of trustworthiness of even the limited intuitive judgments he allowed himself in the
banking studies, id. at 204. While, Moore surely knew the work of Ehrlich, at the very least
he attended the 1914 A.A.L.S meeting at which a paper was read on Ehrlich's work, see
Page, Professor Ehrlich's Czernowitz Seminar of Living Law, [1914] A.A.L.S. HANDBOOK 46,
there is no other evidence to support this half of Northrup's thesis and indeed Ehrlich's
work did not become generally available in English until 1936, after Moore had made his
switch in subject matter. When the FuNDAmENTAL PRINcnPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
appeared, Moore agreed to review this book for the YALE LAW JOURNAL (See Eugene V.
Rostow to Underhill Moore, summer 1937?, Moore papers, Yale), but never completed the
task. The second half of the thesis fits well with the interpretation presented here, especially
the Corstvet paraphrase of Moore's thoughts on the necessity of running risks in adopting a
more strictly behaviorist method, see text at note 408 supra. However, Northrup's evidence
for Moore's conclusion Debiting Study Results, supra note 323, at 1231 n.35, is rather weak
given that Moore had a chance to terminate his banking research when he completed the




B. Studies of Traffic and Parking
When Moore chose to look for something more obviously mea-
surable to study he was not without ideas, or for that matter, not
without other things to occupy his time. Dorothy Thomas had re-
cently decided to give up her seminar at the law school because it
was "clearly against certain of the prevailing dominant attitudes"
there41 0 and Moore, her collaborator* during the previous year, had
inherited it. That meant recasting it into a form more to his lik-
ing,411 a task that may have made up for having had his own pet
course, Commercial Bank Credit, tossed out of the first year curric-
ulum, 41 2 in part a response to continuing student "tumult" and
pressure to "simplify and legalize. . work so as to put it over [to]
the first-year men. '413
Affairs related to the Institute also occupied Moore's time.
Having come to Yale in large part because of the Institute41'4 and
having eagerly expressed an interest in helping to plan its pro-
gram,41 5 Moore arrived nearly a year after its funding only to find
that all the planning had been done 16 and most of the money, dis-
tributed.41 Secure with his appointment as part of the Institute's
original staff,418 he did not overtly complain about having thus
been shut out of the organization that existed at that time, because
of its lack of central quarters, largely in the campus mail system
anyway. Instead, he quite directly attempted to become a part of
the Institute's activities and thus to deal with the apparent antipa-
thy of some of the staff to what they perceived of as "law
410. Dorothy Swaine Thomas to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 9, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
411. See, e.g., Underhill Moore to Charles E. Clark, June 19, 1933 (change in name to
Theories of Law) Moore papers, Yale.
412. Part of a swap in the fall of 1933 that brought a course in the sale of goods called
Marketing I into the first year. Reports of the Dean and of the Librarian, The School of
Law, Bulletin of Yale University 18-21 (1933-34).
413. Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, June 3, 1936 (recounting earlier problems)
Moore papers, Yale.
414. See text at notes 99, 131, 133-34 supra.
415. Underhill Moore to Robert M. Hutchins, Jan. 28, 1929, Jan. 31, 1929, Feb. 1, 1929;
see Robert M. Hutchins to Underhill Moore, Jan. 30, 1929; Underhill Moore to Charles E.
Clark, Apr. 29, 1929, Moore papers, Yale. Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, June 9, 1929,
Angell papers.
416. See Minutes of the Faculty of the Yale Law School, Feb. 21, 1929.
417. See Minutes of the Faculty of the Yale Law School, Dec. 12, 1929.
418. See James R. Angell to Underhill Moore, May 13, 1929, Moore papers, Yale.
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projects."'1  Moore regularly attended the meetings of the senior
research staff at the Institute; indeed he was the only person at the
law school to do so.'20 He also served on Institute committees, even
when it was quite obvious he was not very interested in the activ-
ity.421 And when three prominent Institute members began an in-
formal discussion group on sociology and anthropology Moore
made sure he was included and led a sessioD.' 22
Even after Moore had received his first grant from Institute
funds and then a renewal at a substantially increased level of fund-
ing 23 he continued to work at becoming an integral member of the
group of researchers at the Institute that he saw as being the core
of the professional social scientists at Yale. Thus, long after his
colleagues at the law school effectively abandoned their connection
with the Institute, in large part because they perceived it solely as
a source of funds and expert advice and they no longer felt they
had much need for either,' 2' Moore volunteered to undertake some
research as part of a plan designed to coordinate research at the
Institute.' 25 This plan, an outgrowth of a reorganization of the In-
428 6stitute's administrative structure, proposed to focus available re-
sources on an in depth study of the city of New Haven as seen in
its two communities, the Italian and the "American.' 27 One of the
proposed topics for research was "social control." Under this gen-
eral project, Moore proposed a two part study to be begun when
the two then uncompleted banking studies were finished.' 8
The first part of the study was a novel idea for Moore that
showed the imprint of Thomas and Corstvet. Moore proposed to
419. See Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, July 24, 1930, Moore papers, Yale.
420. See Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, May 12, 1930 (thanks for participating),
Moore papers, Yale.
421. For example, the Institute's committee on Human Relations in Industry which was
making a "total science" study of the impact of new loom techniques in mills. The product
of the study was E. CLAGUE, W. CouPFA & E. BAKKm, AFTER TmE SHiuDOWN (1934).
422. See Maurice Davie, Jerome Davis & Edward Sapir to Underhill Moore, Jan. 4,
1931, Mar. 10, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
423. See text at notes 326, 348 supra.
424. See Schlegel,. note 15 supra, at 550-54.
425. See Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Mar. 1, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
426. For a discussion of this reorganization see Schlegel, note 15 supra, at 555-56.
427. Mark A. May to James R. Angell, Nov. 17, 1932, Angell papers. The untitled
memo enclosed with this letter shows that virtually no one at the Institute was interested in
the idea.
428. Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Mar. 1, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
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survey the incidence of the contacts of "2000 sample families...
with each of the government agencies" in New Haven to be made
with special emphasis on "contacts which should have been made
but were not (e.g., poll taxes not paid, divers [sic.] licenses not se-
cured) .. ."19 It was a complex task, especially if substantial ef-
fort were to be expended in verifying questionnaire responses, but
methodologically it was an easy study that might have yielded in-
teresting results since the 2000 families were to be divided evenly
between the two target communities. The second part of the study
had the mien of an old friend. It was to be "an attempt to observe
the degree of correspondence between the behavior of the commu-
nity, as represented by the 2000 sample families, and the models of
behavior set forth in statutes, ordinances, etc.' ' 43 0 Now, Moore was
by no means sure how he was going to attempt this, except that it
"would probably involve specific inquiries, for example, into deser-
tion laws and family support, or tax laws, their administration and
the actual payment of taxes."481 But the ethnically split sample
made the project formally similar to the design of the banking
studies and placing the study in what was formally at least a single
legal community removed one significant aspect of Moore's earlier
methodological problems.
Moore expected to begin the first part of the new study in the
fall of 1933.432 So when, in the summer of 1933, he desired to call a
halt to the banking studies he had a new project already in the
works. While he tried to make up his mind what to do with his old
research, he had Corstvet prepare massive bibliographies of the
literature on social control, though without any real idea, or at
least ability to communicate, exactly what he wanted.43 3 At the
same time they began several months of study of the recent stat-
utes of Connecticut and the recent ordinances of New Haven look-
ing for potential topics for investigation in the second part of the
429. Id.
430. Id. It should be noted that Moore's topic bore a strong resemblance to one sug-
gested by Dorothy Thomas some eighteen months earlier at the time of the reorganization
of the Institute. See Arnold, Smith & Thomas, Memo, Nov. 27, 1931, (plausible to study
"the interrelation between governmental policy ... with the habit formation and behavior
reactions of the people") Moore papers, Yale; Schlegel, supra note 15, at 107.
431. Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Mar. 1, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
432. Id.




study. 34 Their plan, developed as they worked, was to do field ob-
servations both before and after implementation of a statute or or-
dinance. From the accumulation of "probably feasible investiga-
tions" Moore came to focus on changes in New Haven's traffic and
parking ordinances because of the "relative simplicity" of the sub-
ject and because the Chief of Police, in his role as the New Haven
Traffic Authority, was willing to cooperate.4 5 And so, without re-
ally ever deciding to stop his banking research, by December 1933
Moore slid into a new project. He sent his field workers, armed
with Corstvet's meticulous directions,3 8 out to watch drivers on
the streets of New Haven.
The first study Moore set to do was again a natural experi-
ment. On two blocks in the heart of downtown an ordinance lim-
ited parking to thirty minutes before 7 P.M., but not after.4 37 So
for six days, just before Christmas, observers, placed on the street,
timed the duration of parking for all people who parked in these
two blocks during certain half hour periods both before and after 7
P.M.438 In order to be sure that the two time periods were compa-
rable, observers also monitored the flow of traffic and shadowed
parkers to learn their ultimate destination. 439 The second study,
begun one month later, was a different kind of "natural" experi-
ment, obviously planned with the connivance of the Chief of Po-
lice. This time Moore's field workers spent five three-day, eight-
hour periods of observation at a complex intersection about two
blocks from the Institute." 0 Positioned on three of the five corners
the observers charted the paths taken by cars travelling through
the intersection. The first time the intersection was unmarked; the
second time a traffic circle was painted on the pavement, but in
fact no ordinance establishing the circle had been enacted. Two
months later the observers went out again. This third observation
came after an appropriate ordinance had been adopted and while
the circle was still painted on the street. For the fourth observa-
tion, stanchions were added to further emphasize the perimeter of
434. Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, May 25, 1934, Moore papers, Yale.
435. Moore Report 1934, supra note 375 at 7.
436. See Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, May 26, 1934, Moore papers, Yale.
437. Moore & Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 53 YALE
L.J. 1, 88-94 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Law and Learning Theory].
438. Id.
439. Id. at 92.
440. Id. at 127-28.
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the circle; for the fifth observation both the stanchions and the
painted circle were removed, though the ordinance was not
repealed.
On each of these studies Moore and Corstvet took their turns
like everyone else and Mrs. Moore saw that no one froze by provid-
ing coffee and donuts.441 Collecting the data was not the hardest
part of either study by any means; interpreting it was much
harder. The parking study showed that just over two thirds of the
parkers obeyed the time limit when applicable, while only half of
the cars were parked for similarly short periods of time after the
restriction was lifted.442 But even if one knew what significance to
attribute to that fact, the number of observations was small443 and
even after the effort to shadow parkers and count passing cars the
best one could say was that there was "no clear indication" that
the time periods "were not comparable.' 444 The traffic circle stud-
ies were even more problematical. In general, painting the traffic
circle on the street, with or without an ordinance, caused people to
deflect their normal path through the intersection so as to avoid
the area where the circle was; removing the circle, even though the
ordinance was still in effect, allowed traffic to return to its former
pattern. 45 Adding stanchions to the painted circle accentuated its
effect. But examining the data in detail indicated that three of the
four traffic patterns studied did not entirely accomplish their
goals446 and the fourth had comparably few observations.
The effort to make sense out of this data brought two results.
441. Underhill Moore to Agatha Bowley (family friend), Dec. 18, 1934, Moore papers,
Yale. In this letter Moore states that he was able to get the New Haven Parking Authority
to make and repeal ordinances in order to advance these two studies. Emma Corstvet con-
curs that this was the case. See Emma Corstvet Llewellyn to John Henry Schlegel, Feb. ?
1980.
442. Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 110-11.
443. Approximately 200, id. at 111.
444. Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 92.
445. Id. at 128-30.
446. In one case the normal pattern was through the circle. Here the results conformed
to the common sense hypothesis; only introduction of the stanchions moved all of the traffic
out of the area of the circle, although the painted circle moved about three-quarters. In the
second, two-thirds traffic normally passed on the correct edge of the circle. Painting the
circle on the street moved almost all of the traffic out of the circle, but perversely adding the
stanchions moved it even farther over. In the third case, the circle was designed to shift the
traffic pattern completely around the circle. Only the stanchions accomplished that result;
the painted circle functioned generally in the intended manner but hardly decisively. Id. at
128-30.
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First, frustration set in, as evidenced by a plain hiatus in the stud-
ies and a decision to work into publishable shape the preliminary
study done on the uncollected funds problem.447 Second, in the
process of preparing an annual report for submission to the Insti-
tute,48 Moore acquired a slightly clearer understanding of exactly
what he was interested in investigating when he talked about
studying "social control." Moore's report began by differentiating
his work from traditional legal research. He emphasized the con-
tinuity of his new work with the banking studies. The earlier stud-
ies attempted to isolate "those factors in community life in signifi-
cant causal relation or significantly associated with the behavior of
the official government in laying down propositions of law and ad-
ministering them."449 The parking and traffic studies were directed
at isolating precisely the reverse relationship: "that the established
patterns of overt behavior which are unlike the model set forth in
.*.. [a] proposition of law ... effect the degree of correspondence
between subsequent behavior and the model in the proposition."'450
In other words, taken together, banking and parking would prove
that law generally follows custom and, when not, custom modifies
law. Moore also hoped to isolate "types of legal regulation" for
which there would be a constant ratio between the frequency of
behavior conforming to the legal rule before and after its
adoption. 51
Work on the uncollected funds articles occupied most of the
following year, 52 but with the start of classes in the fall of 1935
447. Cf. Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, June 15, 1935 (reporting work during 1934-
35), Moore papers, Yale.
448. Moore Report 1934, supra note 375.
449. Id. at 3.
450. Id. at 6. Moore described his hypothesis as:
*. . difference between the frequency distribution among the various classes of
relevant overt behavior before and after the enactment of a statute or ordinance
regulating the overt behavior classified is a function (a) of the number of classes,
(b) of the distribution of the frequencies among the classes as disclosed by ob-
servation before the enactment of the statute or ordinance, and (c) of the formal
similarity of the model in the statute or ordinance to the models which describe
the classes ....
Id. at 7.
451. Moore Report 1934, supra note 375, at 7.
452. Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, June 15, 1935, Moore papers, Yale. One parking
study was simultaneously undertaken-this time on two different blocks, judged to be com-
parable-one with a parking limit and the other without. This study discovered that virtu-
ally no one parking in either block was remaining longer than the durational limitation,
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parking studies were begun again in earnest. Initially, two more
studies were completed. One took place on a block of mixed resi-
dential and commercial property located a short distance from the
center of town. Parking was prohibited on one side only with the
prohibition changing sides each month. The second observation
took place on a block considered comparable to the first, though it
was closer to the center of town. Parking on the second block was
permanently prohibited on one side and on the other side limited
to thirty minutes. 53 In spring still another study was added, this
time in the heart of downtown where, similar to the first study,
parking was limited before 7 P.M. to 15 minutes and thereafter
was unlimited.4 " Thus, by the time this fourth study was com-
pleted, Moore had collected two pairs of studies, each a variation
on the natural experiment form, one pair with which one might
contrast parking limited to 15 minutes or 30 minutes against un-
limited parking, the other pair with which one might contrast
parking limited to thirty minutes or unlimited against parking to-
tally prohibited. A pattern to his work was plainly emerging.
While Moore worked on gathering data, Emma Corstvet
worked on analyzing the results.455 Curiously she ignored the obvi-
ous pairing of the studies and instead treated each study sepa-
rately. She began by attempting to determine parking duration by
whether the sub-units-side of street, block, day-could be com-
bined.456 Once she had determined that such aggregation was ap-
propriate, she turned her attention to determining whether the dif-
ferences between the regulated and unregulated distributions were
significant, using six different methods, some standard, some
hardly a helpful investigation. Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 92.
453. Id. at 88-94. Two periods of observation, each four days in duration extending over
the change in regulation at the end of a month and limited to daylight hours were under-
taken. Observers were hidden in a second floor bay window overlooking the street and
parkers were shadowed to learn their destination.
454. Id. at 88-94.
455. Emma Corstvet to Underhill Moore, June 23, 1936 (summarizing work done that
year), Moore papers, Yale. For this task she had the assistance of William L. Dennis, a Yale
undergraduate who was working for Moore as part of his scholarship, and three statisticians
associated with the Institute. See Emma Corstvet to Underhill Moore, July 27, 1936, Moore
papers, Yale. Emma Corstvet, Memo on Discussions of Parking Studies-Status as of Fall,
1936, summer 1936? (copy in possession of the author courtesy of Emma Corstvet
Llewellyn).
456. Corstvet, supra note 455.
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rather novel. 57 When she finished this task, Corstvet was con-
vinced that the last study would have to be discarded as unusable
because it had sampling problems .4 5 8 The rest she found quite fine,
if a bit small in scale. Having thus destroyed Moore's careful pair-
ings, she proceeded to make several suggestions for further work.
One was for reducing the existing data, which had been turned into
graphic form, into mathematical form.459 Another was for doing
further studies with larger samples so as to reduce the possibility
of sampling error.460 And then, her summary of the work to date
complete, Emma Corstvet, in fall 1936, quite reluctantly stopped
working for Moore.41
The task of finding a replacement for Corstvet was difficult;462
ultimately Moore had to accept Charles Callahan, 463 a J.S.D. can-
didate with an interest in procedure, instead of the professional
social scientist he wanted.4" But finding an assistant was the least
difficult problem Moore faced while Corstvet worked at recapping
the work to date. The others could conveniently be gathered under
the heading money-Yale was notably short of it.
Though all of Moore's money problems were related to the
parking research, the first problem was in a sense quite personal.
In spring 1937 Moore was eligible for a sabbatical. He planned to
457. Id.
458. Id. The problems she identified were the small size of the sample and the fact that
even when unregulated nearly two-thirds of the parking on both sides of the street was for
less than the shorter permissible duration.
459. Corstvet, supra note 455.
460. Id.
461. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975. She had married Karl
Llewellyn in 1933. Two years later the sudden illness of her father-in-law made it necessary
for her to move to New York. The extended commute forced her to cut her work week to
three days, but that too proved unsatisfactory, so reluctantly she chose to stop working for
Moore.
462. Moore first tried to hire one of the other sociologists at the Institute who lived
with Thomas and Corstvet, but she declined even though pressured by Mark May to accept.
Underhill Moore to Ruth Arrington, Jan. 30, 1936 ("I am looking for a person who is suffi-
ciently interested and sympathetic with the kind of work... [Corstvet and I] have been
doing to carry it on, or, better even, to develop it."); Ruth Arrington to Underhill Moore,
Feb. 3, 1936; Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Apr. 8, 1936, Moore papers, Yale. Then
Moore tried one of the statisticians who had helped Corstvet, but with no success either.
See Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, May 18, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
463. b. 1910. B.S. 1932, J.D. 1934, Ohio State; J.S.D. 1937, Yale. Private practice 1934,
Ohio. Research asst. 1936, lecturer 1938, asst. prof. 1939, Yale; assoc. prof. 1943, prof. 1948,
Ohio State. d. 1973.
464. Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, May 26, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
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take it and spend the semester and the following summer in Eng-
land and on the continent replicating the parking studies in an at-
tempt to control for cultural variables in his data.4 5 In an effort to
prepare for that research he had planned to spend summer 1936 in
England arranging for the necessary governmental cooperation.406
In winter 1935 the faculty routinely supplied the necessary ap-
proval and then to everyone's surprise the Yale Corporation de-
cided to economize by requiring that persons seeking a sabbatical
agree to do so at half salary, the balance to defray the cost of hir-
ing a replacement. 67 Moore was absolutely unwilling to take his
leave under these conditions, although he was at the time quite
solvent. 68 So, although the law faculty, already angry with the
Corporation over two successive budget cuts, was ready to fight
with a solemn declaration that they could cover Moore's courses
without hiring anyone, 69 Moore, with a certain amount of annoy-
ance, withdrew his sabbatical request.47 0
While the sabbatical problem was hanging fire Moore tangled
first with the Corporation 47 1 and then with Clark472 over the ques-
tion of who would pay the salary of his research assistant at the
465. Underhill Moore to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 20, 1935, (application); Charles E. Clark
to Underhill Moore, Dec. 21, 1935 (no problem), Moore papers, Yale. Moore had a second
reason for wanting to go to England; he had secured an invitation to give several lectures at
the London School of Economics.
466. Underhill Moore to Charles E. Clark, Dec. 20, 1935, Moore papers, Yale.
467. Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, Feb. 28, 1936; Charles E. Clark to Faculty,
Mar. 3, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
468. His objection, never articulated in writing, may have been based on the expenses
he foresaw in connection with the salary of his assistant and the cost of further studies. See
text at notes 471-84 infra.
469. Minutes of the Board of Permanent Officers, Yale Law School, Mar. 6, 1936.
470. Underhill Moore to Charles E. Clark, Mar. 7, 1936; Underhill Moore to James R.
Angell, Mar. 7, 1936; James R. Angell to Underhill Moore, Mar. 7, 1936 (sorry for "annoy-
ance"), Moore papers, Yale.
471. See Charles E. Clark to Underhill Moore, Feb. 28, 1936 (reporting decision of Cor-
poration to terminate salary), May 23, 1936 (reporting his understanding of solution), Moore
papers, Yale. Thomas W. Farnam (Yale Comptroller) to Underhill Moore, Apr. 27, 1936
(reiterating decision); Charles E. Clark to Thomas W. Farnam, Apr. 27, 1936 (stating his
position); Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, May 8, 1936 (offering compromise of partial
payment by University); James R. Angell to Underhill Moore, May 14, 1936 (tentative ac-
ceptance); James R. Angell, Memo to file, May 14, 1936? (recording his understanding of
resolution), Angell papers.
472. See Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, May 18, 1936 (reporting dispute with
Clark over solution); Charles E. Clark to Thomas W. Farnam, May 19, 1936 (reporting his
side of fight); Thomas W. Farnam to James R. Angell, May 20, 1936 (reporting outcome),
Angell papers.
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law school. Although Moore largely won that dispute,47 3 his victory
came at the cost of being reminded how jealously his colleagues
viewed the special provisions made to support his research in the
agreement he had reached with Hutchins when he came to Yale4' 4
and, at the same time, how, as he put it, "no one around here
seems to be interested in ... [empirical] research.' 4 5 But these
two indications of the financial precariousness of Moore's research
were not half as serious as the one eminating directly from the
Institute.
Moore's most recent grant from the Institute had been the
$5,000 received in fall 1931 to support the banking studies.47' For
the following four years his "budget" had been the unexpended
balance of that sum, 477 even though in the interim his research
topic had shifted, and his new research was seen to be "quite in
harmony with the program of the Institute.' 47 So long as the
banking studies were the only research activity that arrangement
was fine, for the salary of Moore's assistant at the Institute was
paid out of Institute funds41 and out of pocket expenditures were
limited. But with the start of the parking studies out of pocket
expenditures climbed drastically because of the need for multiple
paid observers and some paid consultants. Then, in 1935 when, as
a result of these costs, the balance had sunk dangerously low, the
perennial problem of what the Institute should be doing was again
473. The agreement struck was that the University would put up $1000, one-half to
come out of an already shrunken law school budget, and Moore, the balance up to $800. See
Charles E. Clark to Thomas W. Farnam, May 19, 1936, Angell papers. Moore then turned
around and hired a part-time assistant, thus obviating the necessity of expending any of his
own funds and, not incidentally, infuriating Clark. Underhill Moore to James R. Angell,
May 18, 1936, Angell papers. The real cost, of course, was the diminution in the amount of
assistance available for Moore's work. t
474. See Charles E. Clark to Thomas W. Farnam, Apr. 27, 1936 (recounting objections
of Edwin Borchard), Angell papers. Charles E. Clark to Charles Seymour (Yale Provost),
May 29, 1934 (recounting objections of Walton Hamilton, Thurman Arnold & Wesley
Sturges), Moore papers, Yale.
475. Underhill Moore to Charles J. Tilden, Nov. 5, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
476. See text at note 348 supra.
477. See, e.g., Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Oct. 3, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
478. Edgar Furniss to Underhill Moore, Mar. 4, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
479. Clark had engineered the switch of Sussman to the Institute's budget several years
earlier. See Charles E. Clark to Mark A. May, Jan. 15, 1931, Moore papers, Yale. Emma
Corstvet was already on the Institute's payroll, though paid out of grant funds, when, in
1932, she began to work for Moore. See, e.g., Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, Sept. 29,
1932; Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Apr. 23, 1934, Moore papers, Yale.
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raised. The decision to focus the activities of the social science
staff on the New Haven community had neither brought about
much more cooperative research, nor unified the research program
of the Institute.8 0 In another attempt to realize these objectives
the Institute was once again administratively reorganized, this
time under a single director, and a decision was made to liquidate
existing research projects whenever possible in order to provide
that director with a "liquid research fund" to be used to support
such projects as appeared to be most promising for the develop-
ment of "a unified science of behavior and human relations.' 481
Moore attempted to recast his research in order to fit it into what
seemed to be the developing program of the Institute's director,
Mark A. May.482 Nevertheless, when, virtually simultaneously,
Corstvet left and the last of the $5000 grant had just about run
out, May balked at either paying the salary of Callahan or provid-
ing another grant to support parking research.483 After some hag-
gling May agreed to pay part of the salary if Moore would pay the
rest,484 but the matter of research support hung fire.
The combination of these three financial attacks on his re-
search and the growing indications that few people were otherwise
interested in it left Moore deeply depressed.8 5 His normally abra-
sive teaching style got even more irritating to the point that one of
his better students, long the staple of his teaching, was offended
and contemplated leaving his course.4 6 Nevertheless, during this
480. Interview with Mark A. May, June 9, 1975. Cf. May, A Retrospective View of the
Institute of Human Relations at Yale, 6 BEHAVIOR Sci. NoTEs 141, 150 (1971).
481. May, supra note 480, at 148-50.
482. See Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Nov. 29, 1935 (How does your work fit in?);
Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, Dec. 26, 1935 (answer); Clark L. Hull, Memorandum to
Mark A. May and his Committee on Agenda for the Institute of Human Relations, Dec. 3,
1935 (proposal for joint research); Clark L. Hull to Mark A. May, Dec. 18, 1935 (addition of
material on Moore to memo of Dec. 3, 1935); Clark L. Hull to Underhill Moore, Dec. 18,
1935 (recounting Moore visit to talk about proposal); Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Jan.
29, 1936 (have I correctly identified your research interests?); Underhill Moore to Mark A.
May, Feb. 5, 1936 (yes, but you do not recognize other ways my research fits in with other
activities at the Institute), Moore papers, Yale.
483. See Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, May 8, 1936, Angell papers.
484. Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, May 18, 1936 (I have agreed to pay $1000 of
Callahan's salary during next 18 mos.), Angell papers. Underhill Moore to Charles Seymour,
May 18, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
485. Underhill Moore to Hessel Yntema, Feb. 10, 1940 (recounting Yntema's visit to
New Haven in summer 1936), Moore papers, Yale.
486. See Eugene V. Rostow to Underhill Moore, Feb. 26, 1936?, Moore papers, Yale.
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depression Moore did not allow himself to lapse into inactivity.
During the summer of 1936 he went to England as planned and
secured the cooperation of the English government for his planned
research there, now rescheduled for the summer of 1938.487 When
he came back he began in earnest on the plan of further research
Corstvet had laid out for him. And to finance it all he began seek-
ing funds from various sources, including the Carnegie Founda-
tion, 88 the Commonwealth Fund, 89 the Macy Foundation,4 90 the
Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society,491 the Rosen-
wald Foundation, 92 and the federal government. 93
Of the two obviously related efforts the research went better,
or at least easier. Taking Corstvet's advice he reran two of the
studies: the one where parking restrictions were lifted each evening
at 7 P.M., that she had suggested would have to be discarded, and
another one where the no parking zone changed signs each month,
that she thought required a larger sample to be useful.4" Both re-
runs were a success,4'9 5 but neither was in any sense a perfect ex-
Moore's reply was, for him, unusually cordial. Underhill Moore to Eugene V. Rostow, Feb.
27, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
487. See Underhill Moore to S. S. Wilson, Sept. 19, 1936; S. S. Wilson to Underhill
Moore, Oct. 2, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
488. See F. W. Keppel to Underhill Moore, June 4, 1937, Moore papers, Yale.
489. See George Wellwood Murray to Underhill Moore, May 21, 1937, Moore papers,
Yale.
490. See Underhill Moore to John Dewey, Feb. 27, 1937, Moore papers, Yale.
491. Underhill Moore to American Philosophical Society, Nov. ?, 1936, Moore papers,
Yale.
492. See Underhill Moore to Robert M. Hutchins, Mar. ?, 1937 (on file in the Robert
M. Hutchins papers, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago) [hereinafter cited as
Hutchins papers without cross-reference].
493. See Wm. G. Eliot, I, to Underhill Moore, Mar. 15, 1937,-Moore papers, Yale.
494. See text at notes 459-60 supra.
495. In the first of these efforts, Moore again sent his observers out to check parking in
the area where the prohibition of parking and unlimited parking shifted sides each month.
But this time instead of eight days of observation he kept his observers in the field for six
weeks, eight hours per day, again hidden in a bay window and again shadowing parkers. The
second observation was again of an area where parking restrictions were lifted early each
evening, but this time the study was moved a block away. For seven weeks observers in a
second floor window of city hall watched parkers for one hour before the restriction was
lifted and for one hour after. Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 88-94.
The results of the first study were substantially the same as in the earlier study. Com-
pare id. at 100-02, with id. at 102-04. But the second one showed a substantially different
and more marked effect from the parking limitation than had the earlier study. Compare id.
at 104-06, with id. at 106-07. This result in part confirmed Corstvet's feeling that there had
been something wrong with that study. But see text at note 504 infra.
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periment. It is by no means obvious that parkers during working
hours are likely to be doing the same things, even if they are going
to the same places, as parkers in the early evening,496 nor that
parking is such random behavior that, on a two way street, the side
on which parking is prohibited makes no difference. So in two
more studies Moore tried to improve on his earlier research design.
In each of these new studies Moore took advantage of advance
knowledge when parking restrictions were going to be first im-
posed.497 In one of these areas, a warehouse district near the train
station, his observers worked for three weeks before, and then
again after, parking was limited to thirty minutes.498 In the other
area, a spot on the edge of the campus away from town, observers
similarly spent four weeks before and after the imposition of a
sixty minute limitation.9 Unfortunately what Moore gained in
simplicity of design he lost to the possibility that parking behavior
changed with the seasons as late fall went into mid-winter.
Even with these studies Moore had by no means covered all of
the possibilities. He had made no attempt to account for the ef-
fects of police enforcement of parking limitations. To remedy that
omission, in the spring and summer 1937 he arranged to have a
police officer assigned to his control who was set to work placing
regular city parking tickets on cars at precisely determined times
after the elapse of the period for permissible parking. 00 In this
study, carried out at the site of the earlier study in the warehouse
district, observers watched before regular tagging was instituted,
while it was going on, and after it was discontinued.50 1 By thus
tagging cars in a place where law enforcement was apparently ex-
pected to be lax Moore caused some problems with at least one
local businessman who had to be threatened with jailing in order
to convince him that the policeman and tags were real.0 2 But the
496. As Moore recognized, see Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437 at 91-92.
497. See id. at 93. Underhill Moore to Emma Corstvet, Dec. 10, 1936; Underhill Moore
to Agatha Bowley, Apr. 9, 1938, Moore papers, Yale.
498. Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 88-94.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 117.
501. Id. at 116-17. For one part of the study only parkers who had stayed fifty minutes
beyond the posted time were tagged; for another, all those who had stayed fifteen minutes.
Id. at 117.
502. William L. Dennis (research assistant) to Underhill Moore, Aug. 5, 1937, Moore




results were probably worth the effort and the businessman's ag-
gravation, because they showed a small, though noticeable, shift in
the direction of fewer parkings lasting thirty minutes or more.5 0 3
Taken together all the studies revealed several facts: where
parking behavior did not already conform with a regulation, impo-
sition of that regulation made some difference in the behavior of
parkers; that this effect was consistent and more extreme the more
extreme the limitation imposed; that the limitation did not seem
to effect the ultimate destination of those individuals parking in
the place, although it was obviously not clear whether the same
individuals were parking for shorter durations or only parking else-
where; and that systematic enforcement seemed to make the ordi-
nances at least marginally more effective. A little further thought
would have suggested that the most marginal effect found, the one
in the study that Corstvet had decided was unusable and Moore
had then rerun, might have been explained by the location of the
study-across from the post office, a classic location for stops of
less than the fifteen minute limitation.5" One might have called
the effort a success and quickly written up the results. Moore, how-
ever, did no such thing.
His attempts to secure funds from outside grantors had
proven uniformly unsuccessful.50 5 Although May had belatedly
contributed about $500 toward Moore's expenses, 0 6 even before
the tagging studies were begun Moore had expended nearly $2000
of his own funds in addition. 07 By the time completion of the tag-
ging experiments, Moore had spent enough to require that he take
out a $3500 loan to finance the expenditures. 08 The trip to Eng-
land to do research was thus scrapped and the following year spent
in analysis of the data, analysis of a very particular kind.509
503. See Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 117-26.
504. Id. at 90.
505. See Robert M. Lester (Carnegie) to Underhill Moore, Mar. 9, 1938; George
Welwood Murray (Commonwealth) to Underhill Moore, May 21, 1937; John Dewey (Macy)
to Underhill Moore, Feb. 27, 1937; American Philosophical Society to Underhill Moore, Apr.
12, 1937; Win. G. Eliot, HI (federal gov't) to Underhill Moore, Mar. 15, 1937, Moore papers,
Yale. Robert M. Hutchins (Rosenwald) to Underhill Moore, Mar. ?, 1937, Hutchins papers.
506. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Nov. 11, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
507. Underhill Moore to Emma Corstvet, Dec. 10, 1936 ($2000); Underhill Moore to
Fritz M. Marx, Dec. 18, 1936 (over $1700), Moore papers, Yale.
508. Underhill Moore to Agatha Bowley, Apr. 9, 1938; Underhill Moore to Mark A.
May, May 10, 1937, (request for reimbursement of $3,113.39), Moore papers, Yale.
509. Underhill Moore to Agatha Bowley, Apr. 9, 1938, Moore papers, Yale.
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While in 1934 Moore thought only in terms of determining the
"significant association" of various factors and ratios of difference
in frequency distributions,510 by 1936 he was determined to express
his results as "simple mathematical functions" by which one might
predict "behavior after the statute as a function of (i) ... behav-
ior before the statute, and (ii) the statute itself."5 11 To this end he
had shifted from two pairs of related studies to a collection of
studies encompassing four different regulations: no parking, 15, 30
and 60 minute parking. Even before he finished he had isolated a
mathematical relationship which he thought might hold for all the
studies. It suggested that a parking regulation diminished the fre-
quency of parking for durations longer than the limitation only for
durations that exceeded the sum of (a) 37% of the difference be-
tween the longest duration observed when the area was unregu-
lated and the limitation and (b) the limitation.512 Apparently, upon
further analysis the relationship did not hold; at least it was never
heard of again. But Moore and his assistants worked hard to de-
velop other such relationships, deforming curves, aggregating data
this way and that, and generally trying to learn exactly, quantita-
tively, what was the relationship between the phenomena they had
observed and the parking regulations in question.5113
In spring, 1938, Moore, who had been filing research reports
with the American Sociological Society for several years, had his
project selected out of the research directory by the chairman of
the Social Research section and was asked to present his tentative
findings in a panel discussion for that section at the annual meet-
ing of the Society that December. 14 Analysis of the data had pro-
ceeded far enough by then that Moore agreed to do so. 515 The re-
sulting paper appears to have been an unadorned presentation of
the mathematical analysis, largely devoid of an explanatory frame-
510. Moore Report 1934, supra note 375, at 6.
511. Underhill Moore, A Quantitative Investigation of Human Behavior, 1, Nov. 25,
1936 (application to Penrose Fund), Moore papers, Yale.
512. Underhill Moore, Memorandum re an Investigation of the Effect of Statutes and
Ordinances and their Administration, 6, Feb. 27, 1937 (grant application), Angell papers,
Hutchins papers.
513. See Underhill Moore to Roswell P. Angier (Yale, Psychology) June 27, 1938.
514. Calvin Schmid to Underhill Moore, June 3, 1938, Moore papers, Yale.
515. Preliminary Program, 33d Annual Meeting, American Sociological Society, 3 AM.
Soc. REv. 749, 754 (1938).
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work which might have made the analysis intelligible.51 It is also
relatively apparent that even on its own terms the analysis was not
wholly successful.5 1.7 Nor did the presentation bring Moore any-
thing more than cursory, on the spot, criticism of the work.518
With a completed, if not necessarily wholly satisfactory paper
written at this point Moore was faced with two alternatives: pub-
lish a report of the work to date in the hope of generating criticism
from a wider audience than he had been able to attract so far, or
expand the research to other fields in an effort to increase the data
base from which generalizations could be drawn.1 9 Moore plainly
preferred the second alternative, 520 but he was rather limited in his
choices by Mark May's decision, taken at the time the Rockefeller
Foundation refunded the Institute at a lower level of funding,521 to
terminate all support for Moore's work.2 2 Appeals for funds made
to the new university administration 52 3 met with no success,524 al-
though the law school managed to provide places on the faculty for
Callahan and Moore's other research assistant out of funds freed
by the resignations of Clark, Thurman Arnold, and Dorothy
Thomas and the termination of other programs. However, these
posts were accompanied with teaching responsibilities and thus
substantially limited the time available to engage in reanalysis of
the data, or to mount further studies, even if money could be
found. They also provided the occasion for diversions from those
tasks through the ever-present need to spend time on the develop-
ment and revision of curriculum.5 25
While the "painstaking, though undramatic, work" of reanal-
516. Cf. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Feb. 3, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
517. Id.
518. There is nothing in Moore papers, Yale, reflecting comment on the paper.
519. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Feb. 3, 1939 (May's formulation), Moore papers,
Yale.
520. See Underhill Moore to Charles Seymour (by then Yale's President), Feb. 7, 1939,
Moore papers, Yale.
521. May, supra note 480 at 147.
522. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Dec. 5, 1938; Feb. 3, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
523. Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Feb. 7, 1939; Underhill Moore to Charles Sey-
mour, Feb. 7, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
524. Edgar Furniss to Underhill Moore, Feb. , 1939; Charles Seymour to Underhill
Moore, Feb. 14, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
525. See, e.g., Memorandum for Callahan, Dennis & Moore of Work Proposed to be
Given Next Year, Dec. 15, 1939 (detailing a split of Commercial Bank Credit I & II into four
courses), Moore papers, Yale.
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ysis of Moore's data proceeded, if ever so slowly,5 26 Moore received
a wholly unexpected chance to clarify his ideas about the study
and, in the process, provide the explanatory framework for it that
was absent when he had presented his paper at the American Soci-
ological Society Meeting. Albert Kocourek, the junior editor on
Wigmore's Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, requested a short
piece for a projected volume on "American Legal Philosophies" ex-
pressing Moore's views on "the ultimate ideas of the origin, nature,
or ends of the law."52 Kocourek suggested that he was interested
in securing a diversity of approach and offered a variety of poten-
tial starting points: "ontology, epistemology, psychology, logic,
value ... [or] social fact. ' 528 Moore accepted "gladly, but with
many misgivings.15 2 Unlike most of the other participants in the
project, Moore took Kocourek's suggestion seriously and used the
occasion to "make a logical construct of the theory which underlies
... [my] empirical work and indicates the relation of that kind of
legal research to work in psychology and the so-called social sci-
ences." 530 The effort took all of the summer and fall of 1940 and on
into winter 1941. Moore found the work "difficult far beyond ex-
pectation,"5 3 11 but when he and Callahan had finished they had a
piece that Moore was obviously proud of. Significantly, it was ab-
solutely unlike anything else in the resulting "coffee-table"
volume.
Moore began his essay with a flat, if a bit confused, espousal of
the Vienna Circle/logical positivist 53 2 requirement that all scien-
tific, by which he meant causal, theories use operational or observ-
526. Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, Apr. 19, 1940, Moore papers, Yale.
527. Albert Kocouiek to Underhill Moore, May 31, 1940, Moore papers, Yale.
528. Albert Kocourek, Untitled Memorandum, n.d., accompanying Albert Kocourek to
Underhill Moore, May 31, 1940, Moore papers, Yale. The recipients of the letter who de-
clined were Mortimer Adler, Thurman Arnold, Louis D. Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter,
Learned Hand, and Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr. Kocourek also planned to include pieces rep-
resenting the views of James Barr Ames, James Collidge Carter, Benjamin N. Cardozo, John
Chipman Gray and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., though this part of the plan was never
completed.
529. Underhill Moore to Albert Kocourek, June 17, 1940, Moore papers, Yale.
530. Underhill Moore to Albert Kocourek, Jan. 16, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
531. Id.
532. At this time in his life Moore considered himself a logical positivist. See Underhill
Moore to A. H. Pekelis, Mar. 29, 1943, Moore papers, Yale. Others thought so too. See
Albert Kocourek to Underhill Moore, June 23, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
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able definitions.53 3 He therefore dismissed all "philosophies of law
with which... [he was] acquainted" for not being "useful guides
in attempting to formulate operational hypotheses as to the rela-
tions between law and other behavior. '"" In place of the "sterility"
of existing philosophies of law for generating such operational hy-
potheses, Moore proposed to set forth a theory of law "based on an
analysis of the process of learning, through pain or reward, a re-
sponse to a sign in a stimulus-response situation." 535 His goal was
to acquire "precise knowledge of the specific effects of law on be-
havior," in the belief that "until such knowledge is available, any
discussion of the relative desirability of alternative social ends
which may be achieved by law is largely day-dreaming and any dis-
cussion of the 'engineering' methods by which law may be used to
achieve those ends is largely futile."53 6
Having thus abused, if not disposed of, both traditional legal
scholarship and the then newer forms of policy analysis, Moore
presented his own theory. He first asserted that legal rules as well
as legal behavior "may or may not be a sign to which a response
has been learned. '537 Then, importing legal phenomena wholly into
the world of every day events, Moore further asserted that it was
improper to distinguish "between law ... and other behavior and
artifacts" as was commonly done. Rather, Moore claimed, the more
important distinction was between "behavior and artifacts which
are signs" (i.e., those "to which human beings have been taught,
through pain, humiliation, or reward, to respond") "and those.
which are not."538 He proceeded to distinguish learned responses
from other responses, and briefly review the mechanism of learning
through reenforcement.539 Then, reverting to concerns first ex-
pressed in the Wigmore review nearly twenty years earlier, he im-
ported culture into the learning situation as learned responses or
behavior patterns of those who teach, primarily parents, and at-
tempted to account for changes in culture either as random behav-
ior by reenforcing agents or as responses to new stimulus situa-
533. Moore & Callahan, Underhill Moore in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIX-
TEEN AmERICAN SCHOLARS 203 (1941).
534. Id. at 204.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 206-07.
537. Id. at 205.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 207-10.
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tions.5 40 Further, emphasizing cultural aspects of learning, Moore
observed that as others were often responding to the same sign
when an individual was learning his response to it, "the frequency
with which . .. [the] behavior [of others] corresponds to the re-
sponse being reenforced, may become a part of the sign" for the
individual learning that response." 1 He thereafter emphasized the
wide variation in the range of stimuli to which "in life situations"
responses may be learned and attempted to account for problems
created by the verbal content of many stimuli. Moore further
noted that not all things, be they legal rules, advertising messages
or other exhortations, purporting to be stimuli were necessarily
such unless a response to them was learned, if only on the basis of
recognizing the authority of the individual or organ issuing the
stimulus." 2
With the general description of his theory thus complete
Moore returned to a more narrowly legal context and observed,
somewhat dogmatically, that:
the common assumption that propositions of law are exhibited by the state to
most people, that responses to them are conditioned in most cases by punish-
ment inflicted by the state and that therefore law is a peculiar class of signs
to which is given responses differing in degree from responses to other signs,
is erroneous.5a
"[M]ost propositions of law are not exhibited by anyone to the
senses of most people;" "most responses which are thought of as
responses to propositions of law . . . actually are responses to
stimulus situations which do not include any proposition of law;"
most responses given to propositions of law are not responses
"learned through the punishment of the state" but rather have
"been taught byoparents;" and those instances "in which the state
does carry out the process of conditioning a response," "cases of a
few deviational individuals" or cases where "the state is an innova-
tor" that "attempts to obtain a response different from the re-
sponses being given by the great majority of people," "the process
of conditioning a response to a law-sign" and other learning
processes "are fundamentally the same.'
540. Id. at 210-11.
541. Id. at 211.
542. Id. at 211-15.
543. Id. at 216.
544. Id. at 216-17.
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Having thus asserted his wholly naturalistic view of legal
processes, Moore returned to the world of behavioral psychology in
an attempt to produce an hypothesis for testing that was opera-
tional, in the sense he asserted at the outset. With some difficulty
he derived as such an hypothesis the proposition that the change
in behavior after the imposition of a legal regulation "varies di-
rectly... with the ratio, observed ... before" the regulation was
"introduced, between the frequency of behavior not corresponding
to the" regulation "and the frequency of behavior corresponding to
the" regulation." 5 In other words, behavior in conformity with a
law is more likely where behavior has previously conformed with-
out that law; or, stated negatively, the greater the disparity be-
tween the behavior designed to be altered by a law and the behav-
ioral standard established by that law, the less likely behavior will
conform to the law. And thereafter Moore summarily presented
the results of the parking research, complete with three by no
means elegant algebraic formulas, as partial support for the
hypothesis.4
Although Kocourek's book was widely reviewed, Moore's con-
tribution was generally either ignored," found puzzling or per-
plexing,5 8 or subjected to generally vituperative, though unpercep-
545. Id. at 221. Moore explained his thesis as follows:
In life situations in which an individual is being conditioned to give a reinforced
response to a sign, the learned responses of others to that sign are part of the
stimulus situation. [Also] ...the degree of pain or reward by which the re-
sponse of the individual is reinforced varies with the relative frequency of fail-
ures to successes in the responses of those others. Accordingly there is a relation,
throughout the learning periods in which responses to a large number of signs
are learned, between the relative frequency of failures to successes in the behav-
ior of others and the degree of pain or reward by which the response of the
particular individual is conditioned. Since this behavior of others is present to
the senses of the individual during the learning process and since the degree of
pain or reward varies with it, the behavior of others becomes &part of the sign
and differing ratios of failures to successes become parts of different signs to
which different responses are learned because differing degrees of pain or reward
have been applied in the process of teaching those responses.
Id. at 221-22.
546. Id. at 223-25.
547. See, e.g., Bowman, Book Review, 22 B.U. L. REv. 487 (1942); Prosser, Book Re-
view, 27 CORNsm L.Q. 292 (1942); Rose, Book Review, 8 OHIO ST. L.J. 353 (1942).
548. Reiblich, Book Review, 26 MINN. L. Rev. 340, 345 (1942); Rottschaefer, Book Re-
view, 26 MINN. L. Rev. 771, 772 (1942); Laughlin, Book Review, 3 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 61,
77 (1941).
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tive, criticism. 9 Only four of the reviewers seem even to have
understood the piece550 and of the four only one offered even
vaguely useful criticism-the quite contemporary suggestion that
experimental method alone does not make a science.551 Another at
least understood the relationship between Moore's offering and his
having come to intellectual maturity at a time when "science" was
an important, new intellectual force. 52
Moore's friends and associates did little better. Eugene Ros-
tow, understanding the piece to be a "preface" to a larger work,
found it "an entirely articulate statement of the argument of...
[Moore's] research," yet cautioned that the research might "con-
firm an infinite number of hypotheses" in addition to Moore's.
Rostow, then, suggested that Moore "dramatize" his research "for
law professors unfamiliar with other kinds of study" by distin-
guishing it from "other kinds of permissible scholarship in
law"-studies of policy or doctrine.553 Mark May found the piece
"interesting" and "sound" but suggested that Moore make "a more
careful study of the recent formulations of learning theory" by
Hull since Moore's results could be "predicted from the main pos-
tulates of Hull's system." 5" Hull in turn found Moore's contribu-
tion "important" and noted his "impression" that Moore's philoso-
phy of law had "advanced very greatly within the last year or two,
particularly in the psychological direction. ' 555 He also offered a
549. Lucey, Book Review, 30 Gao. L. REv. 800, 801 (1942) ("another loud 'tootl tootl'
for social institutions, with dynamic behaviorism supplying the steam."); Hanft, Book Re-
view, 20 N.C. L. REV. 123, 125 (1941) ("The principal accomplishment seems to have been to
state some fairly simple matters in the other-worldly language of behaviorist psychology.");
Bullington, Book Review, 20 Tax. L. Rav. 644, 645 (1942) ("obfuscating jargon contrived by
the sociologists to bolstir their scientific pretentions ... ends with some meaningless math-
ematical formulae"); Atitcheson, Jr., Book Review, 51 YALE L.J. 523, 525-26 (1942) ("too
long has devoted himself to too much about too little and too little about too much until he
has come to know everything about nothing and nothing about everything"). See also
Smith, Book Review, 53 ETHiCS 46, 47 (1942) ("[T]here is such a thing as getting so scien-
tific that one forgets what he's scientific about."). Moore said he liked this review. See Un-
derhill Moore to T. V. Smith, Oct. 12, 1942, Moore papers, Yale.
550. Husserl, Book Review, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 894 (1942); Sharp, Book Review, 36 ILL.
L. REv. 591, 592 (1942); Cairns, Book Review, 27 IOWA L. REV. 337, 341-42 (1942); Cohen,
Book Review, 18 TuL. L. REv. 172, 177 (1942).
551. Cairns, supra note 550 at 342.
552. Husserl, supra note 550 at 894.
553. Eugene Rostow to Underhill Moore, Apr. 11, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
554. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Mar. 7, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
555. Clark Hull to Underhill Moore, Mar. 17, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
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criticism of Moore's use of "operational," drawing on his own
knowledge of the works of the Vienna Circle, and an extended dis-
cussion of "experimental extinction," the "one important lack" in
a "remarkably realistic account of the psychology of behavior in-
volving statutes.' 51as
Moore quickly followed May's advice557 and with the aid of
Hull's book,558 then still in draft, he and Callahan set to work com-
pleting their analysis and presentation of the studies. In the course
of the two and a half years they worked, World War II intervened
and as a result Moore lost his office at the Institute559 and his re-
search assistant at the law school.560 Then, Callahan lost his teach-
ing job at Yale.5 61 Finally in December, 1943, a full ten years to the
.month after the first observations were made, Moore's study, Law
and Learning Theory, finally appeared in 136 pages of the Yale
Law Journal.
This time, after taking a brief, acid slap at "the failure of ju-
rists and others to undertake . . . investigations of the quantity
and degree of conformity [of behavior] to rules of law, 5 62 Moore
556. Id.
557. See Underhill Moore to Clark L. Hull, Mar. 11, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
558. See Clark L. Hull to Underhil Moore, Mar. 17, 1941, Mo6re papers, Yale.
559. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Oct. 6, 1942 ("come back after the war is over");
Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, Oct. 12, 1942 (enclosing keys), Moore papers, Yale.
560. See Ashbel Gulliver (new dean) to Underhill Moore, Apr. 28, 1942; Edgar Furniss
to Underhill Moore, May 6, 1942, Moore papers, Yale.
561. Gulliver, Report of the Dean of the Law School for the Academic Year 1942-1943,
14 (1943). Part of the reason was lack of money due to reduced enrollments, part to dissatis-
faction with Callahan's teaching. See Ashbel Gulliver to Underhill Moore, May 7, 1943,
Moore papers, Yale. The university was also attempting to enforce a general policy against
reappointments, see Ashbell Gulliver to Board of Permanent Officers, May 4, 1943, Moore
papers, Yale. Nevertheless Moore was bitter over the decision. g'e Underhill Moore to
Ashbell Gulliver, Oct. 16, 1943, Moore papers, Yale.
562. Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 2. Moore hypothesized reasons for
this failure as:
in great part the result of their harboring, more or less unconsciously, one or
more of the following presuppositions. The first of these is that the effect of a
rule of law or of its administration is so different from the effect of all other
devices affecting behavior that it is to be accounted for by a particular theory,
applicable to law alone, and that the effect of law cannot be acccounted for by a
general theory of behavior which accounts for the effect of devices other than
law. The second presupposition is that a proposition of law, or its administra-
tion, is the single and only cause of "its" effect; that is to say, that the behavior
which follows the enactment of a law or its enforcement is a dependent variable,
the value of which depends alone upon the law or its enforcement and upon no
other variable. The presence of either one or both of the first two of these
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began a straightforward presentation of the work he had done. By
subdividing two of his studies and saving the one Corstvet had ear-
lier suggested should be scrapped, Moore managed to present ten
studies of parking behavior spread over the four durational limita-
tions-no parking, 15, 30, and 60 minute parking. These studies
plus the two tagging studies and the old traffic circle study were
his data base. In presenting them Moore straightforwardly empha-
sized the variables controlled for and those left uncontrolled or tol-
erated as uncontrollable.63 With these basics out of the way, he
next turned to an analysis of the data he had acquired. With re-
spect to the parking studies Moore quickly passed over the marked
shift of behavior in the direction of conformity with the regula-
tion;5 4 instead he highlighted two other findings. First, he noted
that, although there was a marked shift of behavior for parking
durations up until a "point" substantially in excess of the regula-
tion imposed, the relative distribution of parkers among these du-
rational classifications was largely identical both before and after
the regulation imposed.5 6 5 Only beyond this point was there any
decline in the relative frequency of parking for a given duration.566
Second, he laboriously observed that although on cursory inspec-
tion it appeared that there was no regularity to the difference be-
tween the number of cars parking in comparable periods before
presuppositions so successfully insulates the investigator from contact with the
theories and methods of disciplines investigating human behavior that the inves-
tigator either withdraws, in limine, from the prospect of unrewarded effort, or
undertakes statistical surveys of this and that somehow connected with law and
its administration. The third presupposition is either that complete conformity
on the part of substantially all the persons whose behavior is prescribed or pro-
scribed by the proposition follows the issuing of the rule, or that, if all do not
completely conform, the number or percentage of persons conforming and the
degree of conformity are known. Entertaining it leads natural-law and analytical
jurists to restrict the study of law to dialectic; historical jurists to the art of
writing either the history of a literature of legal propositions or the history of a
larger fragment of culture; sociological jurists to speculation upon the more re-
mote consequences of propositions of law, speculation upon the effect of the sup-
posedly known but in fact unknown quantity and degree of conformity to the
proposition upon behavior which is not prescribed or proscribed in the proposi-
tion; and "realists" to random behavior.
Id.
563. Id. at 5-8.
564. Id. at 9.




and after the imposition of a parking regulation,567 in fact, by care-
fully accounting for the actual use of the available time and space,
one could observe a decrease in the percentage of available time
used in regulated areas.568 Moore accounted for this decrease as
the effect of the ordinance in making space available by simply
eliminating parkings of long duration.569 Each of these observa-
tions was accompanied by precise mathematical formulas designed
to quantify the relationships discovered, often through the use of
variables, such as the cumulated percentage of unregulated park-
ings of a duration less than the "point. ' '570 Thereafter Moore ex-
plained the results of the tagging studies. Here he argued that the
tagging had made its impact not in the behavior of all parkers but
rather the difference in before and after behavior could be wholly
accounted for by the effect of tagging on the behavior of individu-
ally tagged parkers who again parked in the same location.7 1 Fi-
nally, with respect to the traffic circle study, he argued that the
decrease in behavior prohibited by the ordinance was greatest
when compliance required the least deviation from the path nor-
mally taken through the intersection and least when compliance
required the most deviation, in other words the degree of compli-
ance was directly related to the ease of compliance.72
Having thus summarized his results, Moore turned to articu-
lating an explanation of them in terms of their congruence with a
more general theory of human behavior which he labelled learning
theory. This time his presentation was markedly different from the
piece he had written for Kocourek. Where three years before
Moore had explained learning theory in almost common sense
terms and had integrated into that explanation an appreciation for
the cultural aspects of human behavior that dated back to the
Wigmore review, Moore now spoke in the technical language of the
academic psychologist and reduced the cultural dimension of his
presentation to a short almost afterthought that emphasized not
the impact of culture on behavior but of learned behavior as an
567. Id. at 29.
568. Id. at 34-39.
569. Id. at 37.
570. Id. at 27-28, 39.
571. Id. at 42.
572. Id. at 57-60.
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explanation of cultural change .57 He began by directly presenting
a slightly simplified version of stimulus-response psychology. Rely-
ing on presentations by Hull and two of his colleagues, 7' Moore
emphasized the pattern: drive, cue, response, reward.57 5 "In order
to learn one must be driven to make a response in the presence of
a cue, and that response must be rewarded. '576 He then noted that
the bare outline of the theory would "suffice to explain only the
most simple instances of human behavior '5 77 and proceeded to
complicate the presentation in three ways. First he distinguished
between "inate or primary drives" and "acquired or secondary
drives," especially the acquired drive of "anxiety or fear. '578 Sec-
ond, Moore observed that responses may "extend over considera-
ble time and space" such that one might refer to them as "chain
responses. 579 And third, Moore recognized that the multiplicity of
drives may, taken together, simultaneously call for conflicting re-
sponses580 and that the verbal nature of some cues may create
problems in isolating the learned response to the cue because the
response might differ from the cue.5 81 Finally Moore attempted to
generalize from individual learning to group learning by the func-
tion of parental or group approval as a reward, the extinction of
responses by the cessation of reward, and the part played by "tech-
nological and sociological invention or innovation" in learning
"cue-response" relations. 2
From this rapidly sketched theoretical framework, Moore pro-
ceeded to analyze each of his studies. In each case he began with
the observation that the study was of the change in the frequency
of a particular response brought about by the introduction of a cue
calling for a conflicting response.5 83 In the parking studies Moore
carefully identified the drives, cues, responses, and rewards5 8' of
573. Id. at 68-70.
574. Id. at 61, citing C. HULL, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR (1943); N. MILLER & J. DOLLARD,
SociAL LEARNING AND ImmrTATiON (1941).
575. Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 61-63.
576. Id. at 61.
577. Id. at 63.
578. Id. at 64-65.
579. Id. at 65-66.
580. Id. at 66-67.
581. Id. at 67-68.
582. Id. at 69-70.
583. Id. at 77, 83, 85.
584. Id. at 72-74.
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the individuals parking when the area was unregulated, "not a pe-
riod during which a new response was being learned, but ... a
period during which each of the individuals ... was giving a re-
sponse which he had already learned."585 After eliminating prob-
lems based on the lack of knowledge of the quality and strength of
the drives and rewards of individual parkers by assuming that they
were distributed proportionately among studies and durational
categories,58 Moore was left with one further problem. Learning
theory would have postulated that the elapsed time of parking was
a measure of the delay in securing the reward and thus an index of
the strength of the reenforcement of the response of parking.5817
However elapsed time of parking nowhere entered into the equa-
tions that Moore had painstakingly derived to order his data. He
explained this discrepancy between the theory and his data by sug-
gesting that the strength of reenforcement was not determined by
the absolute duration. Rather, it was determined by the relative
duration between the cue and the response, "by the conception
which exists in the mind of the person giving the response" as to
the duration, 588 a conception that "depends on his conception of
his relative position in a distribution which includes not only his
behavior but also the behavior of others who . . . are doing the
'same thing.' ",8S9 With this problem out of the way, Moore asserted
that the introduction of a new cue-the durational limita-
tion-created a conflict in responses between parking in response
to the errand to be done, and not parking in response to the anxi-
ety aroused by the possibility of violating the durational limita-
tion.5 90 He then explained the changes in the frequencies of the
various durations of parking after introduction of the limitation by
suggesting that the point where the relative frequencies began to
change corresponded to the time at which parkers began to feel
anxiety arising from the subjective perception that they were about
to violate the limitation.5 91 Because the response of not parking
was in the circumstances more strongly reenforced than the re-
585. Id. at 72.
586. Id. at 72, 73-74.
587. Id. at 74-75.
588. Id. at 75.
589. Id. at 76.
590. Id. at 77-78. Note particularly, Moore emphasizes that the learned response to the
durational limit is not to park at all, and not to park for a shorter time.
591. Id. at 80.
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sponse of parking, the apparent decrease in the duration of park-
ings beyond the point where anxiety appeared was thus the effect
of the actions of parkers in passing up potential spaces.9 2 Finally,
Moore suggested that, in the aggregate, the extent to which the
response of not parking predominated was a function of the fre-
quency with which individuals parked less than a given time even
when the area was unregulated.5 9s
Moore discussed the other two studies similarly, though in less
detail. He explained the tagging study by observing that since re-
moval of the repeated parkings of tagged individuals totally elimi-
nated the effect of the tagging program, that program presented no
new cue to anyone but the individuals tagged. 9 4 To explain the
traffic circle experiments he postulated that the painted circle was
a cue that in the presence of the secondary drive of anxiety called
forth the response of keeping to the right to the degree that this
response was more greatly rewarded by the reduction of anxiety
than the response of driving directly through the intersection was
rewarded by reduction of the drive related to crossing the intersec-
tion more quickly.595
Four friends read the manuscript before publication; none had
much to say in response, although Rostow did observe that "the
presentation was admirably clear, and the confrontation of difficul-
ties direct and courageous . ".5.. ,6 Three reviews of the piece
were planned;59 in the following spring two materialized, one by
Clark Hull and the other by Hessel Yntema, Moore's former col-
league at Columbia and participant in the empirical research at the
Johns Hopkins Institute of Law between 1928 and 1933. Hull
found the study "an original, fearless and convincing exemplifica-
tion of the implementation of. . . [Moore's] philosophy" as stated
three years earlier 598 and a "courageous tour de force" given the
592. Id. at 80-81.
593. Id. at 81.
594. Id. at 83. There was no public announcement of the tagging program and the tags
were not noticeable to one driving by. Thus the only people affected by the program were
those actually tagged.
595. Id. at 86-87.
596. Eugene V. Rostow to Underhill Moore, n.d., Moore papers, Yale. The other three
readers were John Dollard, Mark May, and Henry Margenau (Yale, Physics). See Underhill
Moore to Charles C. Callahan, fall 1943?, Moore papers, Yale.
597. Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, Dec. 11, 1943, Moore papers, Yale.
598. Hull, Moore and Callahan's "Law and Learning Theory": A Psychologist's Im-
pressions, 53 YALE L.J. 330, 337 (1944).
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"state of our ignorance concerning ultimate behavioral laws."59 He
suggested a somewhat crude, but effective simplification of Moore's
data by which he quite directly related the point at which the limi-
tation began to have an effect to a simple multiple of the duration
specified by the limitation. 00 This relation, he observed, reflected
"the habits of successful (and so, reinforced) disregard of law pro-
duced by our characteristically lax customs of law enforcement." 60 1
Yntema emphasized the importance of the study, both as a pio-
neering bit of research, and an exemplar of what might be done in
quantitative studies of legal material of a normative nature. 2  At
the same time he questioned whether, in the face of limited re-
sources for empirical research in law, it was wise to concentrate, as
Moore had, on the regularities of behavior, rather than on admit-
tedly abnormal "litigous behavior" that could be investigated
through the use of "more expeditious, if less exact, techniques of
objective inquiry." 603 In a similar vein he wondered whether, con-
trary to Moore's assertions, it was not "legitimate to study legal
propositions without reference to their conformity to or effect upon
behavior. ' 6o4
A thousand copies of the article were printed with a special
introduction by Mark May. Half of these were given away to indi-
viduals on the Institute's mailing list; the rest awaited buyers who
never appeared. Beyond the two comments in the Yale Law Jour-
nal, the law reviews were similarly silent. Moore, who with the ad-
vent of the War, had cancelled all of his subscriptions to social
science journals 0 5 and turned his reading interests to military his-
599. Id. at 331.
600. Id. at 333-34. Hull argued that an ordinance had an effect only in reducing the
frequency of parking that was more than 2.3 times the duration specified in the ordinance.
601. Id. at 334. Wondering why "if the parkers took a chance on such an extensive
violation of the ordinance, they should be influenced by it at all," Hull suggested an expla-
nation based on "the general practice in American culture for the authorities practically to
wink at small violations, but to punish gross violations with increasing certainty and sever-
ity." Id. at 335-36.
602. Yntema, "Law and Learning Theory" Through the Looking Glass of Legal The-
ory, 53 YALE L.J. 338, 340-41 (1944).
603. Id. at 344-45.
604. Id. at 345.
605. Underhill Moore to American Journal of Sociology, Dec. 28, 1941; Underhill Moore
to American Sociological Review, Dec. 28, 1941; Underhill Moore to Association for Sym-
bolic Logic, Dec. 28, 1941; Underhill Moore to Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, Dec. 28, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
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tory and strategy,e e was silent too.
In Moore's banking studies the matter most obviously in need
of explanation and most significant for developing an understand-
ing of that and later work is what caused the studies to die out. In
contrast, the major cause for terminating the parking studies-lack
of m'oney-is both relatively obvious and not particularly signifi-
cant for developing an understanding of them. More important for
an explanation of the studies is an analysis of the form they ulti-
mately took. Traditionally, this problem of explanation has been
approached as one of criticizing Moore for ignoring, or at least
slighting, the obvious in the pursuit of the esoteric. 0 7 Such is the
tenor of Llewellyn's criticism of Moore's work delivered ten years
after the publication of Law and Learning Theory.608 The best ex-
ample of this failure on Moore's part is Hull's rather simple,
though admittedly slightly less accurate, reinterpretation of
Moore's data to establish a direct relationship between the dura-
tional parking limit and the observed effect of the ordinance.10 9
Another is Moore's decision to ignore the possibility, demonstrated
to be the case by the tagging study,610 that in response to a dura-
tional parking limit, people might simply park for a shorter time
either by doing fewer errands or by doing them more efficiently.
Adopting either simplification would have made Moore's work sig-
nificantly more accessible, at least to a legal audience.6 11 Use of
Hull's reinterpretation would have obviated Moore's excursus into
the subjective relativity of time.612 Similarly, acceptance of the no-
tion that parking for a shorter time was an appropriate response to
the anxiety created by the possibility of having to park for a period
longer than specified in the ordinance would have eliminated
606. Underhill Moore to Barnes & Noble, Co., Dec. 28, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
607. See W. TWINING, supra note 14 at 63; FoUNDAToN FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL His.
TORY, supra note 17 at 252. More recently the cirticism has been that the concept of relative
time has no place in a learning theory. See Verdun-Jones & Cousineau, supra note 16, at
388-90.
608. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worthwhile, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399,
400, 403 (1956).
609. See text at note 600 supra.
610. See text at note 503 supra.
611. Not that Moore sought this audience. See Allan Axelrod to John Henry Schlegel,
Oct. 12, 1976.
612. As well as another into the significance of cumulative distributions, see Law and
Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 23-29.
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Moore's complicated computations necessary to account for the ac-
tual use of the time and space available for parking. A third exam-
ple of Moore's penchant for ignoring the obvious is his almost total
failure to advert to the cultural factors that can influence behavior,
factors that Hull, the academic behavioral psychologist, immedi-
ately noticed and presented. Some of these factors virtually jump
out at the reader, for example, in the study done near the post
office where stops of short duration were predominate,6 1 or in the
study done near the Yale campus where stops of about seventy
minutes-just long enough to get to a class and get back-were
unusually frequent." 4 Unfortunately, however, these criticisms, ac-
curate as they are, completely miss the significance of the peculiar,
narrow perspective that Moore adopted in presenting the parking
studies for an understanding of his work. In order to see the signif-
icance of that perspective one must examine the academic context
in which Moore and the other Realists at Yale who were interested
in empirical research found themselves.
Moore was one of the three Realists at Yale who actually par-
ticipated in empirical research. The other two, Charles E. Clark
and William 0. Douglas, became caught between the two "tradi-
tions" of social research. 15 The first and older tradition, the "pro-
gressive reform tradition," saw the gathering of facts as an initial
step in the campaign to reform social or governmental institutions.
Facts were the prerequisite to reform. In its more narrow legal as-
pect this tradition dated back at least to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury and emphasized the reform of legal institutions through pro-
cedural reforms, though occasionally doctrinal reforms were
recommended. In this tradition, reform was seen as a means to
curb popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
Participants in the progressive reform tradition were impatient
with research that did not contribute to reform or that continued
beyond a time when the needs of the campaign for reform had
been satisfied. The second tradition, the "social scientific tradi-
tion," saw the gathering of facts as part of the process of gaining
an understanding of social or governmental institutions. This tra-
613. Id. at 90, 106-07.
614. Id. at 90, 111-15.
615. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 517-19, 539-45, 567-69, 578-85. This and the follow-
ing paragraph is a summary of the argument advanced there.
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dition developed as part of the process by which, with the develop-
ment of the American university around the turn of century, indi-
vidual professional disciplines grew out of the undifferentiated
"social science" of the progressive reformers. Participants in this
tradition tended to ignore, or at least attenuate, the relationships
between research and reform and to emphasize the necessity of
making social inquiry a science-objective, rigorous, precise, math-
ematical-on the model of the natural sciences. They were exas-
perated with research that did not use the latest methods and
carry an inquiry through to the absolute end of potential.
The tension between these two traditions with respect to the
impulse to do research, the standards by which it was to be judged,
and the time when it was to be considered complete, not to men-
tion the objectives of the research, are obvious. These tensions ulti-
mately contributed to the decline of the interest of Clark and
Douglas in empirical research. The reformers would not support
work that went beyond the needs of reform; the social scientists
would not support work that was less than wholly scientific. Thus
deprived of necessary support from either quarter, Clark and
Douglas slid away from empirical research and into other interest-
ing things.
In contrast to Clark and Douglas, Moore was not caught be-
tween two traditions. He was, or at least saw himself as, wholly
within one-the social scientific tradition. His banking and parking
research alone supports this assertion. The reform impulse at the
base of either body of work is impossible, or at least extremely dif-
ficult, to perceive. But the degree of Moore's identification with
that tradition is equally well demonstrated by his suggestion at the
time of Angell's retirement as to the necessary qualifications for
potential candidates for the university's presidency. The "first in-
dispensable ... requirement" was that the candidate be a "natu-
ral scientist," Moore asserted.618 He reasoned that neither under-
graduate work nor graduate work "in the humanities and in
disciplines such as economics" needed attention and that profes-
sional training would not "be changed very much for a long
while; ' 617 therefore, if a natural scientist were chosen "there is at
616. Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, Dec. 19, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
617. Id. See also Underhill Moore to Jerome N. Frank, Jan. 5, 1934 ("I should put the
beginning student in an office and give the law professors a generation to get something to
put in the curriculum. . . ."), Moore papers, Yale.
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least a bare chance that he will have a vision of the possibility of
the application of scientific thinking and scientific method to fields
of experience to which they have never been applied" and "the
will" to see that some of these possible applications will be carried
out.6 18 In other words, the university generally should follow the
pattern of activity he had.
How Moore, whose politics were as progressive as that of the
bulk of the Realists, at least up until 1936,19 escaped wholly from
the progressive reform tradition which animated the work of Clark
and Douglas has been, in part, suggested earlier. Moore entered
law teaching at a time when legal academics were still in the pro-
cess of professionalizing their discipline. As a participant in that
process, he took his place in a university law school very seriously
and carried that seriousness into his exploration of the social sci-
ences and their methods while at Columbia. Presented with a
forceful critique of his legal science by these participants in the
exciting development of the social sciences at Columbia, Moore
gradually, but quite definitely, accepted the modern concept of an
empirical science. With that, he began to fashion a new legal sci-
ence that was like the social science he had come to respect.
In contrast, Clark, a half generation younger than Moore, and
Douglas, a whole generation younger than, as well as a student of,
Moore, entered teaching after the profession's identity had been
formed.62 0 Thus, they were not as a general matter available to a
618. Underhill Moore to James R. Angell, Dec. 19, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
619. By 1936 Moore claimed to be a Landon supporter, though admitted he was at first
"tempted at a schizoid contribution to [Norman] Thomas." Underhill Moore to Mitchell
Levensohn, Oct. 26, 1936, Moore papers, Yale. Moore was certainly skeptical about the New
Deal. He cautioned Abe Fortas, then at the S.E.C., that "all private enterprise is ... preda-
tory" and that thus the attempt to stop predatory activities would "drive private enterprise
out of existence" and lead to an "unfortunate, and perhaps terrible, period of transition."
Underhill Moore to Abe Fortas, Feb. 21, 1938, Moore papers, Yale. Yet, he recognized the
necessity "to face and make adaptation to the new social and economic situation in which
we unfortunately find ourselves." Underhill Moore to N. F. Glidden (former client), Mar. 11,
1939, Moore papers, Yale. On his politics at an earlier time, see text at notes 276-79 supra.
620. The importance of recognizing generational differences in American legal scholars
cannot be ignored. W. TWINING, supra, note 14, at 81-83 makes a start, though I quite obvi-
ously disagree with important parts of the argument he constructs. Twining focuses on six
scholars he labels Realists. Of these Corbin and Hohfeld were simply not Realists; their
science was a doctrinal, analytical science and their politics, conservative. Cook and Moore,
though from the same generation, were Realists; their science was empirical and their polit-
ics, liberal. The balance of the Realists, including Twining's other two scholars, Oliphant,
who was not graduated from law school until he was 30 years old, and thus ought to be
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new identity in the way Moore was, nor were they really con-
fronted with one. Instead, responding to a felt need for reform in
legal institutions, they drew from the progressive reform tradition
the necessity of fact research to aid in their endeavor, and at the
same time, being university academics, they sought the assistance
of the academic apostles of the social scientific tradition in their
factual investigations.2 1 In the process they became caught be-
tween the two traditions instead of partisans of one. Yet, given
their impulse to do empirical research and their time of entry into
the profession, it would have been extremely difficult for them to
have done otherwise, to have made a clean break from their estab-
lished professional identity to a new identity squarely within the
social science tradition.2 2 Thus, although these three men shared
common politics and were animated in their empirical research, in
part, because of their position as university academics, the impulse
toward academic social science had radically different conse-
quences for their research.
Though Moore escaped from the conflicting demands of the
two traditions of social research, his escape by no means elimi-
nated problems like those experienced by Clark and Douglas. He,
too, needed support for his research, both financial and intellec-
tual, and for each he looked squarely to Yale's social scientific
community. The match should have been a natural one. Moore was
committed to a wholly naturalistic view of legal phenomena and
was fiercely determined to pursue research in that mode. But
somehow from the beginning the match was never quite made.
Moore came to Yale because of the establishment of the Insti-
tute of Human Relations and with the support of Yale's President,
James R. Angell, a social scientist himself, who also was an ac-
quaintance from Moore's brief stay at the University of Chicago.6 23
treated as younger than he in fact was, and Llewellyn, were from a second generation, Iso-
lating these relationships helps explain the disparate aspects of the movement (see, e.g., text
at notes 621-22 infra) and not fragment its essential intellectual, though not jurisprudential,
unity the way Twining's categorization does.
621. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 579-81.
622. Which is not to say that they could not have established a new identity. In fact
they did. See text at note 728 infra. But that new identity was hardly a clean break from
anything.
623. Though he had retired six years earlier Angell was prominently thanked for his
help when Law and Learning Theory was published. Law and Learning Theory, supra note
437, at 1, n*.
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However, though Moore eagerly and immediately sought to partici-
pate in planning the research program of the Institute, instead of
being in on the ground floor, he ended up an outsider knocking at
the gate. That turn of events was clearly not his fault; rather it
should be laid squarely at the doorstep of Robert Maynard Hutch-
ins who oversold, and probably overestimated as well, the law
school's control over, and role in, the Institute's affairs.2 4 Had
Moore planned research that was methodologically mundane, the
fact that he was an outsider when he finally appeared at Yale
might not have made a difference. But his research was unusual
and his method had all the hallmarks of having been put together
by someone who had heard about scientific research but had never
seen or done any. In short, it immediately stamped Moore for what
he was, a rank amateur.
For some people associated with the Institute, most notably
Emma Corstvet, 25 but probably also President Angell,e6 Moore's
status as an amateur social scientist made no difference. Rather,
the important point for them was the fact that Moore was engaged
in interesting research and was attempting to execute it as best he
could. For most of the people at the Institute, however, the ap-
pearance of an amateur was a problem. The majority of these men
and women were part of the second generation of academic social
scientists in the American university. They had not created the
discipline in which they worked, but had participated in it as grad-
uate students in the new Ph.D. programs of the newly formed de-
partments, as members of the academic societies that defined the
discipline, as researchers within the bounds so defined, and as
guides for their own graduate students who were headed down the
same paths.627 In short, they were the first beneficiaries of the pro-
624. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 482-88, 573-75 for an estimate of Hutchins' part in
the formation of the Institute.
625. Also Edgar Furniss who provided Moore with consistent encouragement. See, e.g.,
Edgar Furniss to Underhill Moore, Feb. 26, 1932; Mar. 4, 1933; Mar. 10, 1937, Moore papers,
Yale.
626. Donald Slesinger, director of the Institute during its first year, should probably
also be included. Interview with Donald Slesinger, July 8, 1975.
627. There is virtually nothing written about this generation of scholars. I draw my
conclusions here from casual conversations with their students, from scraps in the available
works on the professionalization of the social science disciplines (see works cited at note 4
supra), from exposure to two of these men, Hull and May, as they appear in Moore papers,
Yale, and from Interview with Mark A. May, June 9, 1975. Obviousl this research needs
amplification; I doubt, however, whether I am the one to do it.
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cess by which the academic social sciences professionalized. An in-
tegral part of that process was the almost ritual gesture of exclud-
ing the amateurs from the profession through a combination of the
adoption of technical methods and vocabulary, the imposition of
"standards" for acceptable research, and, most effectively, the es-
tablishment of the Ph.D. as the requirement for academic employ-
ment.6 2 8 As the Moore and Hope piece showed, Moore did not
know the technical methods and vocabulary, had no inkling of
what the standards were, and had never seen the inside of a mod-
ern social science Ph.D. program. His mere appearance at the In-
stitute was thus a threat to the professional status of the social
scientists; his work might well give their Institute a bad name.62 9
Reactions to this threat varied somewhat. Dorothy Thomas
was plainly puzzled, even forty-five years later, how Moore, who
had an obvious commitment to scientific research, could have
looked for help with his research and yet finished the negotiable
instruments studies without abandoning what was to her a pa-
tently unsatisfactory method.60 In this respect, Douglas' attitude,
which allowed Thomas to restructure his research technique, was
preferable to Moore's singlemindness.6 31 But, matter of fact to the
core, she taught Moore what she could, worked with him in their
joint seminar, and, when she found more interesting things to do,
moved on.
Others at the Institute, less charitable perhaps, or maybe only
more insecure, simply chose to ignore him. Thus, nearly two years
after his arrival, Moore's own work, though funded by the Institute
and already visible in the published parts of the direct discounts
study, was omitted from Mark May's virtually complete listing of
research at the Institute issued at the dedication of its building.5 2
A year later when May's program to study the City of New Haven
628. See supra, note 4. A similar process seems to have taken place among the legal
academics. For an example of research standards in operation see Huger Jervey to Stacy
May (Washington lawyer later with the Rockefeller Foundation), Feb. 20, 1925 (patronizing
response to paper entitled "The Economic Foundations of Legalism" to which are attached
handwritten notes from Herman Oliphant and Karl N. Llewellyn), Moore papers, Yale.
629. Prof. Fred Konefsky suggested to me that the potential bad name may have been
the problem for May, Hull and the others. He supplied an example that beautifully captures
the entire difficulty. Said he, "It's as if A. James Casner had gone to the Littauer School
with a project to count fee simples. They laughed after he left the room!"
630. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
631. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 527-29, 543-44.
632. See Yale Daily News, May 9, 1931, at 5.
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was first floated, Moore's potential contributions were again ig-
nored.6 3 Even individuals such as Clark Hulls who, from the be-
ginning, were largely interested in and vaguely supportive of
Moore's work,6 3 5 assumed that seminars designed for the Institute
as a whole would be of no interest to Moore," 6 and ignored
Moore's potential contribution to the joint research program they
tried to design for the Institute.3 7
In time Moore's presence simply could not be ignored. It
could, however, be begrudged. Thus, in the 1936 Institute reorgani-
zation plan, while Moore's research was noted, his interest in and
potential contributions to other proposed research, though quite
obvious, were still passed over. "3 Three years later, when the Insti-
tute's funds were reduced and its "commitment to certain lines of
research" necessitated corresponding budgetary cutbacks, support
for Moore's research was terminated. " The termination stood
even though that research was squarely within the behavioral para-
digm toward which the Institute's commitment had been made.
Only begrudging acceptance, if acceptance is the right word for the
activity of killing a line of research and then later supporting the
preparation of the article tombstoning the corpse,"° was offered
and that only with an accompanying condescending attitude. Mark
May, for example, suggested that Moore's presentation in the piece
for Kocourek's symposium could be strengthened "somewhat by a
633. Mark A. May to James R. AngeU, Nov. 17, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
634. From the acknowledgements at the beginning of Law and Learning Theory, supra
note 437, at 1, n*, and my interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976, I suspect that Hull's
associate John Dollard ought to be included here also.
635. See, e.g., Clark L. Hull to UnderhiUl Moore, Oct. 19, 1931, Feb. 13, 1935 (arranging
appearance at Moore's seminar), Nov. 11, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
636. Clark L. Hull to Institute Staff, Nov. 30, 1935; Underhill Moore to Clark L. Hull,
Dec. 7, 1935 (sorry I missed); Clark L. Hull to Underhill Moore, Dec. 9, 1935 ("I am sure
most of the meetings will have no interest for you."), Moore papers, Yale. The seminar was
to be "an attempt to integrate the major concepts and principle of the conditioned reaction
with those of psychoanalysis." Hull, Notice of Informal Seminar, Jan. 20, 1936 (copy in
possession of the author courtesy of Emma Corstvet Llewellyn).
637. Clark L. Hull to Mark A. May, Dec. 3, 1935; Dec. 18, 1935; Clark L. Hull to Un-
derhill Moore, Dec. 18, 1935, Moore papers, Yale.
638. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Jan. 29, 1936; Underhill Moore to Mark A. May,
Feb. 5, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
639. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Feb. 3, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
640. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Apr. 12, 1940, ($3000 for 1940-41), July 1, 1943
($600 for Callahan's salary for summer), Moore papers, Yale.
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more careful study" of Hull's work.e4 1 Hull was no less offensive
when, in the response to the same article, he commented that
Moore's account of "the psychology of behavior situations involv-
ing statutes" was "remarkably realistic" but when discussing the
"one important lack" in that account-a discussion of experimen-
tal extinction, a subject wholly tangential to Moore's arti-
cle-presented his observations in such a way as to suggest that
Moore might never have heard about experiments with white rats
on electric grids. 2  Even when Law and Learning Theory was
completed, May could not resist emphasizing in his introduction to
the separately bound version that Moore had not attempted to de-
rive his empirical formulas by deduction from "any set of basic
postulates" but had only made "a first crude beginning" with an
attempt "to describe parking behavior . . . in terms of the con-
cepts of behavior theory." 3
Treated as an amateur by the social scientists, Moore might
have been tempted to look elsewhere for support, but for him there
was no elsewhere to look. The law school world generally was
hardly hospitable. Indeed, it had delivered to Moore such "misun-
derstanding and intellectual hardknocks ' " 4 that a merely kind let-
ter from a former colleague" 5 about a presentation Moore made at
an A.A.L.S. meeting"' brought forth an expression of great plea-
sure. 7 In the more circumscribed world of the Yale Law School,
641. Mark A. May to Underhill Moore, Mar. 7, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
642. Clark L. Hull to Underhill Moore, Mar. 7, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
643. May, Forward, in Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at v, vi (1943).
644. Underhill Moore to John A. Hanna, Jan. 14, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
645. John Hanna to Underhill Moore, Jan. 8, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
646. Dorothy Thomas had agreed to give a paper at the Round Table on Jurisprudence
and Legal History chaired by Edwin Patterson, Moore's former colleague and companion on
the ferry back and forth to their Englewood, New Jersey homes. Patterson, who claimed to
be "genuinely loyal to the movement for fact finding research as an aid to change in, or
understanding of, law," had asked Moore to lead discussion of Thomas' paper. Edwin W.
Patterson to Underhill Moore, Oct. 15, 1931, Moore papers, Yale. When Moore wanted to
present a paper of his own Patterson agreed, but with the warning to use a "minimum of
novel terminology," Edwin W. Patterson to Underhill Moore, Oct. 29, 1931, Moore papers,
Yale. Moore's paper, The Data for the Study of Law and Environment has not survived.
From the evidence provided by a critique of it by Dorothy Thomas (Dorothy Thomas to
Underhill Moore, Dec. 25, 1931, Moore papers, Yale), it appears to have been a bridge be-
tween the Moore and Hope institutional method and The Lawyers Law, supra note 350. Cf.
Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss, Mar. 1, 1933, Moore papers, Yale. This was Moore's only
appearance at an A.A.L.S. meeting after 1920.
647. Underhill Moore to John Hanna, Jan. 14, 1932, Moore papers, Yale.
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the conflicting impulse toward research entertained by Clark and
Douglas made it all but impossible for Moore to look to these men
for support. And at Yale, at least, there was no other social scien-
tific community to look to 8 except that of the economists and po-
litical scientists-corners of the intellectual world where a little
support was offered, but where, however peculiar it may seem
given Moore's work in banking, his interests never ran."9 Disciples
could, and to some extent did, provide some support. But good dis-
ciples were hard to recruit, as Moore's experience in finding a re-
search assistant to replace Emma Corstvet had proven and as his
unsuccessful attempts to interest Friedrich Kessler in the soft so-
cial science of the always proposed, always in process, commercial
bank credit book only emphasized.6 50 And even when potential dis-
ciples were recruited, they somehow never managed to gain a real
enthusiasm for empirical research, but rather drifted away to other
activities.65 1
Moore was thus left largely to his own devices. He pursued his
own iconoclastic, idiosyncratic view of empirical research, drawing
on ideas from Dewey, Robinson, and Veblen about what science
was, and on what Dorothy Thomas and Emma Corstvet had taught
him about research design. Thomas' emphasis on the niceties of
observation and the more subtle aspects of statistical method, left
a particularly strong mark on the research, although in this she
was aided by Moore's predisposition to detail as shown in his ear-
lier doctrinal research and continually emphasized in his teach-
648. The sociology department was adamantly opposed to the statistical studies in gen-
eral and the Institute in particular, largely because it was still controlled by the shade of
William Graham Sumner. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975; Interview with
Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975.
649. Not that either discipline was at the time particularly empirically oriented
anyway.
650. See note 462 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying note 740 infra.
651. Sussman stayed five years, far longer than he had planned. He liked working for
Moore and Moore quite obviously liked him. See Underhill Moore to Gilbert Sussman, Dec.
2, 1935 ("Your loving, hating, admiring and contemptuous friend"), Moore papers, Yale.
That fact made staying easier, as did the lack of good alternatives caused by the Depression
and exacerbated by prejudice against Jews seeking professional jobs. But once Sussman
made up his mind to leave he seems to have expressed no regrets at having given up empiri-
cal research for the practice of law. Gilbert Sussman to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976
(taped interview). Callahan was probably equally trapped by the Depression for he was not
much taken with the parking study. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Oct. 19, 1975.
He likewise never did any other empirical work.
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ing. 652 Her mark was also strengthened by Moore's surroundings at
the Institute, for although treated as an amateur by the psycholo-
gists who came to dominate affairs at the Institute, Moore con-
stantly turned to this group for what little support they would pro-
vide. They were the only game in town, the only peer group
available. That they did not want or need him, that his very inter-
est in, and commitment to empirical research was even a bit
threatening and thus brought forth all kinds of negative feedback
from them, made little difference. Moore needed their support and
sought it, almost pathetically. He constantly tried to become a part
of the enterprise. Indeed, but for the rather ponderous dignity of
his mien, one can almost visualize Moore, a three year old, chasing
after the big kids yelling, "I want to play too!". He first shifted the
form of his research to fit their idea of what research should look
like, and then when they announced a new game-community
studies-not only volunteered to play, but also attempted to fit his
research design more closely to their specifications, even to the ex-
tent of adopting a topic of research he was not particularly inter-
ested in .53 Then, when the game changed again, he gave up the
sociological/anthropological perspective on his research developed
at Columbia at the end of World War I, a perspective that had
twice led him to look directly at the relationship between law and
custom, and adopted as his ideal the smooth stimulus-response
curves of the experimental psychologists as well as their language
and theoretical universe. He wanted to play in the worst of ways.
Of course, there is another way to see Moore's behavior. In one
sense he was a captive of the social scientists at the Institute,6 4 for
as an amateur, strung along with occasional hand-outs of cash, he
knew no better, and perhaps, just perhaps, they did. But if in
bondage, it was a quite willing bondage. Moore wanted help with
his work and wanted acceptance in the world where he thought
real scientific research was being done. He searched elsewhere for
that help and acceptance, in Malinowski's anthropology 55 and
652. Grant Gilmore to John Henry Schlegel, Sept. 19, 1976; Friedrich Kessler to John
Henry Schlegel, Feb. 10, 1977. Cf. Underhill Moore to G. H. Robinson, July 11, 1930, Moore
papers, Yale (comments about a planned casebook; "your book should deal for the most
part with the minute problems arising today. The general principles of today are... gen-
eral descriptions of the way in which the minute problems of yesterday were settled.")
653. Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 3.
654. Grant Gilmore to John Henry Schlegel, Sept. 19, 1976.
655. Malinowski was a personal friend. Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976. The
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Timasheff's sociology, 61 for example. But always he came back to
his quite lovely vision of what the scientific study of law meant,
not the nineteenth century science of Langdell, but the twentieth
century science of Eddington, whose book on relative theory Moore
had read the summer before coming to Yale.657
Whether prisoner, or simply tag along, the form of the parking
study-the range of questions asked and left unasked, and the
kinds of answers sought and ignored-was largely determined by
Moore's inability to find support for his work elsewhere. As long as
experimental psychology was the scale against which success was
measured in the world of social science at Yale, amateurs, at least
had to play by the apparent rules. Those rules forbad simple, con-
textual explanations of the kind tossed off by professionals like
Hull. And so Moore, who thought he knew precisely why he was
"busy counting these cars,"65 8 produced a grand piece of research
that Llewellyn, for example, thought proved Moore mad, 59 and
that everyone else in the law school world either disliked, or ig-
nored, or both.66 0
HI. AND THEN THERE WERE NONE
There has always seemed
to be some jinx operating
at Columbia and Yale;
just when the prospects
seem brightest something
happens 661
By spring of 1943 Moore, who knew that Callahan would not
be kept on at Yale and thus that none of the hearty band that
two men taught a seminar together in 1940-41.
656. See Underhill Moore to Nicholas S. Timasheff, Oct. 3, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
Moore unsuccessfully tried to bring Timasheff to Yale to join the seminar with Malinowski.
See Underhill Moore to Ashbel Gulliver, Nov. 11, 1939; Underhill Moore to Edgar Furniss,
Jan. 16, 1940, Moore papers, Yale.
657. See Underhill Moore, Diary written during the Cruise from New York to Gibralter
on the Schooner Yacht Black Eagle, Aug. 7-Sept. 4, 1929, Moore papers, Yale.
658. Clark, Underhill Moore, 59 YALE L.J. at 189, 191.
659. Grant Gilmore to John Henry Schlegel, Sept. 19, 1976. Cf. Llewellyn, supra note
608.
660. Douglas, Underhill Moore, 59 YALE L.J. 187, 188 (1950) ("I was not one to ridicule
it. There were many who did.").
661. Alexander M. Kidd (colleague at Columbia 1926-28) to Underhill Moore, June 10,
1929, Moore papers, Yale.
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worked on Law and Learning Theory, but he, would be left at Yale
when it was published, penned a friendly letter, a most un-
characteristic gesture, to former student Justice William 0. Doug-
las. The letter ended with the plaintive question, "Isn't there some
way in which you can lend me a hand?. '' 62 It was not the first time
Moore had momentarily lost faith in his enterprise and sought ref-
uge in the more glamorous goings on of the day.6 3 And ultimately
the request amounted to little more than a chance to do some
hearings for the War Labor Board. But symbolically the request,
with both its sense of despair and dead ends and its view toward
Washington and the Roosevelt administration, signalled the end of
the brief attempt by the Realists to do empirical legal research and
with it the end of the Realist movement. Significantly that same
month Lasswell and McDougal published their grand vision of le-
gal education for policy making,6 ' which, under the banner of
"Law, Science, and Policy," maintained the Realists' dreams of
empirical legal research, though only as the smile on the cheshire
cat;6 5 the processual reaction had begun. 6
Moore seemed not to notice, or at least not to care about, this
quite obvious changing of the guard. According to contemporary
observers he was depressed with the results of his efforts in the
parking study, 67 although exactly why is not clear. Assuredly, Law
and Learning Theory was not a critical success in the law school
world, but the reaction from those quarters had never concerned
Moore before, so it is doubtful that Moore was depressed because
the law professors, who had little but "bright ideas" to offer as
"the principal pablum of the law student,"66 8 had not beat a path
662. Underhill Moore to William 0. Douglas, Mar. 4, 1943, Moore papers, Yale.
663. See, e.g., Underhill Moore to William 0. Douglas, Dec. 11, 1939 (can you help me
get the chairmanship of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation?), Dec. 29, 1939 (embar-
rassed withdrawal of request), Moore papers, Yale.
664. Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Train-
ing in the Public Interest, 52 YAE L.J. 203 (1943).
665. Dean Richard D. Schwartz provided me with this apt characterization of the com-
mitment of LSP, as it is called, to empirical research. He would not, however, subscribe to
the negative connotations in the text.
666. The only even rudimentary documentation of the legal process movement in
American legal thought remains Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank,
103 DAEDALUS 119, 122-24 (1974).
667. Grant Gilmore to John Henry Schlegel, Sept. 19, 1976; Friedrich Kessler to John
Henry Schlegel, Feb. 10, 1977.
668. Underhill Moore to Jerome N. Frank, Jan. 5, 1934, Moore papers, Yale. Moore
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to his door. Suggestions that Moore had decided that empirical le-
gal research was either "fruitless or worthless,"6 9 either impossible
to do or of unproven value, seem less than likely, too. Although he
had previously concluded that his earlier institutional approach
was not "a sufficient intellectual apparatus for doing scientific
work" 670 by the end of his remaining few years at Yale he had re-
turned to analyzing it. 7 1 Indeed, the one thing that seems rather
certain is that Moore did not give up his search for an adequate
empirically based understanding of legal phenomena.672 He may
have soured on behaviorist psychology, but not on empirical re-
search generally. Moore's general interest, however, generated no
further research, or even projects for future research, only endless
speculations about what the world of facts might disclose as he
passed the five years until his death in 1949.
Twenty years, most of it spent in quite active work, had
proven that for Moore at least, Captain Kidd's optimistic assess-
ment, "It really looks this time as though Yale is going to put it
over," was simply wrong.173 The "jinx" was operating again. While
this is neither the time nor place to explore the general jinx on
reform movements in legal thought and legal education,7 4 Moore's
quite generously included himself among those with little but bright ideas.
669. Grant Gilmore to John Henry Schlegel, Sept. 19, 1976.
670. Underhill Moore to Theodore S. Hope, Jr., Dec. 5, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
671. Allan Axelrod to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 12, 1976.
672. See Clark, supra note 658, at 192 ("Some have thought that he may have weak-
ened a bit in his faith towards the end. But I am quite sure this is a misinterpretation.").
673. Alexander M. Kidd to Underhill Moore, June 10, 1929, Moore papers, Yale.
674. Kidd's observation about the jinx at Columbia and Yale, text at note 661 supra, is
unusually interesting as a reflection of contemporary understanding and as a measure of real
intellectual growth in legal thought. Yale's prospects seemed brightest in the years 1916-18
when Corbin and Hohfeld were joined by Cook. Those prospects were quickly ended with
Hohfeld's death. Columbia then had exciting prospects from 1919-22 when Cook, Moore,
and T. R. Powell attempted to educate Dean Stone. See The Honorable Supreme Court, 13
FORTUNE 79, 83 (May 1936), a piece that Moore contributed to; see Margaret Cobb to Un-
derhill Moore, Mar. 24, 1936, Moore Papers, Yale. Those prospects evaporated with the
departure of first Cook and then Powell. Columbia's prospects again rose in 1926-28 during
the curriculum reform debates. Those prospects disappeared with Butler's appointment of
Young B. Smith and the departure of Douglas, Moore, Oliphant and Yntema.
Hindsight suggests that, given the outcome of the deanship fight in 1923, the prospects
of 1926-28 were largely the euphoria of losers being allowed in the ring again. But such
matters aside, when the Yale of 1929-32 is added to the chain of prospects the series of ups
and downs is quite enlightening. It shows a remarkable pattern of growth from an analytical
scholarship, through a kind of fireside speculation about "real" causes of legal phenomena,
through serious consideration of social science materials, and finally to the doing of empiri-
cal social research. In less than a generation the modern notion of science had somewhat
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personal jinx is another matter. Its contours can be more easily
sketched. As was the case with the research by Charles E. Clark
and William 0. Douglas, essentially three aspects are pre-
sented-the times, the person, and the nature of the research en-
terprise-though in no sense did these three apsects have the same
impact on both bodies of research.
For Clark and Douglas the times had played a crucial role in
the decline of their enterprise. 7 5 The onset of the depression virtu-
ally doomed their efforts, for the style of their research required
large quantities of money which after 1929 simply was not to be
found for the work they wished to do. As a result, when the two
men ran out of sources of funds, their research stopped as other
less difficult, equally attractive opportunities appeared. In con-
trast, initially at least, the times had less of an impact on the de-
cline of Moore's attempts to do empirical research than they had
had in the rise of those attempts. While Clark and Douglas
starved, Moore had an assured, if small, source of funds in the In-
stitute. When that source of funds began to dry up the Depression
had long since dried up any private funds and Yale's sabbatical
policy had become stingy in the extreme. Already financing part of
his own research, Moore was led not away from research as Clark
and Douglas were, but to an even stronger dependence on his
source of funds at the Institute. At least there, for a while, the
salary of his regular research assistants was being paid, though no
money for further research, such as the planned comparative study
in England, was available. By this time interpretation of already
acquired data was such an overwhelming problem817 that the lack
of such funds was probably a blessing, though plainly a morale de-
pressant. Thus, perversely, the Depression directed Moore toward
continuing work already begun and relying on his connections at
the Institute rather than sliding away into some other, seemingly
more interesting, activity, like writing the Federal Rules or regulat-
ing the securities industry.
Of course, sliding away was just as viable an alternative for
belatedly penetrated the insular law school world.
675. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 572-73.
676. How serious this problem had become can be seen from Moore's various attempts
to reach out for other things to do and other perspectives on his work as recounted in text
accompanying notes 655-56 supra. The chance to write for Kocourek's volume was thus a
real boon.
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Moore as it had been for Clark and Douglas. And there is no ques-
tion that at times that alternative was attractive to him and even
utilized in part. The failed bank study, the work, inherited from
Douglas, on the first Statement of Accounting Principles,677 and
the attempt to become a part of the Uniform Commercial Code
project '78 were all, in part, examples of the attractiveness of sliding
away. Similarly, the hours Moore lavished on his course in Com-
mercial Bank Credit, jointly taught with a professor at the
Harvard Business School as part of the Yale-Harvard law and bus-
iness program, 79 represented a sliding away too, for the collabora-
tion was so obviously empty 80 Although such interludes from em-
pirical research abound, Moore never allowed them to become
more than interludes. Why that is so is largely a function of the
677. See Arthur H. Carter (Haskins and Sells Foundation) to Underhill Moore, Mar.
20, 1936 (appointment); Underhill Moore to Arthur H. Carter, Mar. 27, 1936; Underhill
Moore to William 0. Douglas, Dec. 24, 1937 (work substantially done); Underhill Moore to
George Parmly Day (Yale's treasurer), Apr. 28, 1938 (enclosing copy; "tells one exactly what
to do after one has done it.") Moore papers, Yale. The product of the effort is H. SANDERS,
H.R. HATFIELD & U. MOORE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, A STATEMENT OF Ac-
COUNTING PRINCIPLES (1938). As part of the effort to publicize the principles Moore wrote
Relationship Between Legal and Accounting Concept of Capital in PAPERS ON ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE 64 (1938). For a full description of the origins of this project and
its results see R. CHATOV, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORT. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CONTROL?
(1975).
678. Grant Gilmore to John Henry Schlegel, Sept. 19, 1976.
679. See Stevens supra note 82, at 485-86. The project started as a Business-Law Insti-
tute proposed by Carroll Shanks with Moore's support. See Charles E. Clark to Underhill
Moore, Feb. 28, 1930; Charles E. Clark to Carroll Shanks, Feb. 28, 1930, Moore papers, Yale.
As a part of that effort the two men went to both the Wharton School and Harvard for
assistance. Minutes of the Faculty of the Yale Law School, Mar. 27, 1930. Underhill Moore
to Wallace B. Donham, Mar. 29, 1930, Moore papers, Yale. The two men liked Harvard best
and starting in 1931 members of the Harvard faculty began teaching joint seminars at Yale.
Minutes of the Faculty of the Yale Law School, May 21, 1931. By 1933 when the joint
degree program was announced, Douglas had replaced Shanks as its prime backer and he
and Moore arranged the details in a joint trip to Cambridge. See Charles E. Clark to Un-
derhill Moore, June 9, 1933, Moore papers, Yale.
680. Moore began his joint teaching with J. Franklin Ebersole of Harvard in spring of
1934. See Underhill Moore to J. Franklin Ebersole, Jan. 20, 1934, Feb. 14, 1934, Mar. 21,
1934, Apr. 20, 1934, Moore papers, Yale. After this one semester Ebersole recognized that
given "the large amount of work which you have done here-to-fore in emphasizing the bank-
ing practice background ... there is not much that can be added by me." J. Franklin Eber-
sole to Underhill Moore, Apr. 20, 1934, Moore papers, Yale. The two men taught again in
the springs of 1935 through 1938, but each time it became harder to get Ebersole to return.
See, e.g., J. Franklin Ebersole to Underhill Moore, Dec. 13, 1937, Dec. 16, 1937; Underhill
Moore to J. Franklin Ebersole, Dec. 11, 1937; Charles E. Clark to J. Franklin Ebersole, Dec.
28, 1937, Moore papers, Yale. The course collaboration was ended when the law-business
program folded in Fall, 1938.
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particular nature of the man-his temperament, and thus, his re-
action to his surroundings.
All the published accounts of Moore emphasize his gruffness
as well as a teaching style that combined a withering, remorseless
logic with a totally domineering manner. 1e Eugene Rostow tried to
put the matter diplomatically when he blamed himself for an "irri-
tant effect" that he seemed to have on Moore such that, "Twice I
was vigorously assaulted; the questions I raised remained undis-
cussed; and I was of course materially deterred from raising...
any further problems.8 82 But, diplomacy was not always the best
or at times even a possible way to deal with a man whose reputa-
tion for throwing objects out of windows was such that he once
concluded he was slipping since he hadn't thus disposed of any-
thing in years.883 Emma Corstvet, for example, took a more direct
approach: when Moore's neck got red, she took the day off.68 On
the other hand, Moore's last research assistant, faced with the task
of spending long hours "talking with a disembodied pure brain
running about 600 I.Q. points," took refuge in facial gestures: " 'I
agree,' 'I don't understand,' 'That doesn't seem quite right.' ,,85
Published accounts, however, largely fail to capture other
quite different aspects of Moore's personality. For example, it is
perfectly clear that when he chose to do so the gruffness could
completely disappear and Moore could become unbelievably gra-
cious and charming. 86 Instead of visciously attacking he could at
times spend long hours building up individuals, such as the painter
who did his portrait or his marine insurance broker friend.8 7 This
activity was not simply a matter of noblesse either. Stone, for ex-
ample, was the unknowing beneficiary of Moore's campaign to se-
681. See FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HIsToRY, supra note 17, at 250.
682. Eugene V. Rostow to Underhill Moore, Feb. 26, 1936, Moore papers, Yale.
683. Interview with Emma Corstvet Lewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975, (books); Emma Corstvet
Lewellyn to John Henry Schlegel, (Feb. 1980), (plates).
684. Interview with Emma Corstvet Lewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975.
685. Allan Axelrod to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 12, 1976.
686. See, e.g., Underhill Moore to Ruth Arrington, Jan. 30, 1936; Underhill Moore to
Eugene V. Rostow, Feb. 27, 1936, Moore papers, Yale. Friedrich Kessler to John Henry
Schlegel, Feb. 10, 1977; Gilbert Sussman to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976 (taped inter-
view). Clark, supra note 658, at 189.
687. Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976, wholly born out through Moore papers,
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cure for him the presidency of the University of Wisconsin; s
Hope, as a slightly discontented partner in a major New York firm,
received Moore's support in an elaborate campaign to secure for
him a post on the Yale faculty.68 9 Similarly, Moore did not have to
be intimidating in order to be effective. When he chose to attend
and participate in faculty meetings, an occasion where intimidation
alone would count for little, he could be quite impressive.690 And
students like Douglas 91 and Wesley Sturges, who could, or were
permitted to, cut through the gruffness, could also find something
special and expressed in quite personal terms a lasting debt to
Moore for in Sturges' words "initiating" them in "a pattern of
thinking" which kept them free from the ways of "an earlier tradi-
tion." 92 Why students with humbler legal minds stuck it out in
courses whose content was overly detailed and technical 93 is more
of a mystery. Yet these students, too, sensed that something was
present in addition to the shouting. They felt strongly enough
about the force and value of Moore's teaching to line the hallway
from his class to his office in a show of respect on the occasion of
his last class before retirement from Yale,69 4 and are known to
have remarked years later that though they didn't understand a
word in Moore's courses, what they somehow managed to learn was
the most valuable part of their legal education. 95
However disparate these aspects of Moore's temperament may
seem, it would be a serious mistake to simply write him off as a
paradox and leave it at that. For something did hold his personal-
ity together. Despite the gruffness and the aura of the aging, self-
assured, late-Edwardian gentleman that his portrait shows, Moore
688. See, e.g., UnderhiUl Moore to John Dewey, Jan. 12, 1919 (solicitation of letter of
support); Underhill Moore to Benjamin N. Cardozo, Apr. 12, 1919 (same); Underhill Moore
to Ben F. Fast, Mar. 31, 1919, (Stone knows nothing of my campaign), Moore papers,
Columbia.
689. See, e.g., Underhill Moore to Dean Acheson, Apr. 27, 1940 (solicitation of letter of
support), Moore papers, Yale. The pile of letters of support Moore collected was truly ex-
traordinary, but to no avail. His colleagues did not want Hope, and Hope, who went to
Cornell instead, returned to practice after one year because he missed the excitement. Theo-
dore S. Hope, Jr. to Underhill Moore, Christmas 1942, Moore papers, Yale.
690. Friedrich Kessler to John Henry Schlegel, Feb. 10, 1977.
691. See Douglas, supra note 660.
692. Wesley A. Sturges to Underhill Moore, Mar. 29, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
693. See note 652 & accompanying text, supra.
694. Friedrich Kessler to John Henry Schlegel, Feb. 10, 1977.
695. Grant Gilmore to John Henry Schlegel, Sept. 10, 1976.
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was basically quite shy and a bit sensitive. His correspondence
shows that fact well. Although his daughter 6 ' and others0 7 re-
member many visitors at Moore's house both while at Columbia
and at Yale, his papers are virtually devoid of any friendly, per-
sonal, non-family correspondence other than with two long time
non-law school friends; this at a time when long distance telephone
was simply not a possible way to hold together a friendship. In-
deed, time after time openings from former students or friends at
other law schools were left hanging or only prefunctorily acknowl-
edged. Though a colleague of Cook's on three different occasions,
as well as a supporter later on, and prominently associated in the
legal academic mind with him, the two never corresponded after
the demise of Cook's Institute at Hopkins. Though a good friend of
Stone's while at Columbia, Moore let that relationship lapse soon
after Stone's appointment to the Supreme Court despite the fact
that Stone quite obviously expected the friendship to continue,
even to the extent of asking Moore's opinion on cases then pending
before the Court. 98 All correspondence with Yntema was initiated
by Yntema. Only Douglas would get an occasional letter apropos of
nothing at all and even then a business purpose could often be dis-
cerned lurking in the background and embarrassment in the fore-
ground. 99 In short, Moore made acquaintances, but kept few
friends.
Of course, it may be objected that Moore was not shy, but
rather intentionally standoffish, a lone-wolf who by nature pre-
ferred his own company. But in addition to a home full of visitors,
Moore had an intense need to work out his ideas with someone.
His research assistants attest to that fact; Moore regularly spent
hours discussing his ideas with them.700 One gets the impression
that, for at least a time at Columbia, Moore similarly talked with
colleagues, exposing them to his "tenaciously meticulous ... logi-
cally ruthless" thought,70 1 and that at Yale he missed similar in-
696. Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976.
697. Gilbert Sussman to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976 (taped interview).
698. Harlan F. Stone to Underhill Moore, Mar. 18, 1926, [re: United States v. National
Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527 (1926)], Moore papers, Yale.
699. See, e.g., Underhill Moore to William O. Douglas, Mar. 4, 1943, Moore papers,
Yale.
700. Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975. Allan Axelrod to John
Henry Schlegel, Oct. 12, 1976.
701. Hessel E. Yntema to Underhill Moore, Jan. 22, 1940, Moore papers, Yale.
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terchange.0 2 Thus the gruffness, the bluster, the myriad of devices
for keeping the world at a distance-for example, by calling every-
one by their last name03 or by regularly suggesting explanations
for his own behavior that were at the least misleading-was a re-
sponse to that shyness, a defense which made it easier to deal with
other people by making it less likely that they would appear.
Once Moore's basic shyness is recognized, the course of his re-
search, not just parking but banking too, becomes easier to under-
stand. As Moore once observed, he came to Yale in answer to "the
question: 'Where will my personal life probably be happier?'." He
had found that "the ructions at Columbia had been such that...
[he] could no longer be happy there" and so he left.7 04 Then, in the
same breath, he observed that "it makes very little difference
where one does one's work ... [;] [i]ntellectual curiosity and drive
are what count. 70 5 Here one sees still another misleading explana-
tion of his behavior. It made quite a difference to Moore where he
worked for he both needed, and looked for, sustained intellectual
contact as a stimulant for his ideas. It was the search for just such
contact that brought him to Yale. Yet because he was basically shy
his approach was seldom direct. He all but "hung around" the In-
stitute, always wanting to be counted in, but always overlooked be-
cause he never did much to call attention to his presence. While he
learned much from Dorothy Thomas, he put it in practice so slowly
that she lost interest. Likewise, though he had been acquainted
with Hull for nearly ten years at the time he began his piece for
Kocourek's volume in which he drew heavily on Hull's learning
theory, Moore quite obviously wrote that piece without ever having
talked at length with Hull about that theory and its contempora-
neous refinements. Over and over he looked for help, for intellec-
tual stimulation, but from a distance.
While shyness might not have been a handicap in many aca-
demic endeavors, the nature of Moore's enterprise made shyness a
positive disability. Had he been working in a well-plowed field he
might have received the necessary stimulation and guidance simply
by being around other scholars and keeping up with the journals.
702. Cf. Underhill Moore to Hessel E. Yntema, Feb. 10, 1940, Moore papers, Yale.
703. Id. ("Dear Hessel ... I have lived in this army-post atmosphere so long that I am
beginning to call people by their first names.").
704. Underhill Moore to Eugene V. Rostow, Mar. 19, 1941, Moore papers, Yale.
705. Id.
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But he was not working such a field; he was cutting "first growth
timber.' 708 So for his needs Moore had to rely on the law school, or
the Institute, or go it alone.
Relying on the law school for intellectual stimulation and gui-
dance was impossible for several reasons. First, in simple personal
terms, there was no one there to look to. Charles Clark, the most
obvious candidate, and Moore simply could not get along.70
7
Clark's quarrelsomeness and his pompousness together with his
administrator's wish to placate all, to achieve a "balanced"
faculty,710 and to avoid hard decisions, when opposed to Moore's
gruffness and bluster, together with his singlemindedness, espe-
cially in the defense of what he saw as his prerogatives, made these
two neighbors as compatible as a pair of porcupines. Douglas, the
next most obvious choice, while a friend of sorts to the end, was
quite obviously not sufficiently committed to empirical research
over any long haul to fit the bill. And, Thurman Arnold, although
plainly a good buddy,709 was simply not serious enough about any-
thing for Moore's taste.7 10 Beyond Arnold there was simply no
one,7 11 except for Arthur Corbin, 12 but even to mention Corbin's
706. Donald Slessinger provided this description of the activities of all of the Realists
at Yale. Interview, July 8, 1975. It fits Moore's work better than that of anyone else.
707. See, e.g., supra note 472; especially Thomas W. Farnam to James R. Angell, Apr.
20, 1936 ("This will be my last effort to get these two contrary characters together."), Angell
papers. Schlegel, supra note 15, at 577 n.618. Cf. James William Moore to Charles E. Clark,
Nov. 11, 1941 (on file in the Charles E. Clark papers, Sterling Law Library, Yale University)
(suggesting that Underhill Moore led the forces opposing Clark's teaching of procedure at
Yale to fill in for J. W. Moore who had taken a years leave of absence to teach at Texas);
Underhill Moore to Arthur L. Corbin, Apr. 28, 1939 (referring to a deanship candidate as
having a temperament such that "his leadership and administration would be afflicted with
the same morale-destroying defects which have marred Judge Clark's deanship."), Moore
papers, Yale. Gilbert Sussman to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976 (taped interview).
708. Charles E. Clark to Walton Hamilton, June 21, 1934 ("I am... disturbed...
about... Thurman's statement that you and he would not accept a balanced faculty."),
Moore papers, Yale.
709. Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976; Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewel-
lyn, Aug. 19, 1975. See, e.g., Thurman Arnold to Underhill Moore, Oct. 21, 1936, Moore
papers, Yale.
710. See Underhill Moore to Arthur L. Corbin, Apr. 28, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
711. The other alternatives were mostly out of the question. Edwin Borchard seems to
have been a bit of an outcast at Yale and was extremely jealous of Moore's special arrange-
ments for research assistance. See Charles E. Clark to Thomas W. Farnam, Apr. 27, 1936,
Angell papers. Walton Hamilton opposed empirical research generally. Interview with Doro-
thy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975. Roscoe Turner Steffen, "a man of great resentments,"
was embittered by the arrival of Moore and Douglas to teach in what he considered to be his
field. Interview with Fleming James, Jr., June 11, 1975. William Reynolds Vance, whom
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name is to raise problems broader than personalities.
Doubtless there was a special bond between Corbin and
Moore, although its source is, at first, not obvious. Corbin, the
grand old man of the Yale faculty, having begun his teaching there
in 1903,713 was one of the bluest of the old blues, 14 a Landon Re-
publican, well known for his devotion to golf and for singing when
intoxicated, 15 none of which were likely to have created any com-
mon bond with Moore. Moreover, though an intellectual maverick
from before the First World War, e he was an educational con-
servative7 17 and by no means a Realist. His politics was wrong and
his science, a doctrinal science, was too. Indeed the only significant
relationship between Corbin and Realism was his treatment of
caselaw materials and his at first rather lonely defense of the
scraps of a Holmesian jurisprudence 18 that link together most of
the dissidents in American legal thought between about 1890 and
1960, and thus largely fail to distinguish any of them. But Realism
and its empirical science was not the only potential link between
Moore and other legal scholars, and in the case of Corbin the link
was age, or more accurately age of intellectual maturity.
Like Moore, Corbin began teaching in the first decade of the
twentieth century during the years when law teaching was under-
Moore had known at least since 1912, actively disliked Moore's work. See Underhill Moore
to E. C. Coker, Oct. 28, 1931; E.C. Coker to Underhill Moore, Nov. 5, 1931, Moore papers,
Yale. Ernest G. Lorenzen, who had been a colleague at Wisconsin, seems to have kept to
himself. And that left Wesley A. Sturges, who, although a former student, seems not to have
been a good friend. I have been unable to learn why. ,
712. b. 1874. B.A. 1897, Kansas, LL.B. 1899, Yale. Private practice, 1899, Cripple
Creek, Colo., Prof. 1903, Yale. His major work, A. CORBIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTs (1960), was in preparation for nearly thirty years. d. 1967.
713. See W. TWINING, supra note 14, at 28. This is the only readily available biographi-
cal sketch of Corbin.
714. In spirit, though not in fact, since his undergraduate degree was from Kansas.
715. Interview with Donald Slessinger, July 8, 1975; Interview with Leon Green, July
19, 1975.
716. See W. TwINING, supra note 14, at 30-33.
717. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin to Members of the Governing Board of the School of
Law, Feb. 8, 1935 (concerning the appointment for Jerome Frank); Arthur L. Corbin, Re-
port of Curriculum Committee, Comment by A.L.C., fall, 1937?, Moore papers, Yale; Robert
M. Hutchins to Karl N. Llewellyn, May 7, 1926, May 21, 1926, Hutchins papers. Interview
with David Kammerman, June 2, 1975.
As Prof. Fred Konefsky has noted, there is a certain irony in Corbin's position as a
member of the party of the right at a time when he was busily working to deformalize
Williston's conception of contract law.
718. See W. TwINING, supra note 14, at 30-31, 32-33.
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going the process of professionalization. Although Corbin never
saw colonial service, he in large measure colonized Yale, his own
law school, when, soon after his arrival, he introduced his own vari-
ety of the case method in his first year contracts course.7 10 He was
deeply enough involved in professional affairs to have become one
of the few non-dean presidents of the Association of American Law
Schools. In addition to these surface indications of potential simi-
larity of outlook, both men were incredibly serious, indeed single-
minded, scholars. For example Corbin opposed the appointment of
Jerome Frank to the faculty because Frank seemed "to be a propa-
gandist and an agitator rather than a teacher and investigator. '720
He likewise opposed Thurman Arnold's proposal to add "practi-
cal" work in administrative law to the curriculum based on a "sur-
vey of what the lawyer must do in present practice ' ' 72 1 because to
do so in the present climate of opinion, "it would be very easy to
turn ... [Yale] into a second rate school of 'political science.' ,,722
Similarly, Moore opposed one candidate for the deanship because
he suspected that the candidate "would regard work done in the
School as quite satisfactory though it consisted of no more than
the teaching of students along traditional lines plus a liberalistic
destructive social criticism. 7 23 Moore also opposed Arnold's candi-
dacy for much the same reasons that Corbin had expressed with
respect to Arnold's administrative law proposal.2 Thus, though
their politics were different, both men's commitment to sustained
and not faddish scholarship was the same.
Seriousness may have provided the basis for a tolerant friend-
719. Stevens, supra note 82, at 439.
720. Arthur L. Corbin to the Members of the Governing Board of the School of Law,
Feb. 8, 1935 ("[H]is well-known book seems to me to have fundamental defects that invali-
date his major conclusions and will prevent it from having any permanent influence."),
Moore papers, Yale.
721. Thurman Arnold to Arthur L. Corbin, Dec. 14, 1937, Moore papers, Yale.
722. Arthur L. Corbin, Untitled memo, Dec. 1937, Moore papers, Yale.
723. Underhill Moore to Arthur L. Corbin, Apr. 28, 1939 (said of Harry Shulman),
Moore papers, Yale.
724. Id. ("His theories as to the purpose, scope and methods of the work to be done by
a law faculty... make him entirely unqualified for a position" as dean).
At the same time it should be remembered that Moore was no educational conservative.
He quite honestly doubted whether "a law school has ... anything substantive to offer a
student of law." Underhill Moore to Jerome Frank, Jan. 1, 1934, Moore papers, Yale. But he
did not therefore believe that serving up any trendy "innovation" was an improvement.
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ship,725 but that was hardly the kind of support that Moore sought.
What he needed was the support of a common intellectual commu-
nity such as might have been built around the kind of research
that Clark and Douglas, Corstvet and Thomas, and yes, even
Thurman Arnold for a while,726 engaged in. Thus, except for the
women, the kind of seriousness that Moore derived from his partic-
ipation in the process of professionalizing academic legal educators
and that drew Moore toward Corbin separated him from the other
empirical researchers, as well as the other Realists at Yale. For the
one thing that really grand crew was not noted for was sustained
commitment to anything. Clark's dogged pursuit of procedural re-
form came the closest to Moore's ideal of committed scholarship,
but Clark broke the traces and ran back to property or over into
constitutional law with some regularity and even in procedure
Clark's scholarship soon gave way to cheerleading for the new Fed-
eral Rules. Douglas went from business associations to bankruptcy
to securities in seven years. Arnold changed horses at every stream.
Hamilton could never decide whether he was studying economic
organization or constitutional law. Surges covered a permanent
shift from creditor's rights to arbitration by publishing virtually
nothing for nearly ten years. Rodell's idea of consistent effort was
to write regularly for the same magazine. Moore, in contrast, when
at the end of a session with his research assistant spent fleshing
out sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law in a way easily
"ten times . . . better than the regular literature on the topic,"
quickly turned aside the suggestion that they should write up and
publish the analysis with the observation " 'You know, we're not
trying to show everybody how smart we are.' ,727_
The other Realists at Yale were thus unable to provide Moore
with the intellectual stimulation and guidance he needed. And
equally important, they were actively destroying the professional
identity forged by Moore, Corbin and their contemporaries.
Whether they knew it or not, by flitting about as they did the Yale
Realists were forging a more contemporary notion of the law pro-
fessor's role, that of the policy maker-the omni-competent mem-
ber of the academic-governmental "Commissions to Study the
725. The key to recognizing this friendship is address. Corbin was the only faculty
member Moore addressed by his first name.
726. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 492-93, 503.
727. Allan Axelrod to John Henry Schlegel, Oct. 12, 1976.
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Causes of Almost Anything. ' 728 Why they did so is unimportant,
for present purposes at least; that they did so is obvious. But as a
result, their efforts served to undercut Moore's own notion of
scholarship and thus to make it doubly difficult for him to find
necessary support in the law school community.2 9
Lacking intellectual support in the law school, Moore was
driven in the direction of the Institute. There, as an amateur he
was not particularly welcome; yet, being shy, he was uncomfortable
about elbowing his way in. When an even tangentially common in-
terest made discussion easy, as when an engineer offered some re-
search on automobile speeds, Moore opened up quite directly.73 0
But short of that kind of invitation he had a hard time starting
any discussion. Thus Moore's temperament only served to make it
easier for individuals at the Institute to ignore or begrudge his
presence. As a result, he was largely left on his own, led to rely on
himself and his research assistants for much of his intellectual
support.
728. This characterization has been stolen, partly out of context, from Kennedy, Why
the Law School Fails: A Polemic, IYALE REv. oF L. AND Soc. AcT. 71, 88 (1970). One of the
few references to this new, though now old, conception of the law professor's role is Mac
Neil, The Wheel and the Hearth, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1977).
729. Mention should be made of Karl Llewellyn here. At one point the two were plainly
friends, at least, in the way that friendships develop between junior and senior professors.
For example, Moore tried to get Llewellyn the job of drafting the Uniform Chattle Mortgage
Act as early as 1922, a -full four years before Llewellyn finally landed the job. See George M.
Hogan to Underhill Moore, Jan. 9, 1922 (will you draft?); Underhill Moore to George M.
Hogan, Feb. 9, 1922 (no, try Llewellyn), Moore papers, Yale. Their relationship never rip-
ened beyond that; plainly something about Llewellyn irritated Moore. See, e.g., Underhill
Moore to Karl Llewellyn, Apr. 4, 1931, Moore papers, Yale.
Why their friendship never developed no one can agree on. Grant Gilmore suggests that
the causes are to be found in Llewellyn's ambiguous role in the Columbia deanship crisis
and the treatment of Emma Corstvet during their marriage. Grant Gilmore to John Henry
Schlegel, Sept. 10, 1976. Emma Corstvet, on the other hand, suggests that Llewellyn just
didn't have or make many friends, Interview with Emma Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975,
and was more than a bit in awe of Moore, Emma Corstvet Llewellyn to John Henry Schle-
gel, Feb. 1980, while Jane Moore observes that it was wholly unclear why the two men did
not get along, Interview with Jane Moore, May 19, 1976. Perhaps it was largely a matter of
style of research. See Underhill Moore to Max Ascoli, May 18, 1934 (in response to Ascoli,
Realism versus the Constitution, 1 Soc. REsEARCH 169 (1934); Llewellyn's "unwillingness to
undertake the methodological responsibilities of objective research and at the same time his
unwillingness to abandon the title of scientist have forced him to blind himself to the dis-
tinction between philosophy and science;" "a sin against the Holy Ghost."), Moore papers,
Yale.
730. See Underhill Moore to Charles J. Tilden (Yale, Engineering), Nov. 5, 1936, Moore
papers, Yale.
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Unfortunately, while Moore was a formidable personality and
a fine, widely read intellect, left to his own devices he was hardly a
juggernaut capable of both completing his research and under-
standing and remedying the defects in the original design of that
research.3 1 Indeed, his ideas about reasonable methods of research
were anything but naturally sound. Twice he simply made wrong
choices when problems developed with the research. First, in the
banking studies, where he began with a wonderful topic of research
and a bizzarely over-detailed method, he failed to see that the de-
sirable improvement was not to tighten observational techniques,
which were already as rigorous as the subject matter warranted,
but to loosen the overt reliance of quantification and simplify the
elaborate structure of method. Then, in the parking studies, where
he again chose a sensible topic for research, he failed to recognize
that the behavior that to him seemed so simple was in fact too
complicated for Hull's psychological model. Thus he never saw
that what his study needed was not complicated mathematics, but
the simplification of data in the direction of the ethnographic stud-
ies that he had been quite obviously interested in at least as far
back as the time of the review of Wigmore's book.
Why Moore made these critically wrong choices is easy to see.
Too shy to seek real help, he followed the natural bent of his mind
which was toward the methodical and technical. He thus quickly
learned and understood statistical technique and the rudiments of
experimental design,732 but never the theory behind it, for he was
not a theoretician, even at a low level. For example, although, in
his own awkward way, he often tried to contribute to the jurispru-
dential debates of the time, his record in this territory, which he
knew comparatively well, was hardly impressive. 3 So to say that
731. Here and in the following pages my interpretation of Moore's career differs mark-
edly from Northrup, Underhill Moore's Legal Science: Its Nature and Significance, 59
YALE L.J. 196 (1950), which locates the causes for the decline of Moore's research in certain
problems with the nature of scientific proof, particularly, with respect to social science. I do
not see such considerations in Moore's research; that may well be my blindness, I admit.
732. Interview with Dorothy Swaine Thomas, June 3, 1975; Interview with Emma
Corstvet Llewellyn, Aug. 19, 1975. Which is not to say that Moore was capable of doing the
direct manipulation of his own data unaided; he was not. Gilbert Sussman to John Henry
Schlegel, Oct. 1, 1976 (taped interview).
733. The introduction to Moore & Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of
Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703, 703-05 (1929) is a comment on the debate over the
adequacy of the traditional system for the classification of legal materials that developed
during the curriculum reform debate at Columbia. Moore & Sussman, supra note 294;
.1980]
318 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
he could have intuited that the problems with his research lay in
the dominant statistical ethos of the social science that he knew
(and that perversely came to offer help when he really needed it),
then could have dug his way out of that ethos in order to recover
the ground of this thought from some twenty years earlier, and
finally could have built anew on that thought (all much harder
Moore, Sussman & Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop
Payment of Checks-I. Legal Method, 42 YALE L.J. 817 (1933); Moore, Sussman &
Corstvet, supra note 364, are, taken together, a series of demonstrations of the inadequacy
of lawyerly intuitive analysis, traditional doctrinal analysis, and introspective sociological
jurisprudence, respectively, to provide answers to legal questions which Moore's institu-
tional method could answer. See Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, supra note 364, at 3. See also,
Moore & Sussman, supra note 293, at 555-60 (1931) (comment on preceeding article). The
Lawyer's Law, supra note 350, can also be seen as a part of this attempt to contribute, for it
states his own theories. His other attempts, Underhill Moore to Morris R. Cohen, Mar. 16,
1931, Moore papers, Yale; Moore Report, 1934, supra note 375; Moore & Callahan, supra
note 533, at 203-05 (1941); Law and Learning Theory, supra note 437, at 2, are more like
bits of guerrilla warfare, but still are aimed at the debates of the time. And there is a none
too subtle comment on a jurisprudential issue in the traffic circle study where Moore had
the circle in place before the relevant ordinance was adopted and removed while the ordi-
nance was still in effect. See text accompanying note 440 supra. This little ploy still infuri-
ated Llewellyn twenty years later. See Llewellyn, supra note 608, at 400 (1956). See also
note 562 supra.
Unfortunately in his dabblings in jurisprudence Moore's literal mindedness again led
him astray. He took at face value the proposition that the debate was about legal method.
His was, so he thought, demonstratively the best, for it was truly scientific. He seems never
to have understood that the manifest content of the debate masked a deeper dispute about
class control of the legal system and thus the degree that its rules reflected class interests.
This blindness on his part is nevertheless puzzling because he quite firmly believed in a
rather general way in the notion that law is a reflection of class interests. See Underhill
Moore to Oswald Garrison Villard, May 10, 1927, Moore papers, Yale.
Mr. Ernst's position is the result of his harboring a very common preconception.
He thinks of the governing group existing in a particular geographical area as
consisting of all or most of the people in the area. He thinks that the interests of
the governing group are the interests of the inhabitants, and that the ethics of
both should be the same. If he abandoned his preconception and were more real-
istic, he would see the government as only one among a number of groups, such
as the United States Steel Corporation, the American Federation of Labor, and
the Rockefeller Foundation. Further, he would note that the governing group is
much smaller in number than he supposes. He would not expect the interests
and ethics of the governing group to be the same as those of the other inhabi-
tants, but would rather expect them to be class interests and class ethics. Conse-
quently he would not be surprised in a case like the Sacco-Vanzetti case, to find
many members of the governing group, including the courts, sharing the feelings
of the prosecutor, one of their fellow members. Nor would he urge, by argument,
the governing group to restrict its power by changing its rules.
Id. [said of Morris Ernst, Deception According to Law, 124 THE NATION, 602 (1927)]. This
letter was printed as a reply from "A Professor of Law whose name must be withheld," 124
THE NATION 630 (1927).
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tasks in less familiar intellectual terrain than moving along the ju-
risprudential peanut of the day) is simply impossible.7 3 4 He was by
temperament and training committed to scientific research in law,
committed enough that he could not fall away from it as Clark and
Douglas had done, but he was not therefore the man to see beyond
the particular science he had found his way into.
Time and person are not the only factors in the decline of
Moore's research, however. The nature of the research enterprise
contributed its part too. Hutchins and Clark, and perhaps Douglas
too, saw the rest of the university as it passed by and wondered
what it might have to offer for the study and teaching of law be-
yond a common heating plant.7 3 Their research drew on their per-
ception that the university was somehow other than the law school
and thus they tried to reinvigorate a legal world gone stale by at-
tempting to cross progressive reform politics, a part of what the
law had to offer, with empirical social science, a part of what the
university had to offer. Moore, on the other hand, was, at least in
his head, in the parade the others only watched. As part, albeit a
junior part, of the generation that created the academic lawyer, be-
ing a professional meant being a part, an integral part, of the de-
veloping university. Thus Moore did not want to cross anything
with anything; he only wanted to create a legal science that was
like the other sciences in the university.
After the endless curriculum reform discussions at Columbia,
Moore was impatient with endless talk, "mental masturbation" as
he called it.7s6 He had said his piece in the Wigmore review; that
was enough. So, well aware that "the preparation of preliminary
sketches for a bridge to be built sometime, somewhere is not build-
ing a bridge ' 737 and doubting "very much whether a law school has
734. Much less could Moore have known that it would be thirty-five years before the
development of a statistical technique powerful enough to readily handle his data, even in
simplified form. See J. Meeker, The Impact of Law On Behavior: A Reanalysis of Moore &
Callahan (1978) (unpublished student work). He surely would have been pleased to learn
that reprocessing his data with modem techniques of loglinear analysis demonstrates that,
after the length of the durational regulation, the next most influential factor in determining
parking behavior is a cultural aspect of legitimacy-the appropriateness of the particular
regulation in the place where it is imposed.
735. See Schlegel, supra note 15, at 575-79. The heating plant metaphor comes from
Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975.
736. Interview with Mark A. May, June 9, 1975.
737. Underhill Moore to Felix Cohen, Oct. 24, 1932 [said in criticism of Cohen's article,
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. . anything substantial to offer to a student of law,"" 8 Moore set
out to fashion a university, empirical legal science himself. The
idea was wonderful, noble even, but in fashioning his science
Moore ignored three things-the law school world he was in, the
world of the other departments of the university, and the univer-
sity itself. In short he ignored the "real world" that he so obviously
wanted to make the center of legal scholarship.
Had Moore looked as dispassionately at the law school world
of the late twenties and thirties as he had at the behavior of his
parkers in New Haven, he would have quickly discovered that the
world he inhabited was significantly different from the world in
which he had come to intellectual maturity. In the years around
the First World War the role of the law professor had changed
from that of the university scholar to one in which the centerpiece
was professional education. Whether this not so subtle shift was
the price paid for upper bar support for the law school's role as
guardian of entry into the profession, or only a reflection of the
fact that the great research tasks laid out by Thayer and Ames
were really quite simple and soon disposed of in the flood of
casebooks and treatises produced around the turn of the century,
is not necessary to decide. Similarly it is not necessary to decide
whether a scholarly vocation for lawyers became hard to conceive
of without stepping out of the doctrinal box that distinguished law
from other academic disciplines. But a different professional role
was served up to the younger Realists like Hutchins and Clark and
accepted by most other legal scholars. That role was socratic dis-
cussion for the purpose of teaching how to think like a lawyer and
scholarship for the purpose of restating and updating the common
law.
For those who were satisfied with this new professional role
because it was all they could handle, men like Vance and maybe
Lorenzen, Moore's science of law was frightening. Thus they dis-
liked it, even if they did not oppose it.739 For those like Corbin and
Llewellyn, satisfied because the new role gave ample room for us-
ing their quite extraordinary talents to uncover substantial insights
about doctrine and its use, Moore's science was simply unneces-
The Subject Matter of Ethical Science, 42 INT. J. ETHICS 397 (1932)], Moore papers, Yale.
738. Underhill Moore to Jerome Frank, Jan. 5, 1934, Moore papers, Yale.
739. See note 711 supra.
[Vol. 29320
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
sary. A suggestion to go to Cincinnati to "observe the operations of
bank tellers at close range"7 -0 was pointless when a call to a
friendly banker coupled with a bit of imagination would provide
the same information. Thus these men, like Friedrich Kessler to
whom the suggestion was made, mostly ignored Moore's science.7 41
For those like Hutchins, Clark, and Douglas, who found the new
role both a bit empty and largely devoid of sustained commitment
to absolutely anything except the law school, Moore's science was
largely puzzling. They were surprised when, dissatisfied with their
role, they woke up in a university. 2 But the university they woke
up in and thus responded to was a university in which scholarship
of a German historical, or really any sustained kind, was becoming
a lost ideal. Moore's dogged espousal of this ideal was anachronis-
tic. Despite the quite obvious similarities, somehow his science was
not the science these younger men saw around them and so they
tolerated it, but at a distance. Thus, for all the inhabitants of the
law school world Moore's research, neither doctrinal nor directed
at reform and sustained really beyond imagination, was wierd, thus
perhaps dangerous. It left all concerned very ambivalent.74 3 Not
surprisingly many, if not all, felt the need, not to confront it, but
to distance it with a slightly decisive humor-"the love of life of a
check, ' 74 4 or "Can't you see, I'm busy counting these cars." None
felt the need to imitate it.
740. Friedrich Kessler to John Henry Schlegel, Feb. 10, 1977.
741. Kessler was another of Moore's projects. Although Kessler resisted getting into the
"sociology of law" (Underhill Moore to Mark A. May, Oct. 10, 1934, Moore papers, Yale),
Moore worked to get money for him to stay at Yale (Underhill Moore to Stacy May, Apr. 19,
1935), and tried hard to get Kessler a summer school teaching job away from Yale (see, e.g.,
Underhill Moore to Charles K. Burdick, Dec. 18, 1935, Moore papers, Yale). The two men
did a little joint teaching, even tried to write an article together (Friedrich Kessler to John
Henry Schlegel, Feb. 10, 1977), however Kessler's "lack of sympathy" with Moore's ap-
proach led to "a mild estrangement" (Id.) That estrangement suggests another side to
Moore. He was not charitable in intellectual matters. Several years later when thanking
Kessler for a copy of his article Theoretic Basis of Law, 9 U. CHL L. REv. 98 (1941), Moore
could not resist simultaneously remarking that he was "not much interested, in the descrip-
tion and analysis of literature." Underhill Moore to Friedrich Kessler, Jan. 13, 1942, Moore
papers, Yale.
742. Interview with Robert M. Hutchins, June 20, 1975.
743. Friedrich Kessler to John Henry Schlegel, Feb. 10, 1977, quite directly admits this
ambivalence. Grant Gilmore to John Henry Schlegel, Sept. 19, 1976, does not, but shows it.
See also Clark, supra note 658, at 191.




The law school world could not deal with Moore's research en-
terprise. Unfortunately the world of the other university depart-
ments could do little better. They found his research for the most
part unintelligible for they too looked nothing like what Moore,
talking at the faculty club at Columbia, imagined them to be.
Thoroughly balkanized and solidified as Moore slowly got ready to
work, these largely sealed compartments of university life could
not recognize his science, drawn as it was to a non-existent para-
digm within a non-existent culture. They might help his research
become more like something they knew and could understand, but
taking it on its own terms was really quite impossible. That the
research was scientific, empirical and all that, may have been
enough when Dewey, Robinson, and Veblen made Moore over, but
it was not enough fifteen or twenty years later. By then, research
had to be part of a definable academic tradition and by its nature
this was the one thing that Moore's research could not be.
The university too was not, if it ever had been, the university
to which Moore thought he brought his scientific enterprise. The
younger Realists who Moore scorned as "a nest of Dealers who, in
order to get in the New Deal, are Newer Dealers than New Deal-
ers $ 7 45 were forging a new understanding of the role of educator of
professionals. They and scholars like Charles E. Merriam74" or Wil-
liam F. Ogburn7 4 7 were busy forming the much derided "multivers-
ity." Their creation, structured as it was toward public issues and
public service, had no use for Moore's empirical science of law be-
cause that science had no apparent use, except one too far down
the trail to be worth much in the way of support. And so, having
ignored three important aspects of the world he had chosen to in-
vestigate a part of, Moore created an enterprise that in large mea-
sure contained within it its own doom and within that doom the
extinction of the Realists' attempts to do empirical legal research.
While the research by Clark and Douglas suggests the faint
745. Underhill Moore to N. F. Glidden, Mar. 11, 1939, Moore papers, Yale.
746. See B. KARL, CHARLES E. MERR A THE STUDY OF POLITICS (1974).
747. Karl, Presidential Planning and Social Science Research: Mr. Hoover's Experts
in 3 PERSPECTIvES IN AmUcAN HISToRY 347 (1969), chronicles Ogburn's work on one, of the
earliest Presidential social science advisory studies. Moore, a friend from Columbia, reacted
to it with the observation that the work was "a piece of high class journalism" and wanted
to know why Oghurn had bothered to do it. Underhill Moore to William F. Ogburn, Sept. 1,
1933, Moore papers, Yale.
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possibility that things might have worked out otherwise with the
result that law schools would be different and law professors know
more about the world outside their doors, 4' it would be silly to
suggest that there might have been any other ending to the story
of Moore and his research. Part of an entire generation of law
professors whose work has by and large disappeared either in un-
read journals or the equally unread Restatement project, Moore
left no known intellectual heirs, just as was the case with his friend
Corbin. Moore's work has not even enjoyed the phoenix-like cycle
of the rediscovery of social science research that might be traced to
the door of Charles E. Clark. No one thinks that way anymore.
Yet, at the same time, Moore and his research quietly suggest a
possible way of an oft stated problem with contemporary legal edu-
cation-the piteously low level of scholarly activity, especially ac-
tivity outside narrow doctrinal bounds and unrelated to the topical
concerns of which ever social science calls the current tune in "law
and" studies. The role of university scholar and teacher of law749
to individuals who will become lawyers may not be beyond being
recovered, any more than may be the development of a distinctive
paradigm for such scholarship. At least it would not hurt if a few
more Moore-like individuals, possessed of that extraordinary flinty
integrity and seriousness of purpose that was the essence of the
man, should surface to give the idea a try.750
748. Schlegel, supra note 15, at 585-86.
749. Or more precisely, the teacher "about law" to use the current jargon. See Abel,
Law Books and Books about Law, 26 STAN. L. REv. 175 (1973).
750. I find it curious as I reach this last footnote that Clark, supra note 658, at 192-93,
sounded a similar, if more bombastic note in praising Moore for his "fierce devotion, un-
swerving persistence, against all obstacles, to the discipline of the mind and. . . his follow-
ing of the intellectual approach wherever it should lead. . ." and quite uneasy that Felix
Frankfurter particularly liked this passage in Clark's review. See Felix Frankfurter to
Charles E. Clark, Feb. 27, 1950 (on file in the Charles E. Clark papers, Sterling Law Library,
Yale University).
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